

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 11-27-61

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION?~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Security Informants, Gen

REMOVED BY

R D.F.C. 83 7-10-61

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1274

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

November 13, 1961

Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
SECURITY INFORMANTS

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Fox
1 - Mr. Lenz

The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not result in complete harmony between Russia and the rest of the communist countries. In the past controversies arising out of Soviet decisions and statements have penetrated and disrupted the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). Many loyal Party members found their beliefs shaken by the edicts coming out of Moscow, and timely interviews by Bureau Agents convinced many of them of the heartlessness of international communism. The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that a letter be sent to all field offices for the purpose of alerting them to incidents that took place at the 22nd Congress which might be turned to our advantage in acquiring live informant coverage of the CPUSA.

Prominent among the incidents that grew out of the 22nd Congress was Khrushchev's denunciation of "criminal" Joseph Stalin and the subsequent removal of Stalin's body from its honored place in Red Square next to the remains of V. I. Lenin. This act is in sharp contrast to the statement contained in the 4/53 issue of "Political Affairs," by William Z. Foster, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and Pettis Perry, then members of the National Committee of the CPUSA, outlining, in commemoration of his death, the contributions of Stalin in the interest of world humanity.

At the same time other delegates to the Congress excoriated old Stalinists and heaped public humiliation on such former high-ranking Russians as ex-Premier Nikolai Bulganin, ex-Premier Georgi Malenkov and ex-Deputy Premier Lazar Kaganovich, among others. Khrushchev also insisted before the Congress that communism can win on the basis of "peaceful coexistence." At the same time he announced his intention

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66-2542-3
Enc.
CCL:dew/had
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YELLOW
DUPLICATE
NOV 16 1961
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66-2542-3
NOT RECORDED
150 NOV 20 1961

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

SECURITY INFORMANTS
100-3-68
CC-2542-3

of setting off a fifty-megaton bomb, which explosion has since been confirmed. The steady detonation of Russian nuclear devices has added significantly to the weightlessness of his words.

These incidents, when properly presented by Agents during initial interviews with communist subjects or during reinterviews with communist subjects who may have been uncooperative in the past but who might now be susceptible to an approach, can strengthen our coverage of the Party through development of additional live informants.

ACTION:

In line with the above there is attached an appropriate letter to all offices (original on Plastiplate) setting forth directions to interview communists in line with facts set forth above.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *W.C.S.*FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *F.J.B.*SUBJECT: ~~LONG-RANGE PROGRAM TO
DEVELOP HIGH-LEVEL
INFORMANT COVERAGE~~

DATE: December 1, 1961

- D* *J* *W*
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
 - 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 - 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 - 1 - Mr. McNerney

| | |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson | _____ |
| Belmont | _____ |
| Mohr | _____ |
| Callahan | _____ |
| Conrad | _____ |
| DeLoach | _____ |
| Evans | _____ |
| McNamee | _____ |
| Rosen | _____ |
| Sullivan | _____ |
| Tavel | _____ |
| Trotter | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Ingram | _____ |
| Gandy | _____ |

SECURITY INFORMATION

GENL

This is an informative memorandum to record the progress of the captioned operation.

A series of five, two-day field conferences on the development and handling of security informants were held in our major offices during October, 1960. As a result of those conferences, certain changes in procedure were recommended in order to improve both the quality and quantity of our informant coverage. Our Long-Range Program to Develop High-Level Informant Coverage evolved out of the field recommendations above mentioned and full details of this Program were set out in SAC Letter 60-56 dated 12/6/60.

By implementing this Program we are planning now for the future when our present informants, through unforeseen circumstances, may no longer be able to furnish the assistance which they are now rendering. Under our current programs we are developing as informants individuals who are active or inactive Communist Party members or other subversive individuals. Since we are planning for the future, we should consider selecting as potential informants those individuals who possess the qualifications for future leadership and we should seek such prospects not so much from the ranks of the Communist Party or related subversive activity, but from college and postgraduate levels.

SAC Letter 60-56 instructed that the selection of prospects for this program should be based on above-average intelligence and qualities of leadership which would permit them to advance to the top of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). Any payments made should be commensurate with the individual's potential and compensation will be increased as he progresses in the Party. On a long-range basis such an individual should achieve a top position in the CPUSA.

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REC-43

66-2542-3-1275

DJM:cjc
(5)

5 DEC 5 1961

D *J* *W*
INT. J. M. D. J. M. D.

162
DEC 11 1961

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: LONG-RANGE PROGRAM
TO DEVELOP HIGH-LEVEL
INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

Results of This Program:

To date we have five prospects under this program. Brief biographical data on each follows:

(1)

This informant is [redacted]
single and employed by [redacted]

[redacted] He attended [redacted] during
the [redacted] session and is currently enrolled [redacted]
[redacted]. Having no subversive back-
ground, he was originally contacted on 9/1/60 and immediately
offered his cooperation and assistance. [redacted] is
progressing very well and currently is furnishing information
on several Communist Party front groups.

(2)

This PSI is [redacted] single and a

[redacted] where he is [redacted]
He is a [redacted]
[redacted] and, when initially
interviewed 1/30/61, expressed willingness to help the
Bureau. He had no prior subversive affiliations and also
is showing satisfactory progress. Our New York Office feels
he is capable of advancing himself to a position of leader-
ship in the Communist Party.

(3)

This individual is [redacted] married,
works as a [redacted] for a

[redacted] by
day and is trying to [redacted] PSI
was first contacted during 2/61 after background investigation
showed he had no prior subversive connections and definitely
possessed leadership qualities. He is now [redacted]
[redacted] and his chances for
successful development as a security informant appear good.

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b7D

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: LONG-RANGE PROGRAM
TO DEVELOP HIGH-LEVEL
INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

(4)

[redacted] Authority to develop [redacted]
was just granted our New York
Office on 10/8/61. He is [redacted]
single, employed in [redacted] and is
also [redacted]

[redacted] He has no previous history of
subversive affiliation.

(5)

[redacted] [redacted] is [redacted]
years of age and employed
at the [redacted]

[redacted] She attended
[redacted]

[redacted] She has offered to assist the
Bureau in any possible way and authority to use her as a
panel source was granted to New York Office on 11/6/61.

ACTION:

The foregoing is submitted for your information.
We will continue to follow this program closely to insure
that informants demonstrating potential leadership capabilities
are fully exploited under this program.

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b7D

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *NY 694-S*

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *NY 694-S*

SUBJECT: ~~USE OF CURRENT INFORMANTS TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL HIGH LEVEL COVERAGE IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY~~

DATE: November 30, 1961

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
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 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

This is informative memorandum to record the progress of our plan to ensure continuation of top level informant coverage in the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), by utilizing one or more of such informants to bring along other informants in the Party. [redacted] who was successfully approached under the Toplev Program, is being developed under this plan and through the sponsorship of top level informant, NY 694-S, the new informant is being gradually worked into top Party circles. Plan progressing satisfactorily and will be closely followed so we can continue our high level coverage in the event anything should happen to our current top informants.

b7D

BACKGROUND OF [redacted]

Informant was born [redacted] and received a [redacted] From 1931 to the present time he has been employed in [redacted] [redacted] was one of the members of the Communist Party (CP), which was founded about 1936 for the purpose of using members thereof to advise CP members regarding [redacted] Informant contributed [redacted] However, investigation failed to indicate he was active after that date.

On 3-8-60 he was approached under the Toplev Program, and although he was not antagonistic, he did not cooperate. When recontacted on 3-23-60, he repeated that he would not cooperate but the third contact on 11-17-60, he agreed to another meeting to discuss his past activity. On 11-18-60 he said he had decided to help the FBI.

OPERATION OF [redacted]

[redacted] contact of top informants, CG 5824-S and NY 694-S, indicated on several occasions in 1960 that he desired to use a third person in making contacts with our informants.

JDD:had *Rae*

(5)

DEC 1 1961 EX-105

REC-2 XEROX

DEC 7 1961

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DEC 11 1961

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

RE: USE OF CURRENT INFORMANTS TO OBTAIN
ADDITIONAL HIGH LEVEL COVERAGE IN THE
COMMUNIST PARTY

When [redacted] agreed to cooperate, we were presented with an opportunity to work [redacted] into this apparatus. Under this plan, NY 694-S was taken into our confidence but [redacted] was not told that he was to be brought along by a Bureau informant. It was decided for security purposes that NY 694-S would not contact [redacted] directly but he would use an intermediary. Accordingly, NY 694-S contacted a mutual acquaintance, [redacted] who at one time was in the [redacted] and had [redacted] arrange a meeting between NY 694-S and [redacted]. It was felt this approach would be above suspicion as the CPUSA hierarchy considers [redacted] a regular contact of the Party and is listed in the Party as a potential [redacted]

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NY 694-S in March 1961, arranged with [redacted] for the latter b6 to communicate with [redacted] purportedly so that [redacted] could present b7C a personal financial problem to [redacted] for solution. When b7D [redacted] received this letter, he was told by his contacting agent that [redacted] was probably a go between and was setting up a meeting with more highly placed CP figures. On [redacted] met with [redacted] whom he had not seen for many years and [redacted] discussed possible future meetings on [redacted] matters which would include other parties. [redacted] agreed to meet with such unnamed individuals as his schedule would permit. [redacted] and NY 694-S met with [redacted]. The meeting was merely introductory and NY 694-S indicated that certain individuals in his sphere of activity had money to invest and would like to use [redacted] as an investment counselor. [redacted] left this meeting almost immediately after bringing the two informants together.

NY 694-S then obtained from Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA, [redacted]

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[redacted] on economic matters which were presented to [redacted] on 6-14-61. NY 694-S said he was pleased with the meeting with [redacted] and he would mention the latter's name [redacted] when the opportunity arose.

NY 694-S did mention [redacted] to his [redacted] contacts when he was in [redacted] in June, 1961, and the [redacted] showed considerable interest in [redacted]. His background was furnished to the [redacted] when indicated they did not know exactly what [redacted] would do but there should be no undue haste in activating him. NY 694-S was also instructed by the [redacted] to keep [redacted] currently advised of all contacts by NY 694-S with [redacted]

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Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

RE: USE OF CURRENT INFORMANTS TO OBTAIN
ADDITIONAL HIGH LEVEL COVERAGE IN THE
COMMUNIST PARTY

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[redacted] proposed by NY 694-S on [redacted]
[redacted] NY 694-S transmitted [redacted]
[redacted] were also given to Gus Hall
who said on 9-25-61 that he was very pleased and wanted [redacted] to
prepare another set of [redacted] for [redacted]. [redacted]
remarked that he considered [redacted] "a most valuable contact."

ACTION:

This is for information. The progress of this operation is
being closely followed so that no opportunity would be lost to place
[redacted] in the high echelons of the CPUSA and make it possible for
us to continue the coverage we now have on national and international
communism.

gmc

JLW *SP* *G*

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66-2542-3-1277

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-3-1188X

MAR 24 1965

Wa-Jod

REG-54

61-2542-3-1278

December 19, 1961

PERSONAL

(6)

Mr. Donald J. McNerney
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McNerney:

I have received your suggestion that a copy of "Masters of Deceit" be given to certain individuals who have rendered substantial service to the Bureau. Careful consideration is being given to your proposal and you will be advised if it is adopted.

The interest and thoughtfulness which prompted you to submit this idea to me are indeed appreciated.

MAILED 20

DEC 19 1961

COMM-FBI

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

REC'D-READING ROOM
DEC 19 1961
FBI-BALTIMORE

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Personnel file of SA Donald J. McNerney

ML:jmh (Suggestion #403-62 dated 12/14/61)
(5)

NOTE: Referred to the Crime Records Division for views and recommendations.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

SA McNerney was censured by letter dated 6/28/61 due to an error in outgoing correspondence.

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 61-2542-3-1278

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *fb* DATE: December 14, 1961

FROM : Mr. D. J. McNerney

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION ~~X COPIES OF~~
~~"MASTERS OF DECEIT" TO~~
~~DISCONTINUED SECURITY INFORMANTS~~

#403-62

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Malone
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. McNerney

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

McNerney
GEN

This memorandum proposes that any security informant who has served the Bureau faithfully and reliably in the communist field should be given a copy of the Director's book, "Masters of Deceit" when his services are terminated.

There is no rule or practice concerning this matter currently in effect. Section 107 Q, 8, Manual of Instructions points out that discontinued informants should be impressed with the desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance in matters where the Bureau has an interest.

Basis For This Recommendation

One of our most important functions when discontinuing an informant is to maintain his good will and make certain he will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel in the future. An individual who offers to assume the difficulties and risks faced by a security informant has a tremendous respect for the Director and the Bureau. Presenting the Director's book to an informant when he terminates his services will promote his cooperative attitude and give the Bureau a distinct advantage in guiding his activities, as may be necessary, in the future.

Operation of Proposed Plan

If adopted, the plan suggested would be carefully supervised by the Security Informants - Special Records Unit, Internal Security Section. It is intended that only those informants who have provided information in the communist field be considered under this plan.

DJM:blw *fb*

(6)

XEROX
DEC 20 1961

REC-54 66-2542-3-1228

5 DEC 20 1961

INT. SEC

Memorandum to Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SUGGESTION - COPIES OF
"MASTERS OF DECEIT" TO
DISCONTINUED SECURITY INFORMANTS

Only security informants who have served the Bureau in excess of one year, unless other unusual circumstances warrant otherwise, would be considered eligible. An informant's record of service would be carefully screened to make certain (1) that informant, himself, is of reliable character; (2) that his production was consistently good; (3) that the facts he furnished were of real value to the Bureau and not just run-of-the-mill information; and (4) amenability of informant to the Bureau's direction and guidance. No informant will be considered under this plan whose services were unsatisfactory in any respect.

Possible Objection

It is possible that discontinued security informant to whom the Director's book is given might violate the law or otherwise misconduct himself. The question arises concerning whether such a development would embarrass the Bureau since he has a copy of "Masters of Deceit" in his possession. In answer to this objection it can be said that this same possibility exists everytime the Bureau gives an autographed copy of the Director's book to any individual. Under the proposed plan above such a risk is actually lessened since we will have had experience in dealing with an informant before giving him this gift.

It should be noted further that under the above plan it is not proposed that any books be given which are autographed by the Director.

ACTION:

For the reasons outlined above, I, therefore, suggest that any security informant who has served the Bureau capably in the communist field be given a copy of "Masters of Deceit" when his services are discontinued.

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 12-26-61

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Security Informants, Gen.

REMOVED BY 65 JAN 12 1962

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1279

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

12

USE AS EXTRA YELLOW COPY

PA
SAC, Albany

December 7, 1961

Director, FBI (100-372596) (66-2542-3)

UNITED STATES v. COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Reddy
- 1 - Mr. Lenz

REGISTRATION OF SECURITY INFORMANTS

The deadline for Communist Party (CP) members to register in accordance with the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA-50) is 12-20-61. If they do not comply they are subject to prosecution under the Act. The national leaders have stated publicly that neither they nor members of the Party will register. A question has been raised as to the course of action to be followed by our security informants who are CP members in the matter of registering under the ISA-50.

It is readily apparent that if our informants act contrary to CP instructions on this matter their effectiveness as informants would undoubtedly diminish and could result in complete loss of their services. They should, therefore, in absence of good reason to the contrary, follow the dictates of the national CP leaders.

There have been reports that certain local CP leaders do not agree with the decision of the national leaders and that they intend to register as CP members. These dissident leaders may compel or try to influence others in their group to do likewise. At the first indication that such a situation is arising and might affect an informant, the facts should be promptly submitted to the Bureau together with your recommendations as to the course of action the informant should follow.

2 - All other offices

CCL:blw (117) See memo Baumgardner to Sullivan, dated 12-6-61
same caption, CCL:blw/skw

64 DEC 18 1961

USE AS EXTRA YELLOW COPY

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-372598-1/3051

USE AS YELLOW FILE COPY

Letter to Albany

RE: UNITED STATES v. COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

REGISTRATION OF SECURITY INFORMANTS
100-372598
66-2342-3

In the event an informant raises a question of his status as a result of either registering or not registering he should be assured that if and when it becomes necessary the Bureau will bring the true facts of his FBI affiliation to the attention of the Department.

USE AS YELLOW FILE COPY

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

December 6, 1961

Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

1-Mr. Belmont

1-Mr. Sullivan

1-Mr. Baumgardner

1-Mr. Reddy

1-Mr. Lenz

UNITED STATES v. COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

REGISTRATION OF SECURITY INFORMANTS - General

The deadline for Communist Party (CP) members to register in accordance with the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA-50) is 12-20-61. If they do not comply they are subject to prosecution under the Act. The national leaders have stated publicly that neither they nor members of the Party will register. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise the field of the course of action to be followed by our security informants who are CP members in the matter of registering under the ISA-50.

If our informants were to act contrary to CP instructions their effectiveness as informants would be jeopardized. They should, therefore, in absence of good reason to the contrary, follow the dictates of the national CP leaders.

Certain local CP leaders do not agree with the decision of the national leaders and indicate they intend to register as CP members. They may try to influence or actually compel others in their group to do likewise. At the first indication that such a situation is arising and might affect an informant, the facts should be promptly submitted to the Bureau, together with the recommendations of the field, as to the course of action the informant should follow.

In the event an informant raises a question of his status as a result of either registering or not registering the field should assure him that if and when it becomes necessary the Bureau will bring the true facts of his Bureau affiliation to the attention of the Department.

ACTION:

In line with the above, there is attached an appropriate letter to all offices (original on Plastiplate) setting forth the instructions concerning the course of action to be followed by security informants in connection with the registration provisions of the ISA-50

Enc.
100-372598
66-2542-3
CCL:blw
(7)

66-2542-3
NOT RECORDED
128 DEC 13 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *W.C.S.* DATE: January 4, 1962

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *F.J.B.*

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM - *G.E.N.*

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
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 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field has been submitting progress letters monthly under this program but, effective 4-14-61, letters are now being furnished to the Bureau by the field on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 11-30-61, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three months ending 11-30-61 | Three months ending 8-31-61 | Total |
|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|
| A. Number of active communists contacted | 184 | 220 | 6540 <i>m</i> |
| B. Number of other individuals contacted | 464 | 377 | 24458 |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed | 51 | 48 | 2289 |

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3-1280

301-X3

10 JAN 5 1962

66-2542-3
JDD:bmt X
(3)

51 JAN 10 1962

REC-46

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and another memorandum be prepared by 3-25-62 showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current quarter, the preceding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.



REC-48
EX-105

66-2542-3 -1281

January 4, 1962

PERSONAL

REC'D-READING ROOM
JAN 4 1962
ML:4510 PM

Mr. Donald J. McNerney
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. McNerney:

Reference is made to your suggestion that a copy of "Masters of Deceit" be given to certain individuals who have rendered substantial service to the Bureau. I am indeed pleased to advise you that your idea has been adopted and the necessary steps are being taken to place it into effect.

I want to take this opportunity to thank you for giving me the benefit of your observations on this matter.

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

REC'D-READING ROOM
JAN 4 1962
ML:4510 PM



1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Personnel file of SA Donald J. McNerney

ML:jmh (Suggestion #403-62)

(5)

NOTE

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

Based on memorandum J. F. Malone to Mr. Mohr, ML:jmh, 1/3/62, re: Security Informants - General Suggestion #403-62 Submitted by SA Donald J. McNerney, Domestic Intelligence Division.

SA McNerney was censured by letter dated 6/28/61 due to an error in outgoing correspondence.

63 JAN 30 1962
MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 1/3/62

FROM : J. F. Malone

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL
SUGGESTION #403-62 SUBMITTED BY
SA DONALD J. MC NERNEY
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
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 Evans _____
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 Sullivan _____
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 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

SUGGESTION: That any security informant who has served the Bureau faithfully and reliably in the communist field be given a copy of the Director's book, "Masters of Deceit" when his services are terminated. If adopted, this plan would be carefully supervised by the Security Informants - Special Records Unit, Internal Security Section. Only security informants who have served the Bureau in excess of one year, would be considered eligible unless other unusual circumstances warrant otherwise. An informant's record would be carefully screened to make certain (1) that he is of reliable character; (2) that his production was consistently good; (3) that the facts he furnished to the Bureau were of real value; and (4) amenability of informant to the Bureau's direction and guidance.

ADVANTAGES: One of our most important functions when discontinuing an informant is to maintain his good will and make sure he will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel in the future. Individuals who assume the risks faced by security informants have a tremendous respect for the Director and the Bureau. Presenting the Director's book to an informant when he terminates his services will promote his cooperative attitude and give the Bureau a distinct advantage in guiding his activities, as may be necessary, in the future.

DISADVANTAGES: It is possible a discontinued security informant, who has received a copy of the Director's book, might violate the law or otherwise misconduct himself; however, the same possibility exists everytime the Bureau gives an autographed copy of the Director's book to any individual. This risk is lessened since we will have had experience in dealing with an informant before giving him this gift. Additionally, these books will not be autographed by the Director.

OBSERVATIONS: The Crime Records Division considered all angles of this idea and advised they could see no objection to the suggestion other than determining the matter of how these books would be paid for. They felt that as long as the books do not bear the autographic signature of the Director, there would be no possibility

Enclosure
 1 - Bufile 62-104277
 ML:jmh
 (3)

REC-18
 EX-105

66-2542 #3-1081

5 JAN 25 1962

Two

UNREGISTERED COPY FILED

MEMORANDUM MALONE TO MOHR
RE: SUGGESTION #403-62

of embarrassment to the Bureau since any informant can at the present time go out and buy a copy of the Director's book. Additionally, the suggested plan would be carefully supervised by the Internal Security Section.

Mr. Johnson of the Administrative Division advised he knew of no provision for using Bureau funds openly for a project of this type but he felt it could be handled as a confidential expense item.

The Training and Inspection Division agrees that this suggestion has merit. It should be noted that based on a 3-month period in 1961 only 23 security informants in communist matters were discontinued throughout the entire field. Their files were not reviewed at the time to determine if they would be eligible under the proposed plan; however, if all were eligible the cost for giving each a copy of the book would be \$69 (figuring wholesale price of \$3 each) and for a year using above as a yardstick, the total cost would amount to approximately \$276. It is felt this is a small amount compared to the benefit which would be derived from adoption of this idea.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the suggestion be adopted and the attached letter of appreciation forwarded to the suggester. He was thanked by prior letter.

[Signature]
J.W.

2. On approval, that this memorandum serve as authority for the Domestic Intelligence Division acting in concert with the Administrative Division to devise a means to place the suggestion into effect.

[Handwritten signatures and initials over the second recommendation]

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 12-21-61

FROM : M. A. Jones

C

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION - COPIES OF
 "MASTERS OF DECEIT" TO
DISCONTINUED SECURITY INFORMANTS - GEN.

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

D. J. McNerney

With reference to the above-titled memo of 12-14-61 from Mr. D. J. McNerney to Mr. F. J. Baumgardner, I wish to advise we have considered all angles of the suggestion, and we find only one objection and that is the question, "How are the books, 'Masters of Deceit,' which are to be given to confidential security informants to be paid for?"

As long as the books do not bear the autographic signature of the Director, we see no possibility of embarrassment as any confidential informant could go out and buy a copy of the Director's book, if he so desired.

According to the referenced memo, the suggested plan would be carefully supervised by the "Security Informants--Special Records Unit, Internal Security Section." As long as this is done and no autographed copies are given to informants, we feel there is no objection to the suggestion other than settling the matter of how the books will be paid for.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information only.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
 - 1 - Mr. Malone
 - 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 - 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 - 1 - Mr. McNerney
 - 1 - Mr. Suttler
- ack*

BMS:pja (7) *pp*

JAN 26 XEROX 21
 63 FEB 1 1962 21

Rec'd 66-2542-3-1282 JAN 25 1962
REC'D JAN 25 1962
REC'D JAN 25 1962
REC'D JAN 25 1962

REC'D JAN 25 1962
REC'D JAN 25 1962
REC'D JAN 25 1962

Date of Mail 1-25-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL Security Informants

Removed By 6-11-12 1962

File Number 66-2542-3-1283

12

Permanent Serial Charge Out

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 20, 1962

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES PAYMENTS

The following tabulation of expenditures represents payments made to security informants and sources on a monthly basis for the period of January, 1959, through December, 1961.

| | <u>1959</u> | <u>1960</u> | <u>1961</u> |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Jan. | | | |
| Feb. | | | |
| Mar. | | | |
| Apr. | | | |
| May | | | |
| June | | | |
| July | | | |
| Aug. | | | |
| Sept. | | | |
| Oct. | | | |
| Nov. | | | |
| Dec. | | | |
| TOTAL | | | |
| Monthly Average | | | |

Monthly average January, 1959, through December, 1961 -

REC-28

1284

The above figures are recorded graphically on the attached page.

ACTION:

9 FEB 26 1962

None, for your information.

Enclosure

BFR:cad (3)

1 - Mr. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Rose

ENCLOSURE

3/1/1962

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

Bgdg/jk

1959


123456789101112

1960

123456789101112

1961

123456789101112



TOTAL

AVG

TOTAL

AVG

TOTAL

AVG

AVERAGE 1-59 to 1-62

b7E

Date of Mail 2-23-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL Security Informants, Gen.
Removed By 65 MAR 8 1962
File Number 66-2542-3-1285

16

Permanent Serial Charge Out

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad

DATE: 2/7/62

FROM : R. H. Devons

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF RACIAL INFORMANTS.

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen *W.H.* _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

W.H. 5/1
W.H. 5/1

Memorandum Rosen to Mr. Belmont dated 2/6/62, recalled that the National Secretary of the United Klans of America, Inc., recently announced plans to give polygraph examinations to all state and national officers as well as certain other office holders of that organization. The purpose of this scheme is to uncover informants. The General Investigative Division has proposed certain action by our informants to stir up opposition to nullify the plan. The General Investigative Division requested the Laboratory consider the technical aspects of this problem in the event measures to oppose this scheme failed.

The following is possible action which might be taken by our informants to safeguard their identity:

- ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/24/01 BY SPK/AM/EG*
1. Drugs - the use of various drugs both sedatives (tranquilizers, synthetic narcotics) and stimulants (amphetamines, such as Dexedrine and Benzedrine) to cause decrease or increase in respiratory and pulse rate which could interfere or "mask out" emotional responses caused by the questions. The above drugs are obtainable only by a medical doctor's prescription and are dangerous as an overdose could cause death. It is not recommended that drugs be used since responsibility for any after effects could be laid to the Bureau. Additionally, in many instances the use of drugs prior to examination can be detected by various physical signs.
 2. Another consideration along these lines is to have the informant consume a large volume of coffee or even alcoholic beverages (if it fits a particular informant) prior to examination. The consumption of these beverages can in some cases have a similar effect as the above drugs by causing changes in the physiological responses which would interfere with normal emotional responses. However, this is not recommended as individuals vary greatly in their response to these liquids and there are no assurances it would necessarily be effective.
- REC. 42 66-2542-3-1286*

51 MAR 7 1962

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen

BPH:KO (7)

B FEB 28 1962

B.P.H.
MAR 28 1962
AEROX
1962

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 1/57-3910-

Memorandum to Mr. Conrad
Re: SECURITY OF RACIAL INFORMANTS

3. If an informant normally has a nervous physical habit, such as a muscular twitch or usually finds it difficult to sit perfectly still for a period of time, physical motion by parts of the body can affect the polygraph tracings during the examination and possibly confuse interpretation. A competent examiner is usually very alert to this; however, an untrained person is usually so intent on the instrument itself he fails to observe these body movements.
4. Another possibility is to instruct the informant to mentally concentrate on his activities with the Bureau during (a) all of the test questions or (b) only during irrelevant questions and think of some relaxing or pleasant situation when asked a relevant question or (c) concentrate fully on some relaxing or pleasant situation during the entire test series. The above mental gymnastics, however, are not recommended as they are difficult to perform successfully unless a person has a fast and alert mind and can discreetly do the above and still appropriately answer the questions "yes" or "no" as need be.
5. Perhaps the most basic and best possibility is to fully explain to the informant that the polygraph instrument is essentially an "emotional stress meter" and disturbances observed during a test can be caused by many factors and not deception alone as the examiner may claim. Anger at taking a test, fear of falsely being accused, violent dislike of a person giving a test, outside noise or disturbance, nervousness and other factors can cause responses which an examiner, especially untrained, can interpret as deception. Continued and complete denial of deception based on knowledge of this is perhaps the best defense if the informant is so confronted by the examiner.

From a technical aspect considering all of the above, we feel that number 5 is the most feasible possibility under the circum-

Memorandum to Mr. Conrad
Re: Security of Racial Informants

stances. The other possibilities were set forth primarily for information and for possible future consideration in the event future developments should so dictate.

It is pointed out that any information furnished to the informants which would be of assistance to them technically in neutralizing the effect of the polygraph would be equally applicable toward neutralizing any future use of the polygraph which the Bureau might wish to make against the same informants. Accordingly, in determining whether any of the information should be furnished to a given informant, it would be necessary to weigh the need for protecting this individual informant as against the future possibility that the Bureau might wish to afford the same informant a polygraph examination. It would appear that this would have to be decided upon the individual merits in each instance.

ACTION:

That this memorandum be forwarded to the General Investigative Division for their information and consideration.

22
Q

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

DATE: April 2, 1962

1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

General

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field has been submitting progress letters monthly under this program but, effective 4-14-61, letters are now being furnished to the Bureau by the field on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 2-28-62, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three months ending 2-28-62 | Three months ending 11-30-61 | Total |
|--|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| A. Number of active communists contacted | 151 | 184 | 6695 <i>60</i> |
| B. Number of other individuals contacted | 363 | 464 | 25005 |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed | REC-15 <i>66-2542-3-1287</i> 41 | 51 | 2361 |

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3
 JDD:peb
 (4)

53 APR 9 1962

Donohue

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and another memorandum be prepared by 6-25-62 showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current quarter, the preceding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.

J. R. W.
[Signature]

W&L

UNITED STATES

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (File 66-2542-3) DATE: 3/9/62
(Registered)

FROM : SAC, Indianapolis (File)

*A. H.
msj*
SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
IS - C

b7D

This case will be delinquent.

Date of Bureau deadline: 3/10/62

Reason for the delinquency: Report of interviews conducted being prepared and will be submitted promptly. Delay due to expeditious criminal intelligence reports

Date the report or necessary communication being submitted.
will reach the Bureau: 3/15/62

AEC zone designation; e.g., OR, CH, etc.:
(This applies only to 116 cases.)

John J. O'Brien
J. J. O'Brien
FBI - CINCINNATI

Date of Mail 3-26-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject

JUNE MAIL

*Security Informants - Serial
53*

Removed By

65 APR 10 1962

File Number

66-2542-3-1288

Permanent Serial Charge Out

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

May 2, 1962

Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Fox
1 - Mr. Rose

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
SECURITY INFORMANTS

[redacted] has advised the National Office, Communist Party, USA, has stated its greatest weakness is lack of youth in the Party and is initiating a drive to double youth membership by mid-July, 1962. This presents an opportunity for our field offices to establish needed informant coverage in areas where coverage is lacking and to expand and strengthen existing coverage. All offices are being directed to immediately re-evaluate security informant coverage on the Party and direct informants and potential security informants to membership in the Party where additional informant coverage is needed.

b7D

ACTION:

It is recommended that attached letter be transmitted to Albany and all offices (original on Plastiplate) instructing each office to make the most of this opportunity to strengthen its security informant coverage on the Communist Party.

Enclosure

100-3-68

1 - 66-2542-3 (Security Informants) - [initials]

BFR: had
(7)

3102

ORIGINAL COPY FILED 11/10/62 - 3102

166-2542-3
NOT RECORDED
184 MAY 11 1962

344

33/
60 MAY 15 1962

Original on Plastiplate
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Fox
1 - Mr. Rose

SAC, Albany

May 3, 1962

Director, FBI (100-3-68)

**COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
SECURITY INFORMANTS**

The National Office of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), has stated the greatest weakness of the Communist Party is the lack of youth in the Party and is formulating plans for initiating a membership drive to double youth membership by mid-July, 1962.

It has been determined the Party intends to lower membership standards so that the only requirement will be willingness to join the Party. There are indications, however, members will be screened to exclude misfits and suspected agents.

Efforts of the Party to increase its membership presents an opportunity for each office to establish needed informant coverage in areas where coverage is lacking and to expand and strengthen its existing coverage. Each office should immediately re-evaluate its informant coverage and avail itself of every opportunity to direct informants and PSIS to membership in the Party where additional informant coverage is needed.

2 - All Offices

1 - 66-2542-3 (Security Informants) - *check*

166-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
184 MAY 11 1962

NOTE:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, dated
5-2-62, captioned as above, BFR:had.

BFR: had
(117)

51 May 17 1962

DEM COLLETT DIN
MEC. 0

344

Date of Mail 4-25-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL Security Informants - Gen
Removed By 65 MAY 8 1962
File Number 66-2542-3-1289

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *W.C.S.*

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *JFB*

IC O SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES
PAYMENTS OF INCOME TAXES
PROPOSED MANUAL CHANGE

DATE: May 8, 1962

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Malone
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone *EV* _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Buchanan

Dakshin

Section 107, N, 6, Manual of Instructions requires that informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing income tax returns. Several instances recently came to the Bureau's attention where informants, while being interviewed by Departmental attorneys in the presence of contacting Agents, disclosed that they had not paid income taxes on moneys received by them for their services to the Bureau even though they were previously instructed to do so.

SAC Letter dated 5-8-62 instructs the field that whenever an informant or former informant is initially considered as a potential witness in a Bureau case, a determination should be made as to whether he paid Federal and state taxes on the income he received from the Bureau for his services. If the informant has not paid such taxes, all pertinent details must be obtained and promptly submitted to the Bureau with recommendations for handling the situation.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is an appropriate change in Section 107 N, 6, Manual of Instructions. It is recommended that this change be transmitted to the Training Section of the Training and Inspection Division. FBI Handbook change is not necessary.

Enclosure

66-2542-3

1 - 66-1934 (Manual of Instructions)

JDD: had
(7)

REG-41 66-2542-3-1290

11 MAY 18 1962

EX-114

3 ENCLOSURE
1 - 66-1934 (Manual of Instructions)
JDD: had
(7)
RECD: [Signature]
66-1934-3-1290
Manual of Instructions
Received 3/28
6/10/62 2-18-62
6/10/62 2-18-62

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-1934-1

2-18-62

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Malone
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohuo

May 8, 1962

PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

The following new paragraph should be added to Section 107, N, 6, Manual of Instructions.

h. Whenever an informant or former informant is initially considered as a potential witness in a Bureau case, you should determine whether he paid Federal and state taxes on the income he received from the Bureau for his services. If such taxes have not been paid, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit recommendations for handling the situation.

66-2542-3

1 - 66-1934 (Manual of Instructions)

NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, dated as above, captioned "Security Informants and Sources, Payments of Income Taxes, Proposed Manual Change," JDD:had.

JDD:had
(9)

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

Date of Mail 5-25-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL - Security Informants - Gen'l
Removed By 65 JUN 1^{F26} 1962
File Number 66-2542-3-1291

Permanent Serial Charge Out

SAC, Tampa

May 22, 1962

Director, FBI (66-66) - 110
66-2542-3-

mt

INTERVIEWS WITH SECURITY INFORMANTS
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reurlet 5-8-62 requesting authority to rent a room to be used in contacting [] and his wife, who is being developed as a potential security informant by your office.

b7D

In the interest of security in contacting informants, the Bureau feels it is undesirable to meet informants at a fixed location on a continuing basis, and authority to rent space for this purpose is denied.


The Bureau by letter 4-2-62 furnished your office with a listing of suggested locations being utilized by other offices in contacting their informants. The Bureau is certain that with further consideration and ingenuity on the part of contacting Agents, this matter can be resolved by your office.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Tampa has indicated its difficulty in contacting [] and his wife, a PSI, who are both Negroes. Bureau by letter dated 4-2-62 furnished Tampa a list of recommended contact places used and recommended by other offices. Tampa has now requested authority to contact these informants at a fixed location at a rental cose of [] per month. For security reasons Tampa's request is being denied, and this office is being instructed to resolve this problem through further consideration and ingenuity on the part of contacting Agents.

66-66-1

BFR:peb (4)



51 JUN 4 1962

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ZEROX
MAY 28 1962
RIP

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

ORIGINAL FILE IN

DIRECTOR, FBI (66-66)

5/3/62

SAC, TAMPA [redacted]

b7D

✓
INTERVIEWS WITH SECURITY INFORMANTS
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

- GENERAL

ReBulet 42/62.

The Tampa Office has considered the list of places suggested as possible meeting places for [redacted] and his wife, PSI [redacted] who has now been authorized by the Bureau for development as a PSI in NOI matters. The Tampa Office does not believe that such places as those listed furnish maximum security for the Tampa area because it is felt that any observation of a white man in any extended meeting with a Negro man and a Negro woman would arouse suspicion. It is also felt that contacts with these individuals under cover of darkness would be unsatisfactory inasmuch as the reports from these informants are generally written by the Agent and authenticated by the informant. Past experience has shown that any report written by the informant is generally incomplete and difficult to follow due to misspellings, errors in punctuation and construction.

The Tampa Office has conducted a preliminary survey and has located space on [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

which could be rented for [redacted] per month with no lease required. The Bureau is requested to authorize the Tampa Office to rent space in this building under the cover of an individual acting in the capacity of a [redacted] for [redacted] in a nearby location. There is one other tenant on the same floor of this building who is [redacted] and who in the past has furnished information as a PCI of this office regarding SANTO TRAFFICANTE, BuFile 92-2781. [redacted] is not known to the Agent contacting [redacted] and his wife and it is also pointed out that the contacts would be made in the early evening hours, approximately 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. when a business office would normally be closed. The location of this space is in the Ybor City section of Tampa where both caucasion and Negroes pass freely without causing any suspicion on the part of anyone observing the area. This building is managed by PHILLIP

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Tampa
WCH:bct
(3)

66-2548-3-
NOT RPD
30 MAY 29 1962

ORIGINAL FILED IN

[REDACTED]

LICATA and Son Realtor at 1713 East Broadway and inquiry at this firm reflects that the building is owned by an estate. Bureau is requested to authorize Tampa to rent the above-described space for contacting [REDACTED] and his wife.

66-25423-1292

CHANGED TO



b7D

OCT 29 1963

bc-2a

(7)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS

DATE: June 4, 1962

- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Malone
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

During the Internal Security-Espionage Conference on May 28-29, 1962, the reluctance on the part of some security informants to testify for the Government in prosecutions under the Internal Security Act of 1950 was the subject of discussion. Many informants indicated that they did not wish to testify except in the event of a national emergency for fear of physical harm, social and business reprisals and other reasons of a personal nature. Informants are now under instructions to submit their information in such form that if they are called upon to testify their written statements will be available for introduction in court to back up their testimony. Despite the fact that they realize they may be needed as witnesses in the future, some of them are reluctant to face that fact and the conference agreed that we should intensify our efforts to condition the informants in day-to-day contacts with them to instill in them a desire to testify when necessary for the Government.

b7D

With reference to the Nation of Islam (NOI), the representatives at the conference discussed the exorbitant demands by this organization on its members which must be faced by our informants if they are to penetrate the group. It was pointed out that each temple of the NOI decides on the amount of dues for its members and also sets a quota for various other collections. Members are threatened with expulsion if they do not meet these demands; however, we have found that informants in some cases are able to remain in the organization without meeting some of these demands and the representatives agreed that the field should be alerted to the fact that informants should attempt to curtail their financial contributions whenever possible as it has been found from experience this will not result in expulsion.

ACTION:

For approval there are attached appropriate letters to all Special Agents in Charge regarding the above matters affecting security informants. Manual and Handbook changes will be prepared.

Enclosures - 2

JDD:had

(7)

60 CONDITIONS 2/962 XEROX

376

REC-44

66-2542-3-4293
JUN 8 1962
S. J. [Signature]
Records
CC-1-43

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Callahan

DATE: 6-1-62

FROM : C. R. Davidson *AP*SUBJECT: Proposed Form for Recording
TOPCI and TOPSI Submitted by
Detroit Division

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Roslyn _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

Security info. fin

The Training and Inspection Division has requested comments of the Administrative Division concerning a proposed form submitted by the Detroit Office under date of 5-25-62 for recording on a daily basis time spent by each Agent during the month on TOPCI (Time spent on developing potential criminal informants) and TOPSI (Time spent on developing potential security informants). The proposed form (copies attached) would provide a method of recording the time spent by an Agent on each day during the month on these programs in order that the total time spent during the month could be submitted to the Bureau as required. It would appear that the proposed form is unnecessary since present Form FD-324 (Special Agents' Accomplishments Record) could easily be adapted to the purpose of the proposed form. Form FD-324 (copy attached) is designed to record by months on an annual basis various accomplishments of an Agent, such as cases opened and closed, applicants interviewed and recruited, statistical accomplishments and the like. This form contains a column for recording time spent by an Agent on TOPCI and TOPSI. By using this form as a work sheet and by entering in the vertical columns under TOPCI and TOPSI the time spent by an Agent on each of these programs for each day during a particular month, Form FD-324 could be used for a daily recording of this information. At the end of each month the total time spent on both TOPCI and TOPSI by the Agent during the month could then be entered under the appropriate columns on the Agent's accomplishments record for the month. Use of present form FD-324 as a work sheet for compiling this information on a daily basis would appear to accomplish the same purpose as the proposed form and would eliminate the necessity for an additional form.

RECOMMENDATION:

Unfavorable since it would appear that Form FD-324 can be used to compile the required information on a daily basis.

1 - Training and Inspection Division (Forms Desk)

NOT RECORDED

170 JUN 12 1962 5; JUN 12 1962

FDH:mle:mlm

(3) 267

5 JUN 20 1962 66-3482

ENCLOSURE

XEROX

JUN 12 1962

REC-52

66-1194-1294

June 7, 1962

PERSONAL

EX-115

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Detroit, Michigan

Dear [redacted]

Thank you very much for your suggestion regarding a proposed form for use in opening certain case files. Your proposal is being considered and I will let you know in the event it is adopted.

The interest you displayed in submitting your idea to me is indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

b6
b7C

1 - SAC Detroit
1 - Personnel file of [redacted]

ML:jmh (Suggestion #961-62 dated 5/18/62)
(5)

NOTE:

Referred to the Domestic Intelligence, General Investigative, and Special Investigative Divisions for views and recommendations. Also, referred to Washington Field Office. 8 8 58 WA 33

Mailed 10
JUN 7 - 1962
COMM-FBI
Felsen _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Hol. Room _____
Gandy _____

53 JUN 25 1962
TELETYPE UNIT [redacted]

ERI
BE/12 100-1000

XEROX
JUN 11 1962

b6
b7C

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-1194-1294

#A61-62

Date

5/18/62

To: Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name)

Division of Assignment

DETROIT

SUGGESTION

It is suggested that the attached form be approved in opening Informant files, either security or criminal.

Informant

32

b6
b7C

EX-PROC

52. MHP

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

Informant files are now opened on complaint forms, office memorandum, or Informant contact forms.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

1. It will establish a uniform procedure in opening Informant files.
2. It will have the information readily available for the Informant Index, Form FD 348.
3. It will eliminate the sending of routing slips to Agents advising them of the requirements for the Informant Index.
4. It will take into consideration #1, 2, 3, & 4 on Pink Sheet, FD 327, in regard to the Criminal Informant Program. It is assumed that the Security Informant Pink Sheet will be handled in a similar manner.
5. It will be a flash for the Open Case Desk to give case a 134 or 137 file number.
6. It will save clerical time on an average of 1 hour per day.
7. It will be a definite savings in materials by not preparing routing slips.

Disadvantages of suggestion

None

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss

Clark

Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

Recommend adoption for the advantages indicated above.

(Do not write in this space for Bureau use only)

EX-115 MM 2 10 13 MM REC-520 66-3540 - 1294

1962

ERT XEROX
MAY 21 1962

MM e 11 25 MM ES

ERT TWO

b6

b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

PCI CI

PSI SI

SUBJECT:

Description of Informant

| Race | Sex | Height | Weight | Eyes | Hair | Build | Complexion |
|--|-----|----------------|--------|-----------------------------|------|-------|------------|
| Date of Birth | | Place of Birth | | Scar, Marks, or other data | | | |
| Address of original contact | | | | Home address & phone number | | | |
| Occupation | | | | | | | |
| Type of information informant will be in a position to furnish | | | | | | | |
| Reasons for recommending informant | | | | | | | |

66-2542-3-1294

XEROX
JUN 11 1962

EXCLUSIVELY

Recommended by SA

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS* *6/17*

DATE: June 7, 1962

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJ*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - CONTROL *80-178*

Approved

| | |
|------------|--|
| Mont | |
| Mohr | |
| Callahan | |
| Conrad | |
| DeLoach | |
| Evans | |
| Malone | |
| Rosen | |
| Sullivan | |
| Tavel | |
| Trotter | |
| Tele. Room | |
| Holmes | |
| Gandy | |

During interviews with security informants as possible witnesses in prosecutions under the Internal Security Act of 1950, some informants indicated they did not wish to testify except in the event of a national emergency for fear of physical harm, social and business reprisals and other reasons of a personal nature. Instructions are now outstanding that informants must submit their information in such form that if they are called upon to testify, their written statements will be available for introduction in court to back up their testimony. Despite the fact that they realize they may be needed as witnesses in the future, some informants are reluctant to face that fact and a SAC Letter is being transmitted to the field pointing out that contacting Agents must psychologically prepare the informants to the fact that they may at some future date be called upon to render a still further contribution to their Government by testifying to the information they have furnished concerning security matters.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is an appropriate change in Section 107F of the Manual of Instructions. It is recommended that this change be transmitted to the Training Section of the Training and Inspection Division. FBI Handbook change is not necessary.

Enclosure

66-2542-3

1 - 66-1934 (Manual of Instructions)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Malone
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

JDD: had
(7)*ENCLOSURE*

REC-62

WCS *JH* *66-2542-3-1295*

Manual of Instructions
Revised
JUN 22 1962

10 JUN 18 1962

2-foob

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Malone
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

June 7, 1962

PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

The following new paragraph should be added to Section 107F of the Manual of Instructions.

13. Preparation for Testifying

Contacting Agent must condition the informant to the fact that someday the knowledge he possesses may be needed as evidence in court to assist the Government in combating the evil of communism. Psychologically prepare the informant for the fact that he may at some future date be called upon to render a still further contribution to his Government by testifying to the information he has furnished on security matters. Proper indoctrination of the informant is essential as the Bureau must provide witnesses whenever the Department initiates prosecutions in security cases.

66-2542-3

1 - 66-1934 (Manual of Instructions)

NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan, dated 6-7-62, captioned "Security Informants - Control," JDD:had.

JDD:had
(9)

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

W&S

ENCLOSURE

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

June 5, 1962

Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue
- 1 - Mr. Fox

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Security Informants - Gen.

During the course of the Internal Security--Espionage Conference held on 5/28 & 29/62 Supervisors Frederick F. Fox, Lawrence T. Gurley, Seymour F. Phillips and I discussed informant problems with Field Supervisors Warren Marchessault of the New York Office and Carl Freyman of the Chicago Office.

One of the matters we discussed at considerable length was the problem of placing another high-level informant in the national Communist Party (CP) setup.

By SAC letter dated 12/6/60 we initiated a program whereby we hoped through the use of appropriate current informants to obtain additional high-level coverage in the Party. We have considered a number of possibilities under this program and have worked on several. Only one of these has paid off to any extent. This is [redacted] and it does appear at this time we may be successful in moving him into the apparatus operated by NY 694-S*. This will be a very significant maneuver if we can pull it off.

b7D

During the discussion Marchessault stated that the New York Office has been working on this problem constantly since the program was inaugurated in 1960. As a culmination of all the work and study which has been put into this project Marchessault, supported by Freyman, made the following suggestion. CG 5824-S* and NY 694-S* who are brothers and are known to each other as informants of the FBI will meet with Supervisors Marchessault and Freyman from the field and Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan and Section Chief Fred J. Baumgardner from the Seat of Government in New York City in the near future. At this meeting Bureau representatives will discuss with the informants the problem of placing other informants in high-level positions in the Party and solicit any suggestions the informants may have as to how this may be done. Also, the informants would be asked to make specific recommendations of people who might fill the bill.

166-2542-3-

I have considered this suggestion at considerable length and have discussed it with various supervisors in my Section. It does have some merit. However, there are also a number of objections to this plan. These objections are:

FJB:fk
(5)

66-2542-3-1292

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

(1) A meeting with Bureau officials could work to the detriment of the field in controlling these informants in that in the future if the informants have a problem and are not satisfied with the solution given them by the field they may well feel they can present the problem directly to any Bureau officials who might participate in a conference with them.

(2) If such a conference is to achieve maximum results it would be almost imperative that the informants would learn during the discussions that we do not have other high-level coverage such as they are providing. Again this would tend to increase our problems of control.

(3) It is believed we would weaken the Bureau's position in the eyes of these informants if we found it necessary to have an Assistant Director meet with them for the purpose of seeking their assistance in implementing our informant coverage. It would seem this is more properly a field function and the informants could well assume that the Bureau was desperate in resorting to such a measure as this.

On the other side of the coin the favorable aspect of such a meeting is the fact the informants undoubtedly would be impressed by the fact they were meeting with an Assistant Director of the Bureau. It is possible they might even produce the name of a prospect who might turn out to be an individual we could place in high Party circles as an informant. It would seem, however, that this could be done by our field personnel and if necessary our SACs could sit down with these informants and probably obtain the same results. This would keep the operation on a field level which is much more desirable than getting the Bureau involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

After careful consideration of the entire matter, it is recommended we do not accept Marchessault's suggestion. We believe that through concentration of the programs we now have set up we should be able to achieve our goal. We already have a very likely prospect in [redacted].

I agree
WCS

* I think this should
be handled by Field
JAS

Marchessault was
advised 6-7-62
FJB

b7D

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 6/14/62

FROM : J. F. Malone

SUBJECT: INFORMANTS

SUGGESTION #961-62 SUBMITTED BY
MISS [REDACTED] DETROIT OFFICE

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

b6
b7C

SUGGESTION: That a ~~form~~ (copy attached) be approved for use in opening informant files, either security or criminal.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Informant files are now opened on complaint form, office memorandum, or Informant contact forms.

ADVANTAGES: Suggester felt the form would establish a uniform procedure for opening files; would have the form readily available for the Informant Index, Form FD-348; would eliminate sending routing slips to Agents advising them of the requirements for the informant index; would take into consideration #1, 2, 3, 4 on the Criminal Informant Review Sheet FD-237 (Security FD-238 would be items #1, 2, 12 and 6). It would also serve as a flash for the Open Case Desk to give case a 134 or 137 file number. It would save clerical time on an average of one hour a day.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Hostetter of the Detroit Office recommended adoption for the advantages stated.

General
 The matter was discussed with the Criminal Informant, Racial Informant, Security Informants and Criminal Intelligence Top Echelon Informant Desks. They were unanimous in their opposition to adoption of the form. They felt that there would be few instances where the information for the form would be available. If it was intended that the information be supplied to the card when obtained it would require returning to it to add the information or making out an additional card to bring the information up to date. This would appear to be a duplication of work inasmuch as the Informant Review Sheets (FD-237 and 238) must also be kept up to date. Further, the use of the card might encourage delay in opening informant files until the information was obtained.

The matter was also discussed with Security and Criminal Supervisors at the Washington Field Office. The consensus was that the form would not be used to advantage in connection with potential security informants. These already receive special handling and have special deadlines and the informant index card is made up on receipt of Bureau approval. The use of the form would involve unnecessary duplication, for example, in connection with the Security Informant Review Sheet FD-238 which must

Enclosure

4 CLOSURE

XEROX

JUN 19 1962

12 JUN 13 1962

JER:jmh

(2)

53 JUN 25 1962

Two - off

MEMORANDUM MALONE TO MOHR
RE: SUGGESTION #961-62

be kept up to date and has much of the same information as the form requires. As to the use of the form in connection with potential criminal informants, it would have some advantages in obviating the preparation of memoranda but not enough to warrant adoption of another form. The information required by the form is not always available at the time of opening a case and while this would not nullify the use of the form it is felt it might encourage delay on the part of Agents in opening cases until they have the information at hand. Generally speaking, the use of a memorandum is preferable in that the details concerning the contact and reasons therefore can be set forth more fully in a memorandum.

On the basis of the foregoing views, Training and Inspection Division feels that adoption of the form is unwarranted. Further, it would seem that the saving in clerical time would be offset by extra time on the part of the Agents.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the suggestion not be adopted. On approval, no further action is necessary. Receipt of the suggestion was acknowledged by prior letter.

H.S.C. *J.W.D.*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO : _____

DATE:

FROM : _____

PCI CI

PSI SI

SUBJECT: _____

Description of Informant

| Race | Sex | Height | Weight | Eyes | Hair | Build | Complexion |
|--|-----|----------------|--------|-----------------------------|------|-------|------------|
| Date of Birth | | Place of Birth | | Scar, Marks, or other data | | | |
| Address of original contact | | | | Home address & phone number | | | |
| Occupation | | | | | | | |
| Type of information informant will be in a position to furnish | | | | | | | |
| Reasons for recommending informant | | | | | | | |

66-2542-3-7296

ENCLOSURE

Recommended by SA _____

| | | |
|--|-----------------|----------------|
| Name | Symbol | Field Division |
| Code | File Number | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CI <input type="checkbox"/> PCI <input type="checkbox"/> SI <input type="checkbox"/> PSI <input type="checkbox"/> JCS | Date authorized | Race |
| Discontinued | | |

Address at which original contact made

Residence address & telephone number

Employment address, position, & telephone number

Type of information

Agent

Contacting Alternate SOG Supvr. _____ (over)

(For SOG use only)

| | |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| Date of birth | Place of birth |
| Citizenship | Current subversive membership |
| Activity or Remarks | |

Criminal Informant Review Sheet

FD-237 (Rev. 3-21-60)

Mark opposite each item the number of the serial or serials in which the information appears. Although these items are regarded as nonvariable, changes may be noted by adding the new serial number and crossing out the old. When form is complete as to all applicable items, the Agent and Field Supervisor should initial the form at the end.

Symbol Number _____

Office File _____

Type of Informant: CI PCI CS

Bureau File _____

Serial No.

1. Name _____
2. Aliases _____
3. Informant Index Card Made _____
4. Description _____
5. Background Developed _____
6. Photograph _____
7. Credit Check _____
8. Local Criminal Check _____
9. Bureau Identification Record (FD-9) _____
10. Past Criminal Activities _____
11. Criminal Associates _____
12. Availability To Other Divisions _____
13. Advised of FBI Jurisdiction _____
14. Advised of Confidential Relationship _____
15. Advised Not Employee of Bureau _____
16. Advised to Furnish Information Only to Bureau _____
17. Advised Payments are Income _____
18. Advised Not to Contact Office Personally _____
19. When Designated CI _____
20. Indices Search Slip (FD-160) Summarized _____
21. Statement of Willingness to Aid Bureau _____
22. Arrangements for Payment _____
23. Symbol Number Assigned _____
24. Bureau Advised of Symbol _____
25. Service Record Checked, if any _____
26. Flash Notice Placed _____ or Removed _____
27. Alternate Agent _____

Completed: _____

Approved: _____

NO SERIAL NUMBER:

KEEP ON TOP OF OTHER SERIALS IN FILE **EX-CLJSUR**

66-2542-3-

Mark opposite each item the number of the serial or serials in which the information appears. Although these items are regarded as nonvariable, changes may be noted by adding the new serial number and crossing out the old. When form is complete as to all applicable items, the Agent and Field Supervisor should initial the form at the end.

Symbol Number _____

Office File _____

Type of Informant: SI PSI CS

Bureau File _____

Serial No. _____

1. Name _____

2. Aliases _____

3. Code Name _____

4. Symbol Number _____

5. Date and Place of Birth _____

6. Description _____

7. Photograph _____

8. Background Investigation:

(A) File references checked _____

(B) Credit Inquiry _____

(C) Local Criminal Check _____

(D) Bureau Identification Record _____

(E) Selective Service Check _____

(F) Check of Armed Services Record _____

(G) Informants Canvassed _____

(H) Reliability Check _____

(I) Patriotism _____

(J) Reputation _____

9. Informant Advised Of:

(A) Not Bureau employee _____

(B) Activities Voluntary _____

(C) Relationship Confidential _____

(D) Bureau Labor Policy _____

(E) Not to Retain Copies of Notes - Reports _____

(F) Report to be submitted under Code Number and in Third Person _____

(G) Payments are Income _____

(H) Use Public Telephones _____

(I) No Office Contact Personally _____

10. Statement of Cooperation _____

11. Post Office Box Number Assigned _____

12. Informant Indices Card Made _____

13. Agent Who Handles Information _____

14. Alternate Agent _____

15. Concealment and Characterization Guide _____

16. Flash Notice Placed _____ or Removed _____

No Serial Number:

Keep on Top of Other Serials in File.

Initials _____

Agent _____

Supervisor _____

RECORDED

66-2347-3-

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *W.C.S.*

DATE: June 22, 1962

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *F.J.B.*1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

B.F.J.B.

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field submits progress letters under this program on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 5-31-62, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three months ending 5-31-62 | Three months ending 2-28-62 | Total |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------|
| A. Number of active communists contacted | 150 | 151 | 6845 |
| B. Number of other individuals contacted | 379 | 363 | 25384 |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed | 31 | 41 | 2391 |

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3

JDD:peb

(4)

REC-20 66-2542-3-1299

EX-108

12 JUN 26 1962

5 JUN 29 1962

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and another memorandum be prepared by 9-25-62 showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current quarter, the preceding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.



Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 McFarland _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

Plots and Counter-Plots Everywhere

Cleveland, June 6 (AP)—A man identified as a Communist Party member by a Congressional witness who joined the party at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation disclosed last night that he, too, was working for the FBI.

Melvin F. Hardin Jr., 29 years old, a guard at the county workhouse, said he had been an informant for eight years. He said his wife, Virginia, had been a member since 1958 and both reported regularly to the FBI.

Mrs. Julia Brown, former Clevelander now living in Los Angeles, testified Monday before the House Committee on Un-American Activities that the Hardins were members of the Communist party in Cleveland. Mrs. Brown testified she was an informant.

Edward E. Hargett, special agent in charge of the FBI's Cleveland office, confirmed Mr. Hardin's story.

* * *

If it had happened to any other agencies of government, there would have been quick, strident cries for sweeping measures to end such confusionism. But since it happened to the FBI and the House Un-American Activities Committee, there will be only long, awkward silence in most places.

Is it not time some responsible group undertook to ascertain exactly how many FBI men are members of the Communist party, and vice versa? Do we have any solid statistical data on how many other dangerous characters being exposed by the House Committee are in fact still undisclosed FBI operatives?

Things are complicated enough these days. Can we not at least insist that J. Edgar Hoover and the House Committee cease muddling them even more? Must the taxpayers continue to subsidize this Congressional harassment of loyal FBI men who are engaged in inflating the rolls of the Communist party? How large a part of the FBI budget goes for payment of dues of such agents to the Communist apparatus?

Is there no true friend of government economy prepared to ask such questions on the floor of Congress?

Security Information
Gen.

file 5-MJR
in 61-7582 re HCUA

We just feeds a hostile
pro-Soviet material when we
oversaturate coverage
of communists as we
apparently have done
in Cleveland 166-2542-3

NOT RECORDED

199 JUN 21 1962

9 JUN 21 1962

The Washington Post and _____
Times Herald _____
The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star _____
New York Herald Tribune _____
New York Journal-American _____
New York Mirror _____
New York Daily News _____
New York Post 42 _____
The New York Times _____
The Worker _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
Date _____

JUN 8 1962

MEMO 6-8-62
Re: witness to his wife
"Public Disclosure of Identity of
Cleveland Informants" [redacted]
and Virginia Hardin, Rffce [redacted]
HCO, Washington D.C. 6-5-62 JUN 21 1962
was prepared as required
a copy has been sent to the Director.
MTR

Date of Mail 6-25-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL Security Informants, Gen
Removed By 287 6 . IIII 3 1962
File Number 66-2542-3-1298

Date of Mail 7-25-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL Security Informants, San Joaquin
Removed By 65 AUG 6 1962
File Number 66-2542-3-1299

1960 1961 1962

1234567891011121234567891011123456

TOTAL AVERAGE TOTAL AVERAGE TOTAL AVERAGE

12051 - 25/8 - 500

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: August 16, 1962

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJBe*1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. RoseSUBJECT: ~~SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES PAYMENTS~~

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

The following tabulation of expenditures represents payments made to security informants and sources on a monthly basis for the period of January, 1960, through June, 1962.

| | <u>1960</u> | <u>1961</u> | <u>1962</u> |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Jan. | | | |
| Feb. | | | |
| Mar. | | | |
| Apr. | | | |
| May | | | |
| June | | | |
| July | | | |
| Aug. | | | |
| Sept. | | | |
| Oct. | | | |
| Nov. | | | |
| Dec. | | | |
| TOTAL | | | |
| Monthly Average | | | |

Monthly average January, 1960, to July, 1962,

b7E

G

The above tabulations are reported graphically on the attached page.

66-2542-3-1300

ACTION:

REG-8

16 AUG 17 1962

None, for your information.

BER:cad
(3) cad

ENCLOSURE

54 AUG 22 1962

157

W. C. Sullivan
R. J. Baumgardner
APR

UNITED STATES GOV

JM Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : Mr. Sullivan

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

DATE: August 24, 1962

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Fipp
- 1 - Mr. Woodcock
- 1 - Mr. Engelstad
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

John L. Rogers

| | |
|------------|-------------------------------------|
| Tolson | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Belmont | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Mohr | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Callahan | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Conrad | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| DeLoach | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Evans | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Malone | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Rosen | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Sullivan | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Tavel | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Trotter | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Tele. Room | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Holmes | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Gandy | <input type="checkbox"/> |

This is a monthly memorandum setting forth the total number of the Bureau's confidential informants, trash covers, mail covers and coverage we are maintaining for other Government agencies as set forth in the attached pages.

Technical surveillances are only utilized when necessary and are discontinued when they are no longer productive. Their number varies and as of this date we are operating 94 security technical surveillances in Bureau cases.

In addition, at the specific request of National Security Agency, we are maintaining coverage of teletype facilities at 17 diplomatic establishments and at the request of the White House, we are covering the teletype facilities of Tass News Agency in New York.

One hundred fifteen microphone surveillances are presently installed of which 36 are concerned with security investigations and 79 are installed in criminal matters.

During July, 1962, 23 security informants were added and 19 were deleted, making a total of 1,101 security informants. Potential security informants during the same period decreased from 412 to 399.

During July, 1962, 37 criminal informants were added while 60 criminal informants were deleted. This changes the number of approved criminal informants from 2,824 to 2,801. Also, during July, 1962, the number of potential criminal informants changed from 7,168 to 7,167.

During July, 1962, 2 racial informants were added and 3 were deleted leaving a total of 83 racial informants. The number of potential racial informants under development is 38.

Enclosure

66-2542-3-1301

JDD:jmc
(11)

REC-3

10 AUG 28 1962

AUG 31 1962

ENCLOSURE

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

As of August 1, 1962, the field was operating 60 trash covers. As of August 24, 1962, the Bureau had in operation a total of 128 mail covers. Of this number, 2 are maintained in criminal fugitive cases and 14 in criminal cases other than fugitive. All criminal mail covers are being handled by Special Investigative Division. There are 112 mail covers in security cases.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

JK *JGPK* *JH* *G*

| OFFICE | TS | COA | MS | SMC | FMC | OMC | TC | SI | PSI | CI | PSI | (RAC) CI | (RAC) PCI |
|--------------|----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|-----|-----|-----|----------|-----------|
| ALBANY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 1 | 32 | 64 | 0 | 0 |
| ALBUQUERQUE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 50 | 90 | 0 | 0 |
| ANCHORAGE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 40 | 0 | 0 |
| ATLANTA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 53 | 199 | 7 | 0 |
| BALTIMORE | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 8 | 67 | 162 | 0 | 0 |
| BIRMINGHAM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 41 | 82 | 10 | 0 |
| BOSTON | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 3 | 40 | 143 | 0 | 0 |
| BUFFALO | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 4 | 44 | 84 | 0 | 0 |
| BUTTE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 47 | 81 | 0 | 0 |
| CHARLOTTE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 80 | 131 | 15 | 0 |
| CHICAGO | 5 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 89 | 22 | 130 | 299 | 1 | 0 |
| CINCINNATI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 7 | 65 | 118 | 0 | 0 |
| CLEVELAND | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 8 | 55 | 124 | 0 | 0 |
| DALLAS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 48 | 158 | 1 | 0 |
| DENVER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 45 | 84 | 0 | 0 |
| DETROIT | 2 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 9 | 103 | 145 | 0 | 0 |
| EL PASO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 1 | 14 | 54 | 0 | 0 |
| HONOLULU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 11 | 38 | 0 | 0 |
| HOUSTON | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 50 | 54 | 0 | 0 |
| INDIANAPOLIS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 6 | 63 | 99 | 0 | 0 |
| JACKSONVILLE | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 41 | 99 | 11 | 0 |
| KANSAS CITY | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 56 | 307 | 0 | 0 |
| KNOXVILLE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 77 | 5 | 3 |
| LAS VEGAS | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 94 | 0 | 0 |
| LITTLE ROCK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 64 | 84 | 7 | 1 |
| LOS ANGELES | 0 | 0 | 7 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 14 | 15 | 105 | 289 | 0 | 0 |
| LOUISVILLE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 65 | 95 | 0 | 0 |
| MEMPHIS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 38 | 122 | 2 | 0 |
| MIAMI | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 19 | 72 | 189 | 0 | 0 |
| MILWAUKEE | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 16 | 25 | 114 | 0 | 0 |
| MINNEAPOLIS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 9 | 50 | 104 | 0 | 0 |
| MOBILE | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 39 | 130 | 8 | 0 |
| NEWARK | 3 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 47 | 18 | 76 | 239 | 0 | 0 |
| NEW HAVEN | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 27 | 53 | 0 | 0 |

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES - TS
COVERAGE FOR OTHER AGENCIES - COA
MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES - MS
SECURITY MAIL COVERS - SMC
FUGITIVE MAIL COVERS - FMC
TRASH COVERS - TC

OTHER MAIL COVERS - OMC POTENT
SECURITY INFORMANTS - SI
POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS - PSI
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - CI
POTENTIAL CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - PCI
RACIAL INFORMANTS (RAC-CI) (RAC)

POTENTIAL RACIAL INFORMANTS
(RAC)

ENCLOSURE

| OFFICE | TS | COA | MS | SMC | FMC | OMC | TC | SI | PSI | CI | PCI | (RAC) CI | (RAC) PCI |
|----------------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|------|-----|------|------|-------------|--------------|
| NEW ORLEANS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 42 | 118 | 0 | 2 |
| NEW YORK | 41 | 7 | 22 | 42 | 0 | 11 | 10 | 165 | 76 | 102 | 497 | 0 | 0 |
| NORFOLK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 21 | 52 | 0 | 1 |
| OKLAHOMA CITY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 35 | 207 | 0 | 0 |
| OMAHA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 37 | 57 | 0 | 0 |
| PHILADELPHIA | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 48 | 4 | 67 | 203 | 1 | 0 |
| PHOENIX | 1 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 16 | 11 | 28 | 90 | 0 | 0 |
| PITTSBURGH | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 7 | 70 | 134 | 0 | 0 |
| PORTLAND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 4 | 27 | 71 | 0 | 0 |
| RICHMOND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 54 | 101 | 1 | 1 |
| ST. LOUIS | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 1 | 64 | 164 | 0 | 0 |
| SALT LAKE CITY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 3 | 27 | 68 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN ANTONIO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 3 | 36 | 80 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN DIEGO | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 4 | 37 | 76 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN FRANCISCO | 4 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 70 | 18 | 117 | 257 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN JUAN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 11 | 29 | 50 | 0 | 0 |
| SAVANNAH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 51 | 144 | 6 | 3 |
| SEATTLE | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 39 | 16 | 46 | 188 | 0 | 0 |
| SPRINGFIELD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 39 | 119 | 0 | 0 |
| TAMPA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 22 | 27 | 84 | 7 | 6 |
| WASHINGTON | 32 | 11 | 5 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 47 | 45 | 49 | 162 | 1 | 2 |
| TOTALS | 94 | 18 | 115 | 112 | 2 | 14 | 60 | 1101 | 399 | 2801 | 7167 | 83 | 38 |

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (66-2542)

DATE: 9/14/62

FROM : SAC, Indianapolis [redacted]

Acting *Q*
SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS
SEMIANNUAL REPORT

b7D

8
Set forth below are the symbol number Security Informants, Indianapolis Office, currently approved for payment either for services or actual expenses incurred:

b7D



37 SEP 1962
EXP. PROC.

31

1302

66-2542-3-

12 SEP 1962
2 AM 1302

DO NOT INDEX
REC'D

cc: [signature]
② - Bureau (RM)
1 - Indianapolis

WTT: fjm

(3)

REC-55

[Redacted]

The following is a tabulation of subversive organizations being investigated in the Headquarters City and Resident Agencies together with Security Informants, by symbol numbers, and Potential Security Informants, by name, who are reporting on these organizations:

| <u>Organization Being Investigated</u> | <u>Officers</u> | <u>Rank and File Members</u> | <u>Nonmembers</u> |
|---|---|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | <u>Headquarters City Indianapolis</u> | | b6 b7C b7D |
| Communist Party (8 members)* | [Redacted] [Redacted] | | Former Former [Redacted] |
| Infiltration of Labor Unions | | | Former Former [Redacted] |
| Nation of Islam (13 members) | | [Redacted] | |
| <p>*Includes [Redacted] and two members residing out of State, known only to [Redacted]</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Hammond and Gary Resident Agencies (Lake County)</p> | | | |
| Communist Party Steel and Community (9 members) | [Redacted] | [Redacted] | [Redacted] |
| At Large (4 members) | | | |
| Infiltration of Labor Unions (Lake County) | | [Redacted] | |

[Redacted] b7D

| Organization Being Investigated | Officers | Rank and File Members | Nonmembers |
|---------------------------------|----------|-----------------------|------------|
|---------------------------------|----------|-----------------------|------------|

Nation of Islam
(26 members)

Gary
(16 members)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D

East Chicago
(10 members)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Infiltration of
Calumet Chapter of
Indiana Civil Liberties
Union
(102 members)

Fort Wayne Resident Agency

Communist Party
(3 members)

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Infiltration of
Labor Unions

[Redacted]

South Bend Resident Agency

Communist Party
(23 members)

Labor Club -
9 members

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Women's Club -
5 members

[Redacted]

Elkhart CP Club -
7 members

[Redacted]

Unassigned -
2 members

[Redacted]

Organization Being
Investigated

Officers

Rank and File
Members

Nonmembers

Infiltration of
Labor Unions

Nation of Islam
(40 members)

CP Front Groups

Forum for Analysis
of Current Trends
(FACT)
(No known officials
or members at
present time)

Indiana Citizens Committee
for Constitutional Liberties
(ICCL) (3 members)

b6
b7C
b7D

Muncie Resident Agency

Communist Party
(2 members)

Richmond Resident Agency

Communist Party
(1 member)

Evansville Resident Agency

Nation of Islam
(28 members)

Terre Haute Resident Agency

Communist Party
(2 members)

[redacted] b7D

Bloomington Resident Agency - Security Informants - 0
Evansville Resident Agency - Security Informants - 0
Jeffersonville Resident Agency - Security Informants - 0
Kokomo Resident Agency - Security Informants - 0
Lafayette Resident Agency - Security Informants - 0

It is noted that there is no known Communist Party activity in the areas covered by the aforementioned Resident Agencies.

Since February, 1962, [redacted] has been [redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D

[redacted] who has been relieved of responsibility for the [redacted] On [redacted]
[redacted] was at the National CP Headquarters in New York City, at which time [redacted] was confirmed by GUS HALL, PHIL BART and JACK STACHEL, National CP leaders. Although the CP in Lake County, Indiana, is not supposedly under [redacted] has made no contacts in Lake County during the past six months, and [redacted] has been making contacts and collecting dues and donations in this area. Although [redacted] originally received instructions from CP leadership in Chicago that he was to [redacted] CP Committee periodically [redacted] only one such meeting has been held and on another occasion, he has turned over [redacted] to CARL WINTER, Chairman of the CP in Michigan, and the last time [redacted] turned them over to PHIL BART at New York City. Informant's position in the CP [redacted] enables him to furnish information concerning CP [redacted]

[redacted] He also reports on contacts he makes with national CP leaders.

[redacted] have previously held positions of [redacted] respectively, of the [redacted] Both of these informants have also in the past attended [redacted] meetings.

[redacted] b6

b7C

b7D

[redacted]

The Indianapolis Office continues to have coverage in every CP club in Indiana and with the national CP leadership approval of the Indiana CP operating under local leadership, it is expected that [redacted] will be attending more regional and national CP meetings as the representative from Indiana.

During the past six months, the Nation of Islam (NOI) has not experienced as rapid a rate of growth as previously. Although they continue to have a numbered temple in South Bend, Indiana, the other areas have been unable to obtain membership necessary for a numbered temple and continue to meet in private homes and rented vacant store buildings. All groups continue to receive direction and control by ministers sent from Temple #2 in Chicago. The Indianapolis Office has developed one additional symbol numbered informant who has become a member of the NOI at Gary, Indiana, and is continuing its program to develop additional informants in the NOI in Indiana.

There are no active cominfil of labor union files in the Indianapolis Office, as the Indiana CP continues to have no program of infiltrating labor organizations. However, sufficient coverage is maintained to keep abreast of any possible developments. The Indianapolis Office continues to submit Communist infiltration of mass organizations reports in connection with the Calumet Chapter of the Indiana Civil Liberties Union (ICLU) in Lake County, the Michiana Chapter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and of the NAACP. The CP has had no success in infiltrating the NAACP in Indiana and only limited success in the other two organizations.

100-430224
The Forum for Analysis of Current Trends (FACT) and the Indiana Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (ICCL) are the only CP front groups in the State of Indiana, upon which reports are being submitted. Both of these organizations are headed by informants. It is expected that the Indiana University Student Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee will be reactivated this fall at Indiana University and possibly another attempt will be made to form the YSA group. Investigation is being conducted to develop and maintain adequate coverage of these activities at Indiana University through informants and sources.

The Indianapolis Office will endeavor to continue to maintain adequate informant coverage within this Division, and all Agents handling security investigations remain alert to the development of new informants and sources of information.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS* *cc-1014*

DATE: October 2, 1962

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *JFM*1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6/18/56 set forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field submits progress letters under this program on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 8/31/62, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three months ending 8/31/62 | Three months ending 5/31/62 | Total |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------|
| A. Number of active communists contacted | 153 | 150 | 7007 |
| B. Number of other individuals contacted | 391 | 379 | 25898 |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed | 44 | 31 | 2451 |

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3
JDD/ejl (4)

OCT 5 1962 REC-35

66-2542-3-1303

13 OCT 8 1962

56 OCT 12 1962

Donohue

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and another memorandum be prepared by 12/25/62 showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current quarter, the preceding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.

J. Rive *W.R.*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : Mr. Sullivan *Wes*SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

DATE: September 25, 1962

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Fipp
- 1 - Mr. Woodcock
- 1 - Mr. Engelstad
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

This is a monthly memorandum setting forth the total number of the Bureau's confidential informants, trash covers, mail covers and coverage we are maintaining for other Government agencies as set forth in the attached pages.

Technical surveillances are only utilized when necessary and are discontinued when they are no longer productive. Their number varies and as of this date we are operating 92 security technical surveillances in Bureau cases.

In addition, at the specific request of National Security Agency, we are maintaining coverage of teletype facilities at 16 diplomatic establishments and at the request of the White House, we are covering the teletype facilities of Tass News Agency in New York.

One hundred thirteen microphone surveillances are presently installed of which 37 are concerned with security investigations and 76 are installed in criminal matters.

During August, 1962, 16 security informants were added and 20 were deleted, making a total of 1,097 security informants. Potential security informants during the same period decreased from 399 to 379.

During August, 1962, 34 criminal informants were added while 64 criminal informants were deleted. This changes the number of approved criminal informants from 2,801 to 2,771. Also, during August, 1962, the number of potential criminal informants changed from 7,167 to 7,131.

During August, 1962, one racial informant was added and 3 were deleted leaving a total of 81 racial informants. The number of potential racial informants under development is 37.

Enclosure

JDD:jmc
(11)ENCLOSURE
31

65 OCT 25 1962

REC-28
601-101

REC-28

13 OCT 16 1962

B6
B6FBI - SEC
D. Johnson

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

As of September 1, 1962, the field was operating 59 trash covers. As of September 25, 1962, the Bureau has in operation a total of 135 mail covers. Of this number, nine are maintained in criminal fugitive cases and eight in criminal cases other than fugitive. All criminal mail covers are being handled by Special Investigative Division. There are 118 mail covers in security cases.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

f Rur
2008
WMB Q

JD
GND

V
We must keep
down our technical
surveillance; mi -
crophone surveillance;
and mail covers.

K
all section chiefs in the Dom. Intel. Division have been alerted to
keep this type coverage to
absolute minimum.

JMB

| OFFICE | TS | COA | MS | SMC | FMC | OMC | TC | SI | PSI | CI | PCI | (RAC) CI | (RAC) PCI |
|--------------|----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|-----------|
| ALEXANDRIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 1 | 32 | 78 | 0 | 0 |
| ALBUQUERQUE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 49 | 92 | 0 | 0 |
| ANCHORAGE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 39 | 0 | 0 |
| ATLANTA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 55 | 218 | 7 | 6 |
| BALTIMORE | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 7 | 68 | 165 | 0 | 0 |
| BIRMINGHAM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 39 | 84 | 10 | 4 |
| BOSTON | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 3 | 40 | 128 | 0 | 0 |
| BUFFALO | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 4 | 43 | 85 | 0 | 0 |
| BUTTE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 46 | 77 | 0 | 0 |
| CHARLOTTE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 77 | 124 | 13 | 1 |
| CHICAGO | 6 | 0 | 8 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 89 | 23 | 121 | 304 | 2 | 0 |
| CINCINNATI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 5 | 60 | 107 | 0 | 0 |
| CLEVELAND | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 7 | 53 | 128 | 0 | 0 |
| DALLAS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 47 | 154 | 1 | 0 |
| DENVER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 42 | 87 | 0 | 0 |
| DETROIT | 2 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 8 | 98 | 145 | 0 | 0 |
| EL PASO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 1 | 16 | 50 | 0 | 0 |
| HONOLULU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 11 | 39 | 0 | 0 |
| HOUSTON | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 49 | 51 | 0 | 0 |
| INDIANAPOLIS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28 | 4 | 61 | 93 | 0 | 0 |
| JACKSONVILLE | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 42 | 101 | 11 | 0 |
| KANSAS CITY | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 55 | 290 | 0 | 0 |
| KNOXVILLE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 73 | 5 | 3 |
| LAS VEGAS | 1 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 47 | 94 | 0 | 0 |
| LITTLE ROCK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 64 | 80 | 7 | 2 |
| LOS ANGELES | 0 | 0 | 6 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 111 | 15 | 104 | 252 | 0 | 0 |
| LOUISVILLE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 63 | 88 | 0 | 0 |
| MEMPHIS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 38 | 134 | 2 | 0 |
| MIAMI | 0 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 18 | 18 | 73 | 208 | 0 | 1 |
| MILWAUKEE | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 15 | 24 | 101 | 0 | 0 |
| MINNEAPOLIS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 10 | 50 | 96 | 0 | 0 |
| MOBILE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 38 | 143 | 8 | 4 |
| NEWARK | 4 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 44 | 19 | 75 | 236 | 0 | 0 |
| NEW HAVEN | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 27 | 52 | 0 | 0 |

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES - TS
 COVERAGE FOR OTHER AGENCIES - COA
 MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES - MS
 SECURITY MAIL COVERS - SMC
 FUGITIVE MAIL COVERS - FMC
 TRASH COVERS - TC

OTHER MAIL COVERS - OMC
 SECURITY INFORMANTS - SI
 POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS - PSI
 CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - CI
 POTENTIAL CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - PCI
 RACIAL INFORMANTS (RAC-CI) (RAC)

| OFFICE | TS | COA | MS | SMC | FMC | OMC | TC | SI | PSI | CI | PCI | (RAC) CI | (RAC) PCI |
|------------------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|-------|-----|-------|-------|-------------|--------------|
| NEW ORLEANS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 41 | 127 | 0 | 2 |
| NEW YORK | 40 | 6 | 20 | 42 | 0 | 6 | 10 | 161 | 63 | 102 | 478 | 0 | 0 |
| NORFOLK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 22 | 63 | 0 | 1 |
| OKLAHOMA CITY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 36 | 221 | 0 | 0 |
| OMAHA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 38 | 58 | 0 | 0 |
| PHILADELPHIA | 1 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 48 | 4 | 67 | 203 | 1 | 0 |
| PHOENIX | 1 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 16 | 11 | 30 | 89 | 0 | 0 |
| PITTSBURGH | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 7 | 69 | 125 | 0 | 0 |
| PORTLAND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 4 | 28 | 69 | 0 | 0 |
| RICHMOND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 54 | 101 | 1 | 1 |
| ST. LOUIS | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 65 | 171 | 0 | 0 |
| SALT LAKE CITY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 3 | 27 | 67 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN ANTONIO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 3 | 37 | 83 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN DIEGO | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 38 | 3 | 38 | 73 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN FRANCISCO | 3 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 70 | 15 | 116 | 266 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN JUAN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 12 | 29 | 68 | 0 | 0 |
| SAVANNAH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 51 | 130 | 5 | 3 |
| SEATTLE | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 41 | 13 | 45 | 193 | 0 | 0 |
| SPRINGFIELD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 39 | 122 | 0 | 0 |
| TAMPA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 22 | 27 | 74 | 7 | 6 |
| WASHINGTON FIELD | 29 | 11 | 5 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 49 | 41 | 49 | 154 | 1 | 2 |
| TOTALS | 92 | 17 | 113 | 118 | 9 | 8 | 59 | 1,097 | 379 | 2,771 | 7,131 | 81 | 37 |

REC-39 254-63-7 1305
October 24, 1962

PERSONAL

REC'D-READING ROOM

FBI


OCT 24 3 54 PM '62

Mr. Carter E. Jones
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Mr. Jones:

Your suggestion concerning the practice of channelizing certain reports to various subfiles has been received. The change you propose is under consideration and you will be advised if it is adopted.

I want to thank you for giving me the benefit of your observations in this matter.



Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

2 - SAC, Salt Lake City - 1 - Suggestion File
1 - Field Personnel File

1 - Personnel file of SA Carter E. Jones

JER:jmh (Suggestion #334-63 dated 10/18/62)
(6)

NOTE: Referred to Domestic Intelligence Division for views and recommendations.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

NOV 1 1962
MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

#334-63

Date

10/18/62

| | | |
|----------------------|--|--|
| To: Director, FBI | From: (Suggester's name) SA CARTER E. JONES | Division of Assignment Salt Lake City |
|----------------------|--|--|

SUGGESTION

It is suggested the Bureau consider the discontinuance of channelizing informants' reports to each other's sub files. At the present time this office has several informants attending meetings of the same front group, and at the suggestion of the Inspector in September, 1959, informants' reports are designated to the sub file of each informant in attendance, which means in some instances as high as 7 or 8 copies of informants' reports dealing with the same meeting are placed in each informant's sub file. This practice was suggested by the Inspector in order that a check could be made on each informant. As a result of this practice, the sub files are becoming voluminous, a great deal of paper is being wasted, and valuable cabinet space is being used needlessly. In

(over)

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts) Inspector D. E. RONEY in September, 1959, instructed this office to follow the practice of designating copies of informants' reports to sub files of other informants attending the same meetings. It is believed this practice is followed by most of

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate) the offices throughout the Bureau.

If the above practice is adopted, considerable saving will result to the Bureau. Following is an estimate of savings per year:

| | |
|--------------------------------|-------------|
| Filing clerks' time | \$10,000.00 |
| Cost of paper | 1,000.00 |
| Cabinet and office space | 5,000.00 |

Disadvantages of suggestion

None

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss

Carter E. Jones
Signature and Title of Suggester

SA

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

If adopted, the above suggestion will definitely improve the efficiency of this office and it is recommended it be approved.

J. B. Campbell
Signature and Title SAC

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

REC-39

*Approved by the Director and the Director of Security
10/18/62, Carter E. Jones - Acting TIN, SAC, Salt Lake City*

SUGGESTION (Continued)

addition, a great deal of clerks' filing time is utilized. Especially in small offices where the informant program is handled by a few Agents, this practice, it is felt, is unnecessary and the sub file containing this information is not needed to corroborate information. This can be done by checking files dealing with the organization involved, as well as the submitting informant's sub file.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : Mr. Sullivan

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

DATE: October 30, 1962

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Fipp
- 1 - Mr. Woodcock
- 1 - Mr. Engelstad
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

Tolson ✓
 Belmont ✓
 Mohr
 Casper
 Callahan
 Conrad
 DeLoach
 Evans
 Gale
 Rosen ✓
 Sullivan ✓
 Tavel ✓
 Trotter
 Tele. Room
 Holmes
 Gandy

This is a monthly memorandum setting forth the total number of the Bureau's confidential informants, trash covers, mail covers and coverage we are maintaining for other Government agencies as set forth in the attached pages.

Technical surveillances are only utilized when necessary and are discontinued when they are no longer productive. Their number varies and as of this date we are operating 101 security technical surveillances in Bureau cases.

I do not want to go over 100 preferably 90.
 In addition, at the specific request of National Security Agency, we are maintaining coverage of teletype facilities at 17 diplomatic establishments and at the request of the White House, we are covering the teletype facilities of Tass News Agency in New York.

One hundred thirteen microphone surveillances are presently installed of which 37 are concerned with security investigations and 76 are installed in criminal matters.

During September, 1962, 14 security informants were added and 28 were deleted, making a total of 1,083 security informants. Potential Security informants during the same period increased from 379 to 380.

During September, 1962, 34 criminal informants were added while 69 criminal informants were deleted. This changes the number of approved criminal informants from 2,771 to 2,736. Also, during September, 1962, the number of potential criminal informants changed from 7,131 to 7,018.

REC-31 EX-102 66-2542-3-1306

During September, 1962, one racial informant was added and 1 was deleted leaving a total of 81 racial informants. The number of potential racial informants under development is 37.

NOV 15 1962

Enclosure

JDD:jmc
(11)

ENCL 66-2542-3-1306

65 NOV 26 1962

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

As of October 1, 1962, the field was operating 59 trash covers. As of October 30, 1962, the Bureau has in operation a total of 122 mail covers. Of this number, ten are maintained in criminal fugitive cases and five in criminal cases other than fugitive. All criminal mail covers are being handled by Special Investigative Division. There are 107 mail covers in security cases.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

JF Rive
JMP
MWP
JH
EPC per wkt ✓

6-12512-W

| OFFICE | TS | COA | MS | SMC | FMC | OMC | TC | SI | PSI | CI | PCI | (RAC) CI | (RAC) PCI |
|--------------|----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------------|--------------|
| ALBANY | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 1 | 32 | 79 | 0 | 0 |
| ALBUQUERQUE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 49 | 92 | 0 | 0 |
| ANCHORAGE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 38 | 0 | 0 |
| ATLANTA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 55 | 209 | 7 | 6 |
| BALTIMORE | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 9 | 68 | 169 | 0 | 0 |
| BIRMINGHAM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 41 | 78 | 9 | 5 |
| BOSTON | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 4 | 40 | 125 | 0 | 0 |
| BUFFALO | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 3 | 41 | 88 | 0 | 0 |
| BUTTE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 46 | 79 | 0 | 0 |
| CHARLOTTE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 76 | 129 | 13 | 1 |
| CHICAGO | 6 | 0 | 10 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 89 | 25 | 123 | 290 | 2 | 0 |
| CINCINNATI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 5 | 60 | 118 | 0 | 1 |
| CLEVELAND | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28 | 8 | 56 | 134 | 0 | 0 |
| DALLAS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 46 | 159 | 1 | 0 |
| DENVER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 42 | 92 | 0 | 0 |
| DETROIT | 2 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 9 | 97 | 146 | 0 | 0 |
| EL PASO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 1 | 16 | 49 | 0 | 0 |
| HONOLULU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 10 | 38 | 0 | 0 |
| HOUSTON | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 47 | 52 | 0 | 0 |
| INDIANAPOLIS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 28 | 4 | 60 | 95 | 0 | 0 |
| JACKSONVILLE | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 43 | 107 | 11 | 1 |
| KANSAS CITY | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 53 | 243 | 0 | 0 |
| KNOXVILLE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 34 | 75 | 6 | 2 |
| LAS VEGAS | 1 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 92 | 0 | 0 |
| LITTLE ROCK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 65 | 80 | 7 | 1 |
| LOS ANGELES | 0 | 0 | 5 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 112 | 14 | 93 | 224 | 0 | 0 |
| LOUISVILLE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 62 | 87 | 0 | 0 |
| MEMPHIS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 37 | 132 | 2 | 0 |
| MIAMI | 0 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 20 | 74 | 199 | 0 | 1 |
| MILWAUKEE | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 15 | 23 | 105 | 0 | 0 |
| MINNEAPOLIS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 9 | 45 | 133 | 0 | 0 |
| MOBILE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 37 | 116 | 8 | 4 |
| NEWARK | 3 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 44 | 18 | 73 | 234 | 0 | 0 |
| NEW HAVEN | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 15 | 27 | 51 | 0 | 0 |

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES - TS
 COVERAGE FOR OTHER AGENCIES - COA
 MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES - MS
 SECURITY MAIL COVERS = SMC
 FUGITIVE MAIL COVERS = FMC

OTHER MAIL COVERS - OMC
 SECURITY INFORMANTS - SI
 POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS - PSI
 CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - CI
 POTENTIAL CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - PCI
 TRASH COVERS - TC
 RACIAL INFORMANTS (RAC-CI) (RAC)

| OFFICE | TS | COA | MS | SMC | FMC | OMC | TC | SI | PSI | CI | PCI | (RAC) CI | (RAC) PCI |
|----------------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| NEW ORLEANS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 41 | 126 | 0 | 2 |
| NEW YORK | 41 | 7 | 16 | 37 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 158 | 67 | 100 | 477 | 0 | 0 |
| NORFOLK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 22 | 69 | 0 | 1 |
| OKLAHOMA CITY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 35 | 183 | 0 | 0 |
| OMAHA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 40 | 56 | 0 | 0 |
| PHILADELPHIA | 1 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 45 | 4 | 66 | 190 | 1 | 0 |
| PHOENIX | 1 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 16 | 11 | 31 | 86 | 0 | 0 |
| PITTSBURGH | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 6 | 67 | 123 | 0 | 0 |
| PORTLAND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 4 | 29 | 66 | 0 | 0 |
| RICHMOND | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 54 | 108 | 1 | 1 |
| ST. LOUIS | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 64 | 155 | 0 | 0 |
| SALT LAKE CITY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 2 | 27 | 63 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN ANTONIO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 3 | 36 | 84 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN DIEGO | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 38 | 5 | 38 | 78 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN FRANCISCO | 4 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 69 | 15 | 117 | 272 | 0 | 0 |
| SAN JUAN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 11 | 28 | 71 | 0 | 0 |
| SAVANNAH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 51 | 125 | 5 | 3 |
| SEATTLE | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 41 | 10 | 43 | 211 | 0 | 0 |
| SPRINGFIELD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 39 | 115 | 0 | 0 |
| TAMPA | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 24 | 24 | 76 | 7 | 6 |
| WASHINGTON | 37 | 11 | 6 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 47 | 38 | 50 | 147 | 1 | 2 |
| TOTALS | 101 | 18 | 113 | 107 | 10 | 5 | 59 | 1083 | 380 | 2736 | 7018 | 81 | 37 |

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (66-2542-Sub 3)

DATE: 11/26/62

FROM : SAC, PORTLAND [redacted]

b7D

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT

Re Portland letter dated 5/28/62.

(1) The Portland Division currently has the following security confidential informants who have been given symbol numbers and are being paid on a regular basis:

[redacted]

b7D

The Portland Division has no confidential sources who are being paid.

(2) The Portland Office has no symbol-numbered security informants who are not paid.

(3) There has been no change in the informant coverage of the Portland Office since the submission of referenced letter. All functioning CP clubs are covered, as well as the state board of the CP.

(4) HEADQUARTERS CITY

Communist Party

Civil Rights Club

66-2542-3-1307

REC-25

10 NOV 26 1962
FBI - PORTLAND
221 IB

- A. Membership
B. Coverage

EX-118

Simplex

K. Karpman

55 DEC 7 1962

cc-815-RB

② - Bureau (RM)

1 - Portland

FJS/jlk

(3)

[redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

Labor Club

- A. Membership
B. Coverage

7

[Redacted]

South Club

- A. Membership
B. Coverage

6

[Redacted]

Youth Club

- A. Membership
B. Coverage

3

[Redacted]

Committee for Protection of Oregon's Foreign Born

- A. Membership
B. Coverage

No official membership

[Redacted]

Oregon Federation for Social Action (Portland Chapter,
Methodist Federation for Social Action)

- A. Membership
B. Coverage

75 to 100

[Redacted]

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

- A. Membership
B. Coverage

1,000

No informants; coverage has been
afforded by source who is
close to officers of this
group

Portland Sobell Committee

- A. Membership

No official membership; no
units or chapters; one person
in charge of all activity

B. Coverage [redacted]

ROAD TRIP OUT OF HEADQUARTERS

Astoria, Oregon

Communist Party

A. Membership [redacted]
B. Coverage [redacted]

5

Committee for the Protection of Oregon's Foreign Born
(Clatsop County Committee for the Protection of Oregon's
Foreign Born)

A. Membership [redacted] No official membership
B. Coverage [redacted]

RESIDENT AGENCIES

Coos Bay, Oregon

Communist Party

A. Membership [redacted] One member-at-large
B. Coverage [redacted] Maintained through state chair-
man, state secretary and PSI
who resides next-door to the
one member

Eugene, Oregon

Communist Party

A. Membership [redacted] Three, plus two members-at-large
B. Coverage [redacted]

Medford, Oregon

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

(Klamath Falls, Oregon)

A. Membership 118
B. Coverage Chairman of this group is an
established source

[Redacted]

Ontario, Oregon

No information re existence of any subversive group.

Pendleton, Oregon

No information re existence of any subversive group.

Salem, Oregon

Communist Party

(Lincoln County, Oregon)

- A. Membership
B. Coverage

5

[Redacted]

The Dalles, Oregon

Communist Party

b7D

No organized or current Party members residing in this area, although five Security Index subjects, former CP members, residing this area. Four of these former members presently carried on Security Index are well known to [Redacted] and coverage afforded through this source. The remaining Security Index subject recently transferred in from the Midwest and is not known to informants; there has been no indication that he has been in touch with CP officials since taking up residence in this division.

Date of Mail 11-26-62

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL Security Informants, Den
Removed By 65 DEC 11 1962
File Number 66-2542-3-1308

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *W.C.S.*

DATE: December 13, 1962

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *F.J.B.*SUBJECT: ~~SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CP IN EACH FIELD OFFICE~~ *P.J.G.***EVALUATION OF PROGRAM**

This Program was due for evaluation in December, 1962, In connection with the inspection of the Domestic Intelligence Division in December, 1962, this Program was reviewed and justified. No separate memorandum will, therefore, be prepared at this time and a complete review and evaluation will again be made in December, 1963.

ACTION:

If you approve this Program will continue to receive close attention and a complete evaluation will be made in December, 1963.

66-2542-3

JDD/jmc *J.D.D.*
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue

EX-109

REC- 56

18 DEC 13 1962

54 DEC 26 1962

| | |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson | _____ |
| Belmont | _____ |
| Mohr | _____ |
| Casper | _____ |
| Callahan | _____ |
| Conrad | _____ |
| DeLoach | _____ |
| Evans | _____ |
| Gale | _____ |
| Rosen | _____ |
| Sullivan | _____ |
| Tavel | _____ |
| Trotter | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holmes | _____ |
| Gandy | _____ |

146

*5
F.J.B.
146*

Director, FBI (100-3-9)

12/5/62

SAC, Pittsburgh (100-577) P

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA DISTRICT
IS - C

ReBulets to Pittsburgh, 8/19/58 and 9/19/58, and mylet to Bureau, 11/5/62.

In accordance with instructions of reBulet, 9/19/58, the following information is furnished to advise the Bureau of efforts to develop potential security informants (PSIs) within the Communist Party of Western Pennsylvania (CPWP).

Pittsburgh has three Bureau approved PSIs being developed as possible future security informants regarding the CPWP, one PSI [redacted] Bufile [redacted] having been converted to a security informant during the past month. Pittsburgh is also currently conducting background and other appropriate investigation concerning twelve other individuals who are believed to possess some potential as PSIs in view of past contacts with the local CP organizer or because of connections with the CP or related groups.

b7D

Pittsburgh will continue to advise the Bureau concerning its program to develop additional PSIs.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - 66-2542-3 Security Informant Program
2 - Pittsburgh
1 - [redacted] Security Informant Program

JWS/jep
(5)

66-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
172 DEC 6 1962

5 DEC 16 1962

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: December 14, 1962

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

~~EVALUATION OF PROGRAM~~

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

Boggs

This Program was due for evaluation in December, 1962, In connection with the inspection of the Domestic Intelligence Division in December, 1962, this Program was reviewed and justified. No separate memorandum will, therefore, be prepared at this time and a complete review and evaluation will again be made in December, 1963.

ACTION:

If you approve, this Program will continue to receive close attention and a complete evaluation will be made in December, 1963.

66-2542-3-1219

JDD/jmc *JMC*
 (4) *J. Rov*

1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

ST-104

REC 18 66-2542-3-1310

18 DEC 18 1962

54 DEC 26 1962

140

John S. Kee

EX-10
REC-5
JAN 15 1963

January 15, 1963

PERSONAL

REC-5
SUGGESTION #559-63 - - - - 1311

Mr. Thomas W. Leavitt
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Leavitt:

Thank you very much for your suggestion concerning a method for handling one of the investigative steps frequently covered in our investigations. A careful study is being made regarding your proposal and you will be advised if it is adopted.

The initiative and interest which prompted you to bring this matter to my attention are indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1) Personnel file of Mr. Thomas W. Leavitt

ML:pab

(5) (Suggestion #559-63 dated 1/9/63)

NOTE: Based on memorandum W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 1/9/63, TWL:dmd re: Verification of Telephone Numbers through a Confidential Source, addendum by the Domestic Intelligence Division, 1/11/63 JON:rmc.

Referred to the General and Special Investigative Divisions for views and recommendations.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

ADM

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

REC'D-READING ROOM
JAN 15 1963
TJ
CB
T

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: VERIFICATION OF TELEPHONE NUMBERS
THROUGH A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE
#559-63

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Training Division
 1 - Inspection Division

DATE: 1-9-63

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

Gen-Wallace
J. P. McLean
Jan. 64 8-RB

One of the investigative steps frequently covered in our investigations, both of security and criminal nature, is to identify individuals who have been in contact with the subject by telephone. Most field offices, in fact, have developed confidential sources at local telephone company offices who furnish lists of numbers called by the particular subject's telephone.

It has been noted that in many instances the field subsequently obtains the identities of the subscribers to such phone numbers through confidential sources at the telephone company. In many instances it has been observed that checks with telephone company sources have shown the identities of such contacts to be hotels, travel agencies, routine business establishments, and other contacts which are not pertinent to the investigation.

The thought occurs that in many cases, except where highly sensitive investigations are involved, the field could readily identify such telephone contacts by a simple ~~pretext~~ telephone call rather than by referring the telephone numbers in question to our confidential telephone company source. The field would, of course, refer to proper confidential source any numbers which were not readily identified through pretext calls.

For example, if field office obtains list of twelve telephone contacts it could make pretext phone calls to the numbers involved and in this way possibly identify six or eight of them as business establishments, hotels, travel agencies, etc. Thereafter, the field office would only have to submit to its confidential source the remaining four or six numbers which were not identified in this manner. This would have the dual advantage of speeding up the identification of the telephone numbers in question while at the same time reducing numbers referred to the confidential source for handling. This would apply, of course, only to local telephone calls where no expense was involved and it is believed that each such pretext call could be made in a minimum of time. Probably, several such calls could be made in a minute.

TWL:dmd
(9)

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
 1 - Mr. Leavitt
 1 - General Investigative Div.
 1 - Special Investigative Div.

REC. 54 66-3542-3-1311
 1/15/63, M-166
 memo C-102 mod. 11 JAN 16 1963
 JCL/AB 1/15/63-4-63

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 3

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: VERIFICATION OF TELEPHONE NUMBERS
THROUGH A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

ACTION:

If this suggestion is approved, we will prepare an appropriate SAC Letter to the field which will suggest that consideration be given to such pretext phone calls where circumstances warrant.

TWL

Mr. [unclear]



OVER

STREAMLINING COMMITTEE

ADDENDUM

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1/11/63 JON:rmc

The Committee feels that this is a problem to be solved by individual Field Offices. This problem will ordinarily arise only in the larger Offices. Proper indexing of telephone numbers or the establishment of a telephone number index will make the desired information readily available in many instances in an Office, thus eliminating further investigation of a telephone number.

Good judgement should dictate use of pretext calls when the alternative is placing an unreasonable burden on a confidential source.

In view of the above, it is believed that an SAC Letter is not necessary. However, the views of the General Investigative and Special Investigative Divisions should be obtained before this matter is resolved.

Jon

1/11/63

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum.

TO : Mr. Evans *Cash*

DATE: January 15, 1963

105 FROM : T. J. McAndrews *TJ*SUBJECT: *Secretary info to - Jan -*
VERIFICATION OF TELEPHONE NUMBERS
THROUGH A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

| | |
|------------|-----------------|
| Tolson | _____ |
| Belmont | _____ |
| Mohr | RECD |
| Casper | RECD |
| Callahan | _____ |
| Conrad | _____ |
| DeLoach | _____ |
| Evans | _____ |
| Gale | _____ |
| Rosen | _____ |
| Sullivan | _____ |
| Tavel | _____ |
| Trotter | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holmes | _____ |
| Gandy | _____ |

Jan 15, 1963

Reference is made to memorandum W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan dated January 9, 1963.

The Special Investigative Division agrees with the Domestic Intelligence Division that this is a problem to be handled by individual field offices. The establishment of a telephone number index in each office will not only make readily available the desired information in many instances thus eliminating further investigation of a telephone number, but will also preclude the unnecessary checking of telephone company indices on more than one occasion for a particular telephone number. Such a procedure goes a long way toward reducing the workload imposed upon telephone companies which in most instances provide this service as a cooperative function.

In view of the above it is not felt that the recommended SAC Letter is necessary.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Training Division
- 1 - Inspection Division
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - General Investigative Division

REC-43

McA:rap
(9)

EX-102

66-2542-3-1312

JAN 31 1963

FEB 1 1963

50 JAN 6 1963

FEB 1 1963

VIEWS OF THE GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION RE: SUGGESTION #559-63

ADDENDUM GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION: 1/15/63 RJG:ige

The General Investigative Division recommends that this suggestion not be adopted. In many cities it is possible to obtain a cross-reference telephone directory and through the use of this the identity of the telephone subscribers called by a particular subject could be in many instances ascertained. Also the problem is peculiar in each field office and it is conceivable that it does not exist at all in many of the field offices. In view of the above, it is believed an SAC Letter is unnecessary.



Memo Cosper to Maher
JER:jah, 1/24/63.

- 4 -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 1/24/63

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL
SUGGESTION #559-63 SUBMITTED BY
SPECIAL AGENT THOMAS W. LEAVITT
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SUGGESTION: That the field be instructed to make more use of pretexts to ascertain identities of subscribers to telephone numbers obtained through investigation rather than through contacts with existing confidential sources in the telephone companies.

ADVANTAGES: Suggester felt that use of pretext calls in all but highly sensitive investigations, where prudence would dictate to the contrary, would greatly reduce the volume of requests made to contacts in telephone companies which generally provide the information as an accommodation.

OBSERVATIONS: The Streamlining Committee of the Domestic Intelligence Division commented that such instruction to the field was unnecessary since this is a problem to be solved by individual field offices. Ordinarily the problem is prevalent in larger field offices and proper indexing of telephone numbers or the establishment of a telephone number index would make the desired information readily available in many instances within an office thereby eliminating further checking to ascertain a subscriber's identity. Further, good judgment should indicate the use of pretext when the alternative would be to place an unreasonable burden on a confidential source.

The opinions of the General Investigative and Special Investigative Divisions were also solicited and their comments were in accord with those of Domestic Intelligence Division. General Investigative Division also noted that the use of a cross-reference telephone directory such as is available in many cities will reduce the necessity for verification of subscribers through confidential sources.

The Training Division also agrees that the proposed instruction to the field is unnecessary. It is felt that Agents in the field make good use of their ingenuity in obtaining information such as is described in the suggestion and only as a last resort or in cases of emergency or a sensitive nature are requests made of contacts at telephone companies.

REC-25 66-2542-3-1313

RECOMMENDATION PAGE TWO

JER:pab
(2) FEB 6 1309 30

1800 XEROX B JAN 31 1963

FEB 1 1963

EX. - 116

66-2542-3
RECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memo J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr
Re: Security Informants - General

RECOMMENDATION:

That the suggestion not be adopted. On approval, no further action is necessary; receipt of the suggestion was acknowledged by prior letter.

JJM
Jewell

74465

February 6, 1963

PERSONAL

REC'D--READING ROOM
FBI
T B I

120
66-2542-3-1314
REB-64


Mr. Carter E. Jones
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Mr. Jones:

Thank you for the suggestion concerning the disposition of channelizing memoranda in certain instances. Your proposal is being carefully considered and I will let you know if it is adopted.

I appreciate the interest which prompted you to submit this idea to me.

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover



2 - SAC, Salt Lake City 1 - Field personnel file
1 - Suggestion file

1 - Personnel file of SA Carter E. Jones

JER:pab *pal*
(6) (Suggestion #647-63 dated 1/30/63)

NOTE: Referred to Domestic Intelligence Division for views and recommendations.

EDD 203 11.03
P. E. B. T.
DECEMBER-DIRECTOR

cm 53 APR 2 1963
MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Date

1/30/63

To: Director, FBI From: (Suggester's name)
SA CARTER E. JONES

Division of Assignment
SALT LAKE CITY

#641-63

SUGGESTION At the present time the various offices are designating copies of informants' reports to the various 100 case files of those individuals in attendance at a pertinent subversive gathering. In channelizing these memoranda, copies are designated to the 100 file maintained on each informant. Where several informants are attending the same meeting, several copies of a report involving the same meeting will be placed in the case file of the informant. Where the 100 case does not involve an informant, the Bureau presently has a practice of destroying these channelizing memoranda when a semiannual or annual report is prepared. Through this means, valuable filing space is saved. However, in case of the informant's channelizing memorandum where no report is submitted, there is no provision to destroy periodically the memorandum and the various case files are becoming voluminous. It is suggested that after the submission of each justification letter or after one year, authority be granted to Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts) destroy the memoranda channelized

(See above) / to informants' files. *7AAGC*

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)
The purpose of designating informants' reports to each other's case files is to afford a means of double checking and substantiating information the informants are furnishing. It is felt that after a period of one year the copy designated to the case file on the informant has served its purpose and can be destroyed. Valuable cabinet space would be made available and a savings of at least \$1,000 per year to the Bureau would result with this additional space.

DESTRUCTION OF MEMORANDA CHANNELIZED TO INFORMANTS' FILES

Disadvantages of suggestion

None.

SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss

EX-116

Carter E. Jones Special Agent

Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

I recommend this suggestion be adopted. After submission of each justification letter for an informant or after one year, there would not appear to be any reason to maintain these memoranda

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

Let R. Beck
REC. Jan. 2/6/63.
Memo Casper to Mohr,
mon., REC. Jan.
3/6/63. dcl of
Appreciation.

REC. Feb. 2/15/63.
Let to SAC, WY
REC. Feb. 2/15/63.
32 FEB 4 1963

J. Blaylock SAC
Signature and Title

b7D

REC. Feb. 3/8/63. 32 FEB 4 1963

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: February 8, 1963

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FBC*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - *General*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Gurley
- 1 - Mr. Rose

| | |
|------------|--------------|
| Tolson | _____ |
| Belmont | _____ |
| Mohr | _____ |
| Casper | _____ |
| Callahan | _____ |
| Conrad | _____ |
| McLoach | _____ |
| Evans | _____ |
| Gale | _____ |
| Rosen | <i>REC'D</i> |
| Sullivan | <i>REC'D</i> |
| Tavel | _____ |
| Trotter | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holmes | _____ |
| Gandy | _____ |

Bauer FBC

CG 5824-S* has advised Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, intends to establish a committee to tighten security measures within the Party. The field is being instructed to alert Bureau informants as to the tightening of security measures within the Party.

OBSERVATIONS:

CG 5824-S* reported that Gus Hall intends to set up a committee of "old timers," the most trusted people in the Party, for the purpose of compiling a list of individuals who have joined the Party since the mid 1950's. After this list is compiled, there will be an investigation of these individuals to ascertain whether or not they are "security risks." It is also likely this list may include individuals who came into the Party in the early 1950's. Hall declared he will discuss this matter with the individual District leaders and will emphasize the necessity of "searching out security risks and security leaks."

CG 5824-S* also reported that Jack Kling, Communist Party functionary in the Chicago area, suggested that in regard to such individuals a check should be made regarding the circumstances around their joining the Party, the identities of their friends and inquiry made into any phase of their background which might now be pertinent in developing their informant status.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Bureau informants should be alerted as to the tightening of security measures within the Party.

Plaster all original
ENCLOSURE

2. The Bureau should be promptly advised of any indication that there is a tightening of security measures within the Party.

Enc. sent 2-12-63 REC-6 66-2542-3-1315

66-2542-3

BFR/jmc (6) *RS*

ST-118

22 FEB 18 1963

54 FEB 20 1963

J. B. R. V. 5-115

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANTS
66-2542-3

3. In line with the above, there is attached an appropriate letter to all field offices.

BR
JL
Wells
John
JL
OK
P
V

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, Albany

DATE: February 14, 1963

FROM : Director, FBI (66-2542-3)

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS

Information has been received from a highly placed reliable informant that Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, intends to set up a committee of "old timers", the most trusted people in the Party, for the purpose of compiling a list of individuals who have joined the Party since the mid 1950's. After this list is compiled, there will be an investigation of these individuals to ascertain whether or not they are "security risks." It is also likely this list may include individuals who came into the Party in the early 1950's. Hall has stated that he will discuss this matter with the individual District leaders and will emphasize the necessity of "searching out security risks and security leaks."

Jack Kling, a Communist Party functionary in the Chicago area, suggested that in regard to such individuals a check should be made regarding the circumstances around their joining the Party, the identities of their friends and inquiry made into any phase of their background which might now be pertinent in developing information which should have reflected their informant status.

You should immediately alert all informants furnishing information regarding the Party of the security measures that may be instituted by the Party. The Bureau should be promptly advised of any information indicating these security measures are being placed in effect by the Party.

2 - All Offices

ENCLOSURE

6-2542-3-1315

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: February 15, 1963

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL
 SUGGESTION #647-63 SUBMITTED BY
 SPECIAL AGENT CARTER E. JONES, SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE

Suggerster proposed that memoranda channelized to 100 classification case files on security informants be purged from these files periodically such as after submission of a justification letter, to save filing space.

At the present time, ~~channelizing memoranda in various security files may be purged therefrom after the information they contain is incorporated in a report.~~ However in the case of 100 classification case files on informants, reports are rarely written and these memoranda cannot be purged. Frequently where several informants attend the same meeting, several copies of reports concerning the same activity will be directed to informants' files, In time, these files can become voluminous.

Domestic Intelligence Division considered the suggestion and commented that there are certain factors which militate against adoption of the idea but felt that comments should be obtained from the larger field offices such as Chicago, Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco, which have a relatively large number of security informants, before final decision. They also recommended that the Inspection Division determine the practicality of the suggestion during forthcoming field inspections.

Training Division agrees that the larger offices should be canvassed for their views. However, it is felt that any request for action by the Inspection Staff would be premature until the views of these offices are received.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- REC-58 66-2542-3-1316
 (1) That the enclosed letter be directed to the New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco

Offices for their recommendations.

- (2) That no request be made of the Inspection Division pending results of the canvass of field offices.

Enclosure

JER:pab

(2)

53 APR 2 1963

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

13 FEB 18 1963

19

Enclosure

JER:pab

(2)

53 APR 2 1963

ADDENDUM

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

2/8/63

JON/rmc

In considering certain factors enumerated below, it is believed that the suggestion should not be adopted.

In the vast majority of instances, investigative reports are not prepared on informants in their 100 files. Thus, serials cannot be purged in informants' 100 files as they are purged in other 100 files where reports are prepared.

Justification letters on informants are submitted in the 134 files, do not include all data furnished by informants, are administrative in nature and have no direct bearing on informants' 100 files. Therefore, the justification letter cannot serve the same purpose as a report in considering the purging of serials from an informant's 100 file.

The 100 file on an informant can be used to many advantages by a field office. Generally, his reliability can be determined by comparison of data furnished on a particular event with that furnished by other informants. A channelizing memorandum from each informant will be in informant's 100 file, enabling an agent to readily evaluate the accuracy and reliability of an informant. If an informant becomes a potential witness, review of his 100 file can quickly determine what other informants, if any, can testify to the same data, as well as the accuracy and completeness of such information.

It is recommended that comments be obtained from certain field offices, such as Chicago, Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco, which have a relatively large number of security informants. It is also recommended that the Inspection Division during forthcoming field office inspections determine the practicality of this suggestion and if its adoption would alleviate space problems which might exist.

NJW
mambo Casper to MAFK
2/15/63 JRF:pas
let to NY 2/15/63
JER:pas

1. Anti-Skt
jnk

SAC, New York

February 15, 1963

Director, FBI

SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL
EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION #647-63

It has been suggested that the field be permitted periodically to purge characterizing memoranda and the like from the files maintained on informants in the 100 classification. A copy of the suggestion is enclosed for your information. Please submit your comments and recommendations concerning the proposal to reach the Bureau, attention Training Division, by close of business February 25, 1963.

Enclosure

- 2 - Chicago - Enclosure
2 - Los Angeles - Enclosure
2 - San Francisco - Enclosure

JER:pab

(10)

NOTE: Based on memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr, 2/15/63,
re: Security Informants - General, Suggestion #647-63 Submitted
by Special Agent Carter E. Jones, Salt Lake City Office, JER:pab.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAILED 8

FEB 1 1963

COMM-FBI

RECEIVED
FEB 18 1963

REC-58

RECEIVED

FEB 18 2 50 PM '63 13 FEB 19 1963 3 50 PM '63

407TH INF DIVISION
WEIR HILL

407TH INF DIVISION
WEIR HILL

53 APR 2 1963

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2/21/63

PROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-00)

ATTN: TRAINING DIVISION

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL
EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION #647-63

ReBulet 2/15/63, enclosing xeroxed copy of employee suggestion #647-63.

At the present time in the Chicago Office there is considerable channelization to informants' 100 case files. As pointed out in the employee suggestion #647-63, this is a means of cross checking informants as to their reliability. Also, as pointed out in this employee suggestion, after a period of time these channelizing memos have served their purpose and are useless to retain, only to occupy file cabinet space.

As a general rule, after three or four months have elapsed, these channelizing memos have served their purpose and could be destroyed; however, if a rule is placed in effect to destroy these channelizing memos at the time of the submission of justification letters, it would mean that the agent handling the justification letters would be required to review and purge these 100 case files three times each year. It is the opinion of the Chicago Division that it would save considerable agent time if this review were conducted on a yearly basis.

In view of the above, it is the recommendation of the Chicago Division that a rule be placed in effect to destroy these channelizing memos on a yearly basis, but that the destruction include memos up to three months prior to the date of the review and preparation of the destruction memorandum. The three month lag in destruction is recommended so as to maintain a ready reference for the cross checking of information.

REC-50

66-2542-3-1318

(2) - Bureau
1 - Chicago
JRW/mab

(3) Memo Casper to Mohr,
QER:pub, 3/6/63.

11 FEB 25 1963

EX-114

53 APR 2 1963
12

R. L. Mohr
MAB

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2/20/63

WJm
FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES

ATTENTION: TRAINING
DIVISION

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL
EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION #647-63

ReBulet to New York captioned as above, dated 2/15/63.

Captioned suggestion was discussed with supervisory and agent personnel handling security investigations in the Los Angeles Office. The opinion expressed was that continued retention of channelizing memoranda in informants' 100 files serves no practical purpose after letters of justification have been submitted. If these files are purged at the time of, and in conjunction with, the preparation of justification letters, it would be a continuous operation; and after the initial destruction has been completed the filing space utilized for such memoranda would remain constant.

The adoption of this suggestion is recommended.

(2) - Bureau 1 - cc detached Sugg. Det
1 - Los Angeles

REC-50

66-2542-3-1319

28
to FEB 25 1963

PLM:slb
(3)

EX-114

Memo Casper to Mohr,
FEB 25 1963

53 APR 2 1963

DW

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
Attn: Training Division

DATE: 2/19/63

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: ⑥ SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL
EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION #647-63

Rebulet 2/15/63.

The NYO has considered the suggestion set forth in rebulet. As the Bureau is aware, there are a number of reasons why copies of informant reports are channelized to the 100 files of informants. It is the unanimous opinion, however, of personnel of the NYO who considered this matter that all of these reasons will have been satisfied when such informant reports are one year old. Accordingly, the NYO recommends that this suggestion be adopted.

2 - Bureau 1 - cc detailed Sugg Det
1 - New York

DER:MEW
(4)

EX-114 REC-50 GG- 250-3-1320

REC-50 GG- 250-3-1320

Memorandum
Date: April 5, 1963

RECORDED APR 5 1963

53 APR 2 1963

127

APR 5 1963

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL
EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION #647-63

DATE: 2/18/63

ReBulet to New York dated February 15, 1963, and Employee Suggestion Form, attached.

The San Francisco Office does not follow the practice of having a "dead" or "dummy" file on its informants and therefore, is not faced with the problem set out in the suggestion attached to referenced Bulet. Where one informant reports on the activities of another informant, the first informant's report is placed in the administrative file of the second informant in the San Francisco Office. This enables the agent handling the informant very readily to check on the information reported by his informant as compared to the information reported by the other informant on the same meeting or activity. The filing of these informant reports in the 134 informant files in this office has not become a space problem and therefore, San Francisco suggests that, in those offices where a space problem exists, and where the 100 "dummy" files are maintained on informants, the offices be allowed to destroy the copies of serials in the 100 files, if they so desire.

cc: detailed Sugg. Rel.
2 - Bureau Am Reg.
1 - San Francisco

HFC:jab
(3)

REC- 50

66-2-62-3-1321

12 FEB 19 1963

Memo Copy sent to
Mstr. Geripab,
3/6/63. EX-114

53 APR 2 1963

121

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*Memorandum*TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *2/3c*

DATE: March 12, 1963

FROM : Mr. Donohue

1- Mr. Baumgardner
1- Mr. RoseSUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND
SOURCES PAYMENTS

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

The following tabulation of expenditures represents payments made to security informants and sources on a monthly basis for the period of January, 1960, through December, 1962.

| | <u>1960</u> | <u>1961</u> | <u>1962</u> |
|-------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Jan. | | | |
| Feb. | | | |
| Mar. | | | |
| Apr. | | | |
| May | | | |
| June | | | |
| July | | | |
| Aug. | | | |
| Sept. | | | |
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| Nov. | | | |
| Dec. | | | |

b7E

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|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |
| <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |

Monthly average January, 1960, through December, 1962,

REC. 17 \$ [redacted] 66-2542-3-1322

The above tabulations are reported graphically on the attached page.

ACTION:


12 MAR 13 1963

None, for your information.

BFR:dfm
(3)

56 MAR 18 1963

[Handwritten signatures and initials follow, including "M. J. Baumgardner", "F. J. Baumgardner", "S. P. R.", "R. L. Rose", and "J. W. Donohue".]



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *JBC*

DATE: March 8, 1963

FROM : Mr. D. Ryan *D**Security General*SUBJECT: INFORMANTS EXPOSED AS A RESULT OF
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
PROCEEDINGS AND OTHER PROSECUTIONS,
1962-1963

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue
 1 - Mr. Reddy
 1 - Mr. Ryan

Bush

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
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 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

Set forth below are statistics concerning the status of our Security Informant Program with emphasis on informants exposed or who may be exposed as a result of proceedings under the Internal Security Act of 1950 and other prosecutive action.

Informants made Available to Department for Interview to Consider Their Potential as Witnesses..... 214

Informants (Active or Discontinued) Who have been Released or Otherwise Made Available to the Department for Testimony..... 34

Active Informants Who were Communist Party Members Who have been Exposed:

(1) By Their Testimony before the Subversive Activities Control Board..... 12

(2) By Testimony of Spouse before the Subversive Activities Control Board..... 1

(3) By Testimony of Relative before the Subversive Activities Control Board..... 1

(4) By Testimony in Artie Brown LMRDA Case..... 1

(5) By Testimony of Spouse in Artie Brown LMRDA Case..... 1

Total Active Communist Party Informants Exposed as a Result of Subversive Activities Control Board Proceedings or Prosecutions during Period 1/1/62 to Date..... 16

Discontinued Informants Exposed as a Result of Testimony before the Subversive Activities Control Board..... 3

DR:bgc

(5)

54 MAR 5 1963
100-372598 1963166-2542-1
MAR 11 1963

NOT RECORDED

128 MAR 12 1963

MAR 12 1963

5-BR

Memorandum to Mr. Baumgardner

RE: INFORMANTS EXPOSED AS A RESULT OF
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
PROCEEDINGS AND OTHER PROSECUTIONS,
1962-1963

100-372598

Broken down by field division, our loss of active informants who were Communist Party members as a result of testimony before the Subversive Activities Control Board or in the Artie Brown LMRDA case is as follows:

| <u>City</u> | <u>Active CP Informants Exposed</u> | <u>Number of informants in field office as of 1/1/63</u> | <u>% of loss</u> |
|---------------|---|--|----------------------|
| Buffalo | 2 | 6 | 33 1/3 |
| Chicago | 2 | 40 | 5 |
| Los Angeles | 3 | 80 | 3.8 |
| Minneapolis | 1 | 15 | 6.7 |
| New York | 4* | 35 | 11.5 |
| Newark | 1 | 6 | 16.7 |
| San Francisco | 2 | 30 | 6.7 |
| Seattle | 1 | 34 | 2.9 |

* An additional informant [redacted] was discontinued in New York as a result of his refusal to testify before the Subversive Activities Control Board.

The following figures indicate the over-all effect of loss of active Communist Party informants on our informant program:

Total Informants in the Communist Party as of 1/1/62.....427

Total Informants in the Communist Party as of 1/1/63.....400

% Decrease of Informant Coverage During the Period
1/1/62 to 1/1/63.....6.3%

b7D

Memorandum to Mr. Baumgardner

RE: INFORMANTS EXPOSED AS A RESULT OF
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
PROCEEDINGS AND OTHER PROSECUTIONS,
1962-1963

100-372598

Our greatest loss of informants as a result of the first 14 Subversive Activities Control Board hearings under the membership provision of the Internal Security Act of 1950 took place in New York where 4 informants were exposed through testimony and an additional active Communist Party informant was discontinued as a result of his refusal to testify. New York had an estimated Communist Party membership of 1,855 as of 1/1/63 and 35 of these were Bureau informants. We lost 5 informants as a result of the Subversive Activities Control Board hearings and this loss represents 14.2% of our informant coverage of the Communist Party in New York.

The following informants have appeared as witnesses before the Subversive Activities Control Board in the first 14 hearings afforded Communist Party functionaries under the membership provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950:

| | | |
|-----|--------|--|
| 1. | former | |
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| 16. | | |

b6
b7C
b7D

ACTION:

None. For information. You will be periodically advised regarding the status of our informant program as it is affected by proceedings under the Internal Security Act of 1950 and other prosecutions.

X 835-63
Date

3/15/63

| | | |
|----------------------|--|------------------------------------|
| To: Director, FBI | From: (Suggester's name) [Redacted] | Division of Assignment NEW YORK |
|----------------------|--|------------------------------------|

b6
b7C

SUGGESTION

Whenever an agent does not interview a subject due to fear of compromising an informant a memo should be placed in informant's file. If informant is discontinued, dies etc., agent closing informant file will insure that desirability of interview be forthwith reconsidered.

MR.
Second Informant

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

No such requirement. Usually agent handling case talks to agent handling informant and puts reason for non-interview only in subject's case file.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (Include basis for estimate)

On Security Index subjects the desirability of interview is considered annually. This suggestion would apply chiefly to other subjects who are not considered periodically. Would insure more complete handling of certain unresolved situations. Would tend to accelerate and/or increase the number of interviews. 32

Disadvantages of suggestion

Requires additional memo in informant's Administrative File. Requires agent closing informant file to take certain additional steps.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss

S.A. b6
b7C

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

It is felt this suggestion is worthy of consideration.

REC-12

Signature and Title

SAC

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

Memo C.R. to Mohr,
mid-pak, 3-21-63.

66-254-3-1323

3 MAR 20, 1963

106
APR 1 1963

Officer TWO

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MemorandumTO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: 3/13/63

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJG*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - SECURITY MEASURES

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Donohue

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

Baumgardner

Chicago has furnished additional information indicating the Communist Party, USA, is tightening up security measures within the Party in order to uncover our informants.

According to CG 5824-S

Jack Kling, Lou Diskin and

met on 2/23/63. CG 5824-S does not know how this [] will function in connection with its review of the membership but there is every indication that the Party is attempting to determine some sort of pattern of the informants who have been exposed in recent cases before the Subversive Activities Control Board in order to learn the identities of our informants. The Party has noted that both Chicago informants who testified were Negroes and that they had joined or rejoined the Party in the 1950's. In addition, the Party has discussed persons who appear too eager to perform Party tasks or are available to travel at any time for Party meetings without apparent concern for the expense involved. Any individual taking notes at Party functions is to be considered as "marked" and under b6 b7C suspicion.

CG 5824-S has also reported that during the recent visit of Gus Hall to Chicago, Hall designated [] as responsible for the Indiana District and issued instructions to [] to ferret out "stool pigeons." Likewise, Hall instructed Claude Lightfoot to be responsible for the State of Missouri and additional midwest members of the National Committee were assigned responsibilities for co-ordinating work within several midwest districts as follows:

[], Carl Winter - Cleveland area, Jack Kling - Wisconsin. According to CG 5824-S Hall's instructions to these individuals regarding checking of work in the districts includes responsibility to be alert and take appropriate action to uncover "stool pigeons" through inquiries et cetera.

This latest indication of alertness by the Party to security should be brought to the attention of the field. In doing so, we are referring to Bureau letters of 9/27/62 and 2/14/63

Enclosure

JDD/jmc

(5)

3-7223

166-2542-3

NOT RECORDED

191 MAR 20 1963

MAR 13 1963

17 MAR 16 1963

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANTS -
SECURITY MEASURES

which described in some detail, characteristics of individuals and incidents which will be watched by Party officials in their efforts to search out "security risks" in the Party.

ACTION:

There is attached an appropriate letter to all field offices in line with the above. No Manual or Handbook change is necessary.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 3/21/63

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - *General*
 SUGGESTION #835-63 SUBMITTED BY
 SA [redacted] NEW YORK OFFICE
 RETIRED 3/15/63

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
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 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

J. J. Casper

b6
b7C

SUGGESTION: When a subject is not interviewed due to fear of compromising a security informant, a memorandum setting forth this information should be placed in the informant's file. If informant is discontinued, dies, etc., agent closing the informant file would insure that consideration be given to interviewing the subject at this time.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Suggester states the usual method is for agent handling the case to talk to agent handling the informant and reason for not interviewing the subject is placed only in the subject's case file.

ADVANTAGES: This suggestion would apply chiefly to subjects other than Security Index (SI) subjects since the desirability of interview on SI subjects is considered on an annual basis. Adoption would insure more complete handling of certain unresolved situations and would tend to accelerate and/or increase the number of interviews.

DISADVANTAGES: An additional memorandum would be required in the informant's administrative file and would require additional steps be taken by the agent closing the informant file.

OBSERVATIONS: The Domestic Intelligence Division and the Training Division are in agreement that this suggestion should not be adopted. In most cases, an interview with a subject can be conducted that will not compromise the informant. In most types of security cases, this matter will arise and a conclusion reached during the annual review. The need for such a procedure would not appear to exist for those subjects not on the Security Index.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted. Since the suggester ceased active duty as of close of business 3/15/63 no further action is necessary. Letter of acknowledgment not prepared. A copy of this memorandum is being designated for the personnel file of the suggester.

1 - Personnel file of SA [redacted]
 ML:pab f:ab
 (3)

55 APR 2 1963

REC-11
5-11-1963

66-2542-3-1324
 MAR 26 1963

20

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan *WCJ* 3/26

DATE: 3/4/63

FROM : Division Streamlining Committee

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

Streamlining Committee
 1 - Belmont
 1 - Sullivan
 1 - Division
 1 - Training Div.
 1 - J. D. Donohue
 1 - Newpher

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 647-63

*Security Informants - Gen'l*SUGGESTION:

J. D. Donohue
Bm. 647-63-RB

Special Agent Carter E. Jones of Salt Lake City Office suggested that informants' reports channelized to other informants' case files (100 files) be destroyed after such reports have served their purpose and that such destruction occur after a period of one year or after a justification letter has been submitted in an informant's 134 file.

OBSERVATIONS:

This suggestion was originally considered by this Committee 2/8/63, at which time it was recommended the suggestion not be adopted. Our recommendation was based on the following factors:

Investigative reports are not prepared on the vast majority of informants in their 100 files and, therefore, serials cannot be purged in informants' 100 files as they are purged in other 100 files where reports are prepared.

Justification letters on informants are submitted in the 134 files, are administrative in nature and have no direct bearing on informants' 100 files. Further, 100 files on informants can be used to many advantages by field offices, such as determining reliability, evaluating accuracy of information and evaluating informants as potential witnesses.

This Committee also recommended that the observations of certain field offices, which have a relatively large number of security informants, be obtained.

Comments have been obtained from the Chicago, Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco Offices, and they have unanimously agreed that the suggestion submitted by Special Agent Jones be adopted.

ST-120

REC-64 66-2542-3-1325

RECOMMENDATION: *[Signature]*
53 APR 2 1963 Inasmuch as this suggestion is primarily of field interest and the above-mentioned offices have unanimously agreed that it should be adopted, this Committee recommends adoption of the suggestion, with the following provisions:

12 MAR 27 1963

JON:jal:bjs *[Signature]* memo: Cooper to Mohr,
 (7) QEP:jah, 3/6/63.

[Signature]

Memorandum from Division Streamlining Committee to W. C. Sullivan
Re: SUGGESTION NUMBER 647-63

The channelizing memoranda may be destroyed on a yearly basis, with retention of such memoranda covering the previous year. Thus, in 1/63 the channelizing memoranda covering 1961 may be destroyed and 1962 retained until 1964.

Further, when channelizing memoranda are destroyed, a memorandum must be prepared which will list those channelizing memoranda that have been destroyed. This will correspond to requirement that such a memorandum be prepared in cases not involving security informants.

[Handwritten signatures and initials follow]

REC 6A

66-2542-3-

1326

March 8, 1963

PERSONAL

EX-10
OCT-1963

Mr. Carter E. Jones
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Mr. Jones:


Reference is made to your suggestion concerning the disposition of channelizing memoranda in certain instances. It is a pleasure to advise you that your proposal has been adopted with certain modifications. Purging of these items will be done on a yearly basis when one year old and a memorandum must be prepared listing each item destroyed.

MAR 8 10 22 AM '63
RECEIVED READING ROOM

I want to take this means to express my appreciation to you for your interest in calling this matter to my attention.

Sincerely yours,

Edgar Hoover



✓
2 - SAC, Salt Lake City 1 - Field personnel file
1 - Suggestion file

1 - Personnel file of SA Carter E. Jones

JER:pab pab (6) (Suggestion #647-63)

NOTE: Based on memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr, 3/6/63,
re: Security Informants - General, Suggestion #647-63
Submitted by SA Carter E. Jones, Salt Lake City Office, JER:pab.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

58 APR 2 1963
MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Policy
before
FD-338a.

see serial 1314
this file

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 3/6/63

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL
SUGGESTION #647-63 SUBMITTED BY
SA CARTER E. JONES, SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

Back from [unclear]

SUGGESTION: That memoranda channelized to 100 classification case files on security informants be purged from these files periodically, such as after submission of a justification letter in the informant's 134 file, to save filing space. Since the originals are retained in the appropriate 134 files, destruction of the copies in question would not entail any loss of information.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Channelizing memoranda in various security files may be purged after information they contain is incorporated in a report with certain exceptions such as when the original information is not contained elsewhere in the office, the memorandum is serial one of a file or, it contains indexing or action. However in 100 classification case files on informants, reports are rarely written and these memoranda cannot be purged.

ADVANTAGES: Would save filing space.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Blaylock of the Salt Lake City Office recommended adoption.

The Domestic Intelligence Division originally opposed adoption but felt the opinion of larger offices, where retention of this material could be a problem, should be solicited and the Inspection Division could determine its practicality.

The Training Division solicited the views of the New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco Offices but recommended that no request be made for action by Inspection Division until more information was known. This was approved.

The four offices mentioned all agreed that the idea should be adopted and the matter was discussed with the Inspection Division which felt since this is a field problem and the four offices to which such a procedure is particularly applicable all favored adoption, no special action need be taken by them beyond the normal scope of inspections. However, in view of the result of the canvass of the field, Domestic Intelligence should have the opportunity for additional comment. *66-2542-3-1326*

Enclosures

1 - Mr. Gale

JER:pab

(3)

cc-46-1934

Manual of Rules & Regulations REC-64
Manual of Instructions 116
Revised

12 MAR 27 1963

SEE NEXT PAGE -

2-fo

Memo J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr
Re: Suggestion #647-63

The Domestic Intelligence Division reconsidered the idea in the light of the views of the field and recommended adoption under the following circumstances. The channelizing memoranda in question may be destroyed on a yearly basis after one year old. Thus on 1/63, the channelizing memoranda for 1961 may be destroyed but those of 1962 would be retained until 1/64. Further, when channelizing memoranda are destroyed, a memorandum must be prepared which will list the items destroyed and the location of the original information. This corresponds to present requirements that such memoranda be prepared in cases in which security informants are not involved. The Training Division agrees.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the suggestion, modified as provided by the Domestic Intelligence Division, be adopted and the enclosed letter of appreciation be directed to the suggester. He was thanked by prior letter.

✓

W.H. Jr.

(2) On approval that the enclosed SAC Letter be directed to the field.

W.H. Jr.

(3) On approval that this memo serve as the necessary authority for the Manuals Desk, Training Division to make the necessary manual revisions.

W.H. Jr.

✓

W.H. Jr.

W.H. Jr.

W.H. Jr.

W.H. Jr.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *W.C.S.*

DATE: 4/2/63

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

- 2818 GEN*
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 - 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 - 1 - Mr. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

(Signature)

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6/18/56 sets forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permit the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field submits progress letters under this program on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 3/31/63, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three months ending 3/31/63 | Three months ending 12/31/63 | Total |
|--|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|
| A. Number of active communists contacted | 188 | 184 | 7380 |
| B. Number of other individuals contacted | 422 | 383 | <i>66-2542-3-1327</i> <i>REC-10</i> <i>26824</i> |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed | 47 | 25 | <i>EX-102</i> <i>APR 3 1963</i> — 2543 — |

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3

JDD/jmc *Jmc*
(4)56 APR 8 1963 *1/2**Donahue*

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that the program be continued and another memorandum be prepared by 6/25/63 showing the progress of the program reflecting the figures for the current quarter, the preceding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.

J. R. R.
J. R.

66-2542-3-1328, 1329

CHANGED TO

FILED AS CORNER # TO
66-2542-1-664

MAY 6 1963

mt/mgs

177

66-2542-3-1330, 1331

CHANGED TO

66 - 2542-1-664;
FILED AS CORNER # TO ABOVE

MAY 6 1963

mt/718

137

66-2542-3-13328

April 18, 1963

PERSONAL

FV. 515

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
Charlotte, North Carolina**

Dear

I have received your suggestion that Form FD-306
be printed on thin paper. It is a pleasure to advise you that your
idea has been adopted and the necessary steps are being taken
to place it into effect.

I want to thank you for giving me the benefit of your observations in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

2 - SAC, Charlotte 1 - Field personnel file
 1 - Suggestion file

1 - Personnel file of
JER:pab *pab*

(6) (Suggestion #925-63 dated 4-12-63)

(b) (Suggestion #335 as dated 1-1-58) NOTE: Suggests Form FD-306(Cover Sheet for Informant Report or Material) be printed on thin white paper. It is presently printed on bond and mimeograph paper. With the bond, it is difficult to prepare more than 5 or 6 copies at a time unless a stencil is cut or another run of the report is made by the typist.

edn The Training Division checked with the Domestic Intelligence Division which had no objection to the preparation of the form on the thin white writing paper now used for forms and eliminate the bond paper. Washington Field Office also favored the idea. On approval, this letter will serve as authority for the Forms Management Desk, Training Division to take necessary

MATH ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

MAY 3 1963

b6
b7c

THE HISTORY OF THE
ANGLO-SAXON CHURCH

AIR 18.11.38 AM 6

#925-63

| | |
|------------------------|----------------|
| Date | April 12, 1963 |
| Division of Assignment | CHARLOTTE |

b6
b7C

To:
Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name) [Redacted]

SUGGESTION

Suggestion Division - 66-366-133-1

It is suggested that FD-306 (Cover Sheet for Informant Report or Material) be printed on thin paper.

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

At the present time FD-306 is printed only in bond and mineograph form.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

In many instances it is necessary to make more than five copies of informant report and FD-306. The present FD-306 will not make more than five (5) clear, legible copies. When more than five or six copies of FD-306 are required, it necessitates typing FD-306 on stencil. This consumes time of steno inasmuch as she has to hold informant report until FD-306 is run off and returned to her, usually overnight. Inasmuch as CCO has to take time to run FD-306 (which could have been typed outright if thin paper were available, but in order to have legible copies had to be placed on stencil), it also utilizes time in CCO. Since the typing of FD-306 on stencil is so frequent, it is felt that the cost of printing FD-306 on thin paper would be less expensive than stencil and mineograph paper on which it is run.

None known at this time.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered within two years after submission.)

suggestion is adopted

Mr. Mrs. Mis

Stenographer
of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

Charlotte has a large volume of matters of this kind and could save time and money if suggestion approved. I recommend approval.

Duffy, R. G. , SAC
Signature and Title

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

*Get of Ack
SPK: Sab, 4-18-63.*

REC-61

ENCLOSURE
envelope form

66-2542-3-133-1
12 APR 15 1963
5-2

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-366-133-1

Cover Sheet for Informant Report or Material

FD-306 (3-21-58)

| | | |
|---------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| Date received | Received from (name or symbol number) | Received by |
|---------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|

Method of delivery (check appropriate blocks)

in person by telephone by mail orally recording device written by Informant

| | |
|--|---|
| If orally furnished and reduced to writing by Agent: <u>Date</u> Dictated _____ to _____ | Date of Report Date(s) of activity |
| Transcribed _____ Authenticated by Informant _____ | File where original is located if not attached _____ |
| Brief description of activity or material _____ _____ | |

Remarks:

Block Stamp

ENCLOSURE 66-2542-3-1332

66-2542-3-1333, 1334, 1335

CHANGED TO



b7D

NOV 21 1963

BW/MTM

C

July 3, 1963

REC-38

phd 66-2542-3-1336 PERSONAL

Mr. Kennerly R. Corbett
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Savannah, Georgia


Dear Mr. Corbett:

Thank you very much for the suggestion that the names of certain individuals be listed for a particular purpose and that index cards prepared on these names be filed by geographical location. This proposal has been carefully considered and it was decided it should not be adopted. It is felt the work involved in this procedure would far outweigh any anticipated advantage to be gained.

The interest which prompted you to give me the benefit of your observations on this matter is indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover



2 - SAC, Savannah

1 - Field personnel file

1 - Suggestion file

1) - Personnel file of SA Kennerly R. Corbett

ML:pab pab

(6) (Suggestion #4-64 dated 6/29/63)

NOTE: Suggests parents of newly assigned Bureau employees be listed as sources of information and that index cards prepared on these individuals be maintained by geographical location for ready reference.

Inspection Division and Training Division recommend suggestion not be adopted. In the majority of cases, parents of employees are not in a position to give us any valuable information. If parents have any information of value to us, they would come forward with it without placing suggested procedure into effect. This idea would require a great amount of indexing of useless names.

REC'D-READING ROOM

JUL 3 11 26 AM '63

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2542-3

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| MAILED 20 |
| JUL 3 1963 |
| COMM-FBI |

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
End _____

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Date

JUN 22, 1963

| | | |
|----------------------|--|------------------------------------|
| To: Director, FBI | From: (Suggester's name) SA KENNERLY R. CORBETT | Division of Assignment SAVANNAH |
|----------------------|--|------------------------------------|

SUGGESTION

Sources of Information - Bureau Employees

Suggestion that parents of newly appointed Bureau employees be listed as Sources of Information. Suggest Source of Information cards be prepared on these persons and be maintained by geographical location for ready reference in event of a need for a particularly reliable Source of Information in that area.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION - PNL

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

None

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (Include basis for estimate)

These persons have been determined by investigation to be of excellent family background, of good character and reputation, and loyal. Over a period of time they would represent an excellent cross section of the population geographically. They would have a natural inclination to be more cooperative than the majority of other persons and would normally be more alert for things of interest to the FBI. Geographical listing of these persons as Sources of Information would provide a ready reference list of reliable persons available in event of crime or other need in a particular area. There is no means available to determine possible savings.

Disadvantages of suggestion

None Known.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss

Kennerly R. Corbett
Special Agent and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

Parents of Bureau employees and former Bureau employees appear to be excellent material for sources of information, and I feel that the above suggestion warrants further consideration by the Bureau.

JOE D. JANESON Director, in Charge

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

JUL 8 1963

REC-38

JUL 2 1963

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 7/11/63

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. DonohueSUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
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 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6/18/56 sets forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permit the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field submits progress letters under this program on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 6/30/63, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three months ending 6/30/63 | Three months ending 3/31/63 | Total |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------|
| A. Number of active communist contacted | 206 | 188 | 7586 |
| B. Number of other individuals contacted | 435 | 422 | 27313 |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed | 37 | 47 | 2580 |

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3

66-2542-3-1337

BFR:chs

(4)

JES

EX-114

8 JUL 16 1963

30 JUL 1963

RDR-6

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITYINFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that this program be continued. Another memorandum will be prepared upon receipt of the information from the field showing the progress of the program and reflecting the figures for the current quarter (ending 9-30-63), the preceding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.

A handwritten signature consisting of stylized initials and a surname.

July 18, 1963

PERSONAL

REC 7 66-2542-3 - 1338

b6
b7C

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Dallas, Texas

Dear [redacted]

I have received your suggestion that a particular item be added to the format of Form FD-209. This proposal has been carefully considered and it was decided it should not be adopted since it is only in rare instances that this information is available when the FD-209 or a memorandum is prepared.

Your continued interest in seeking ways and means to improve our operations is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

MAILED 8
JUL 18 1963
COMM-FBI

2 - SAC, Dallas

1 - Field personnel file
1 - Suggestion file

1 - Personnel file of [redacted]
ML:pab pab

(6) (Suggestion #40-64 dated 7/10/63)

NOTE: Suggests FD-209 be revised to include word "STATISTICAL" with a corresponding space for indicating such information contained on the form.

The Special Investigative Division opposed adoption. FD-209 prepared from information furnished by informant. Statistics are not received from informant but from agencies to which information disseminated; therefore, not available when FD-209 executed. A memo or the FD-209, whichever is prepared, must be read by supervisor and he can extract statistical information

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

JUL 25 1963

MAIL ROOM

JUL 22 1963
TELETYPE UNIT

SEE PAGE TWO

NOTE CONTINUED

at that time; however, it would be a rare instance when statistics are known at time FD-209 prepared because investigative action has not as yet taken place to verify informant's information. If suggestion adopted, Agent would have to go to file and enter statistical information received at a later date thus adding information on serialized mail in file on which action has already been taken. Training Division agrees and recommends idea not be adopted.

1064
Date

7/10/63

| | | |
|----------------------|--|--|
| To: Director, FBI | From: (Suggester's name) <input type="text"/> | Division of Assignment Dallas Field |
|----------------------|--|--|

b6
b7C

SUGGESTION

It is suggested FD-209 be revised by adding the word STATISTICAL under "Purpose and results of contact", with the corresponding space provided for indicating such information is contained therein.

2 Scans, 15/12-2063

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

Form presently provides for indicating information is "NEGATIVE" or "POSITIVE".

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

All CI and PCI files are reviewed monthly and STATISTICAL accomplishments reported to reach Bureau no later than 10th of each month. At present form only indicates if information is POSITIVE and does not provide for indicating STATISTICAL information contained therein. Much POSITIVE information is not STATISTICAL; however, employee reviewing files must read entire FD-209 containing POSITIVE information to determine if information is STATISTICAL. If this suggestion should be adopted, it will be necessary to review only those FD-209's where it is indicated STATISTICAL information contained, thus

(continued page 2)

Disadvantages of suggestion

None known.

b6
b7C

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for a position in the Bureau within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss

Investigative Clerk

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

This suggestion appears to have considerable merit and I believe would save time whether the statistical accomplishments are checked and

(continued page 2)

XEROX

JUL 22 1963

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

1064-2542-3-1
JUL 15 1963

~~EXP. PROC.~~

REC

3 JUL 15 1963

ENCLOSURE!

Employee Suggestion

FD-252

Submitted by [redacted]

Investigative Clerk

b6
b7C

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (continued)

saving many man-hours each month. It is estimated approximately three hours each month are spent in the Dallas Office reviewing POSITIVE information in which no STATISTICAL information is contained. Assuming the Dallas Office to be average, 55 field offices would spend approximately 2,000 man hours annually in this effort. This function is performed in the Dallas Office by GS-7 Investigative Clerk, \$6280.00 per annum, or \$3.02 per hour. Using this salary figure as a basis, on the basis of the above, it is estimated annual savings in excess of \$6,000.00 would result if suggestion adopted.

Recommendations and comments of Division Head (continued)

reported by an Agent or Clerk, and I recommend its adoption.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC

DATE:

FROM : SA

CI SI
 PCI PSI

SUBJECT:

| | |
|---|----------|
| Dates of Contact | |
| Titles and File #'s on which contacted | |
| <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> | |
| Purpose and results of contact | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Negative <input type="checkbox"/> Positive <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Statistical | |
| Security Informant certified that he had furnished all information obtained by him since last contact. | |
| Personal Data | Rating |
| | Coverage |

1 - _____ XEROX

1 - _____ JUL 22 1963

66-2543-3-132

REC-10

66-2542-3-1339

August 20, 1963

EX-103

PERSONAL

AUG 20 3 35 PM '63
REC'D-READING ROOM


Federal Bureau of Investigation
Salt Lake City, Utah

b6
b7C

Dear [redacted]

I have received your suggestion concerning the frequency with which certain individuals are contacted. After careful consideration, it has been decided the present rule in this regard is adequate. If good judgment is used in handling this procedure, it is felt this matter can be worked out in a fashion similar to that proposed by you.

The interest you displayed in submitting this idea is indeed appreciated.



Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

SAC, Salt Lake City 1 - Field personnel file

1 - Suggestion file

Personnel file of SA [redacted]

ML:mlf 7/14
(6) (Suggestion #113-64 dated 8/12/63)
NOTE: Suggests the files that Security Informants, Potential Security Informants, and Panel Sources be contacted personally every two weeks be changed to require two personal contacts each month.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

72 AUG 27 1963

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

SEE PAGE TWO

NOTE CONTINUED

The Domestic Intelligence Division recommended suggestion not be adopted. The present rule in this regard is adequate and no objections have been received concerning it. If good judgment is used in handling these informants, no problem should exist. Informant contacts are handled more on a personal level depending upon circumstances involved in each situation. If on occasion an additional meeting is involved, this in effect aids our program since contacts are necessary to maintain desired cooperation. Training Division recommends suggestion not be adopted.

#113-64

Date

8/12/63

| | | |
|----------------------|--|---|
| To: Director, FBI | From: (Suggester's name) SA [redacted] | Division of Assignment Salt Lake City |
|----------------------|--|---|

b6
b7C

SUGGESTION

It is recommended that the rule that Security Informants, Potential Security Informants and Panel Sources be contacted every two weeks personally be changed to require two personal contacts each month.

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts) **Manual of Instructions, Section 107(F) 4a states: "Except in Espionage and Foreign Nationality matters where the frequency of contact is dependent on circumstances of each case, informants should be contacted as often as necessary but at least**

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate) **one personal contact should be made every two weeks."**

Some informants, PSIs and Panel Sources require numerous contacts each month because of their activity; however, most informants, PSIs and PSs do not require more than two contacts per month. The present rule in effect requires a minimum of three personal contacts per month for any informant, PSI or PS if such persons are being paid by the Bureau. This arises from the fact that if such an individual were personally contacted the first or second day of any month for payment purposes, the second contact would be due on the 15th or 16th of the month and a third

(over)

Disadvantages of suggestion **It would become theoretically possible for an Agent to contact an informant, PSI or PS in the early part of the month and not recontact this informant until the latter part of the month. This possible disadvantage could be eliminated by including a requirement that no more than twenty days elapse between any contact.**

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss [redacted]

Signature and Title of Suggester **Special Agent**

Recommendations and comments of Division Head **This suggestion has definite merit and I feel it should be adopted. Instead of including a requirement that "no more than twenty days elapse between any contact," I would recommend "good judgment control when the two contacts per month be made." (C-10) 113-64-1337**

Signature and Title **SAC**

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

EX

11 AUG 16 1963

11 AUG 16 1963

b6
b7C

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (continued):

contact on the 29th or 30th day of the month. It would then be necessary for payment purposes to recontact this individual in the early part of the following month. It is considered that this recontact which now becomes necessary because of payments could be eliminated and the purpose of the Bureau appropriately served by requiring two contacts each month rather than one contact each fourteen days.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 7/17/63

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: DAILY REPORTS

TIME SPENT IN THE OFFICE (TIO) AND TIME SPENT ON
DEVELOPING POTENTIAL CRIMINAL INFORMANTS (TOPCI) AND
POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS (TOPSI)

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Travel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

V

The Director approved recommendations of the Executives Conference as set forth in memoranda dated July 16, 1963, to the effect that agents should no longer be required to record each day the total time spent on the development of potential criminal informants (TOPCI) or potential security informants (TOPSI), and that time spent in the office on key interviews of subjects and witnesses, regularly scheduled conferences, and the review of accountancy-type books and records should not be included in the computation of time spent in the office (TIO). It was further recommended and approved that daily reports no longer be submitted by headquarters city agents. They will, of course, continue to be submitted by those investigative personnel assigned to resident agencies and those working outside headquarters city in excess of 24 hours including absence in another division for purpose of testifying.

An SAC Letter incorporating this information is enclosed and appropriate manual changes will be prepared to handle the necessary changes.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1). That the enclosed SAC Letter be approved and sent.

166-2542-3 -
NOT RECORDED
176 JUL 31 1963

(2). On approval, appropriate manual changes will be submitted.

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Casper
1 - Mr. Gale
JER:pab
(4)

5th letter
Approved & Admin
Gale
Aldrich

6 JUL 20 1963

JJC
JPC
TWO-82
" 1st to 2nd
" 2nd to 3rd

66-2759-3441

ORIGINAL FILED IN



PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER NO. 63-35

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 19, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) DAILY REPORTS - TIME SPENT IN THE OFFICE - TIME SPENT ON DEVELOPING POTENTIAL CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - TIME SPENT ON DEVELOPING POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS -- Henceforth, daily reports will no longer be submitted by investigative personnel, special employees, radio personnel having special employee ratings, and clerks assigned to monitoring technical surveillances, assigned to headquarters city with the exception of those working outside of the divisional headquarters in excess of 24 hours, including absence in another division for the purpose of testifying. They will, of course, continue to be submitted by those personnel enumerated above who are assigned to resident agencies. Consequently, the Number Three (Locator Card) Register will be used by those investigative personnel now exempted from the submission of daily reports to indicate, in addition to those items presently entered thereon, their times of initial arrival and final departure and their daily tabulations of voluntary overtime and time in the office. Therefore, from now on, the Number Three Registers will be retained for a period of two years after which they will be destroyed on a monthly or other staggered basis if preferred.

In connection with the tabulation of time spent in the office, in addition to those activities presently excluded, it will no longer be necessary to include time spent therein on key interviews of subjects and witnesses, regularly scheduled conferences, and the review of accountancy-type books and records.

Further, it will no longer be necessary for agents to compute each day the total time spent on the development of potential criminal informants or potential security informants.

The elimination of these requirements in no way mitigates the necessity to insure that time in the office is kept at an absolute minimum and that agents are held accountable for any unjustifiable time so spent. With respect to the development of potential informants, both criminal and security, you are reminded that they are vital to success in the discharge of our investigative responsibilities and you must continue to stress the importance of these programs.

Appropriate manual changes incorporating the foregoing information are being prepared for issuance in the near future.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

66-2542-3-
RECORDED
P.M. 1963

8192
JUL 25 1963

NOTE CONTINUED

subsection to informant's 134 file, where a copy of form would be filed as information furnished by informant is used in SGE-type cases. Supervisor would also be responsible for having a copy of a communication received from Bureau in response to Departmental inquiry concerning availability of a current informant placed in "B" subsection of informant's file.

Referred to Domestic Intelligence Division for views and recommendations. Also referred to the Special Investigative Division.

#157-64

Date

9/3/63

| | | |
|----------------------|---|--|
| To: Director, FBI | From: (Suggester's name) JOHN WALLACE WERTZ | Division of Assignment Chicago |
|----------------------|---|--|

SUGGESTION

See attached pages and enclosed sample form.

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts) **Manual of Instructions, Volume IV, Section 107Q requires a file review made of discontinued informant's file to determine if information furnished was used in SGE type cases, or if Department had requested using informant to testify when available.**

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

Elimination of extensive reviews of 134 files. This will reduce agent work hours spent in file reviews, with a resultant increase in agent productivity in outside investigative time. Most important of all, it would enable the Bureau to fulfill its dissemination responsibilities with greater accuracy.

Unable to calculate annual savings.

Security Informants

Disadvantages of suggestion

Minimum of additional dictation or rough draft time on part of applicant agent.

Creation of additional 134 sub files.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss *John Wallace Wertz Special Agent*
Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

It is believed this suggestion has considerable merit and should be given consideration by the Bureau.

XEROX

SEP 9 1963

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

John Wallace Wertz Special Agent
Signature and Title in Charge

157-64-66-2042-5-1

3-Bureau (Enc. 10)

2-Chicago (1-Suggestion File)(1-Personnel File SA WERTZ)

JWW:mec (5)

CONFIDENTIAL

In compliance with instructions contained in Manual of Instructions, Volume IV, section 107 Q, regarding procedures to be followed upon the discontinuance of a security informant, a file review of information furnished by, or pertaining to, a former confidential informant of the Chicago Office, was undertaken. Purpose of this review, of course, was to determine any instances where information furnished by this former informant was incorporated in reports on Security of Government Employees type cases and to determine if any copies or summaries of correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Department's interest in using the informant for testifying when she became available as a witness were contained in her file.

It should be noted that this former informant was operated as an informant by the Chicago Office for 11 years. Information furnished by her is contained in 42 volumes. Administrative data concerning her is contained in 12 volumes. As a result, this review required a considerable amount of agent time to complete.

While performing this extensive review, the thought occurred that such a project might be avoided and 100 percent effective results obtained by the employment of a different system to locate information reflecting a relationship between discontinued informants and SGE type cases.

The existing regulations concerning the investigation and reporting of SGE type cases require that current contacts be made with logical informants who might have some knowledge of subversive activities on the part of applicant, employee, etc. In addition, recontact is to be made with any active informants who had furnished information in the past concerning applicant. In all contacts with negative results, a notation to that effect is made on the informant contact sheet (FD-209) and the contact memorandum returned to the agent assigned the SGE type case. Only if the informant possesses current or additional knowledge of the activities of the applicant is that information reduced to memorandum form and channelized to the informant's 134 file, as well as the SGE file.

It is conceivable therefore, that a SGE report could contain numerous items of information reflecting subversive activities of applicant, obtained from file review, yet if the source could furnish no current information there would be no indication in the informant's 134 file that he had ever furnished information on the applicant.

The possibility also exists that source could be currently furnishing information on almost a day-to-day basis on applicant (or one of his relatives or associates) and there would be no apparent necessity for recontact. Again, the informant's 134 file would not reflect that information furnished by him was used in a SGE report.

It is very likely also that informants have been utilized in a SGE report to subversively characterize relatives or associates, law partners, fellow professors, etc., of the applicant, either from reports or literature submitted by the informant, as ascertained by a review of office indices, without the informant being able to furnish any positive information regarding the applicant himself.

To correct this situation and better enable the Bureau to fulfill its obligations in the dissemination of information to the interested agencies, as well as saving agents hundreds of work hours spent in 134 file reviews, it is believed the following suggestion should be adopted on a field-wide basis.

When dictating all SGE type reports, the agent who investigated and/or correlated the report should dictate the information necessary to complete the enclosed sample form, with number of copies to correspond with sources concealed by T symbol in the report upon whom 134 files are maintained. This would include symbol numbered informants, potential security informants, panel sources, and discontinued informants who continue to be concealed for one reason or another.

It is to be noted that the necessary information, which will be reflected on the enclosed sample form, will include the Bureau and field file numbers, title and character of the case, date of report and name of reporting agent, and the T symbol number used to conceal the informant. The page numbers, upon which information attributed to the informant appears, can be added to the sample form by the stenographer after the report is typed.

It would then be incumbent on the appropriate supervisor to open a "B" sub-section to the informant's 134 file, where a copy of the sample form would be filed as information furnished by the informant is utilized in SGE type cases.

It would also be incumbent on the supervisor, in the event a communication was received from the Bureau in response to Departmental inquiry concerning availability of a current informant, to have a copy of the communication placed in the "B" sub-section of the informant's file.

The above outlined procedure would establish a central repository for the information which must be furnished the Bureau under Manual of Instructions, Volume IV, Section 107Q, concerning discontinued informants and would enable an agent to merely insert this information verbatim into the letter he prepares to discontinue the informant.

It would continue to be necessary, of course, that file reviews be made of 134 files for information received prior to the cut-off date of implementation of this proposed system. A memorandum indicating this cut-off date would be channelized to all existing informant files and a record made indicating the review would not be necessary in any 134 files opened subsequent to the cut-off date.

It is felt that the implementation of this proposed system will eliminate extensive reviews of 134 files and substitute the routine dictation of a simple form memorandum. This will reduce agent work hours spent in file reviews, with a resultant increase in agent productivity in outside investigative time. As pointed out above, it would also enable the Bureau to fulfill its dissemination responsibilities with greater accuracy.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SAMPLE FORM

TO : SAC (140-100)

DATE: 5/6/63

FROM : SA JOHN W. WERTZ (BUfile 140-1000)

SUBJECT: JOHN DOE
SGE

In connection with the preparation of the report of
SA JOHN W. WERTZ, dated 5/6/63, captioned
as above, information appearing therein was, in part, furnished
by the following listed confidential informants, who were
concealed by the indicated T symbol numbers. Page numbers
indicated correspond to pages of the report upon which
information attributed to the informant appears:

| <u>T symbol</u> | <u>Source</u> | <u>Page number(s)</u> |
|-----------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| T-1 | | 6, 7, 8 |
| T-2 | | 8, 9 |
| T-3 | | 9 |
| T-4 | | 10, 11, 12, 13 |

b7D

| | |
|-------|--|
| 1 - B | |
| 1 - B | |
| 1 - B | |
| 1 - B | |
| X - | |
| X - | |
| X - | |

JWW:bms
(5)

111 XEROX

SEP 9 1963

66-2542-3-13
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: August 8, 1963

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: DAILY REPORTS, TIME SPENT IN OFFICE,
TIME SPENT ON DEVELOPING POTENTIAL CRIMINAL
AND POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS

Toison _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Enc. fmb

Security Informants

The present decisions of the Executive Conference, which were approved by the Director in connection with the captioned matters, have necessitated extensive manual changes. The proposed revisions are enclosed. Changes on various forms involved will be made with each new printing of the individual forms.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the enclosed manual changes be approved.

Enclosures

JER:mlf 7:

(2)

166-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
184 AUG 29 1963

PERS. REC. UNIT

12 AUG 28 1963

3 - fm -
2 - fm -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 9/13/63

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS
SUGGESTION #157-64 SUBMITTED BY
SPECIAL AGENT JOHN WALLACE WERTZ, CHICAGO

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Gale _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Spillman
SUGGESTION: That a form be adopted on which will be shown the Bureau and field office file numbers, title and character of case, date of report and name of reporting agent, T symbol number of each informant furnishing information used in report and the page numbers, each time a report is made in a Security of Government Employees (SGE) Case in which information from informants was incorporated. A copy of the form will be executed for the file of each source used and should be placed in a "B" subfile opened for that purpose.

PRESENT PRACTICE: Manual of Instructions (M of I), in Volume IV, Section 10, Q, 5 & 6, instructs that files of discontinued security informants, if willing to testify, should be reviewed to determine if there are any cases in which the Department has expressed an interest in using the informant for testifying at such time as he becomes available as a witness. In particular, the Bureau must be advised of all cases of the SGE-type in which the informant has furnished information.

ADVANTAGES: Suggester feels the use of the proposed forms and subfiles would eliminate extensive file reviews of 134 files on discontinued informants thereby saving valuable agent-time and enabling the Bureau to fulfill its disseminative responsibilities more expeditiously and accurately.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Johnson of the Chicago Office felt the idea worthy of consideration.

Special Investigative Division had no objection to the procedure if it would save time and promote efficiency. They noted, however, that, if suggestion were adopted, every agent reporting information from an informant in an SGE-type case would have the definite responsibility to prepare the memorandum for the proposed subfile or the purpose of the idea would be defeated and the chance of error increased.

ENCL **RE: 44** *66-52572-2-134* *FILE*
Domestic Intelligence Division opposed adoption. It pointed out that current instructions in M of I, Volume IV, Section 107M, 9 & 10, require that informant files be maintained in such manner that identities of cases in which informant furnished competent evidence can be supplied immediately to the Bureau by reference to the file of the informant.

JER:mlf *KV* *232*
(4) SEP 25 1963

1 - Mr. Tolson
1 - Bufile 140-00

SEE PAGE TWO

THO-jm *UNREC'D*

Memorandum to Mr. Mohr
Re: Security Informants
Suggestion #157-64 Submitted By
Special Agent John Wallace Wertz, Chicago

without necessity of extensive research. Copies of correspondence in which the Department expressed interest in using the informant for testimony should be placed in the informant's file and these, if voluminous, or applicable to more than one informant, should be summarized and a copy placed in appropriate informant's file.

They felt that adherence to these instructions would preclude the necessity for a separate subfile as proposed to record those cases of possible prosecutive nature in which informant furnished information. They commented further that, on discontinuance of an informant, his file, no matter how voluminous, must be reviewed to make sure that all necessary action has been taken such as return of Bureau property, repayment of money he might owe Bureau, unpaid taxes settled, etc. Therefore, a separate file for SGE cases and cases in which Department expressed the aforementioned interest is not warranted.

Training Division agrees with Domestic Intelligence Division that suggestion should not be adopted. In view of the many other matters that must be resolved, a file review is always necessary and the proposed subfile would be, in effect, a duplication of effort since the material should already be in the 134 file and could be picked up during the review.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted. On approval, no further action is necessary; receipt of the idea was acknowledged by prior letter.

Opnw *JW*
JW

IEWS OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION RE: SUGGESTION #157-64

ADDENDUM

STREAMLINING COMMITTEE
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

9-10-63

GHL GHL
GHL:nck

Current instructions (Section 107M, 9&10, Manual of Instructions) require that informant files be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which the informant has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the file of the informant and without the necessity of conducting extensive research. In regard to the Department expressing an interest in using a particular informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness, copies of the correspondence showing this situation between the Bureau and a field should be placed in the informant's file. If such correspondence is voluminous and/or applies to one or more informants, such information should be summarized and placed in the appropriate informants' files.

Adherence to these instructions will preclude the necessity of establishing a separate file to keep a record of those cases of possible prosecutive nature in which the informant furnished information. Furthermore, no matter how voluminous the file of an informant may become, when he is discontinued a thorough review of the file is necessary to make certain that all necessary action has been taken, such as the return of any Bureau material loaned to the informant; repayment of any money owed to the Bureau; notification to other agencies, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which may have held up their investigation in order not to jeopardize the informant; and a settlement of any unpaid income taxes. Therefore, the suggestion of setting up a separate file merely to follow SGE cases and cases in which the Department has indicated an interest in the informant is not merited.

It is therefore recommended that this suggestion not be adopted.

164 XEROX

SEP 19 1963

Aut. 9-13-63 M/S
9-13-63 M/S

memo Cooper ds M/S
9-13-63 for: m/f.

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3 - 13-11

TX/0 [signature]

ADDENDUM TO SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
OF SA JOHN WALLACE WERTZ, CHICAGO
DIVISION, 9-3-63

CS
CWS:pjh:mjs

9-12-63

COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION:

SA John Wallace Wertz, Chicago Division, points out extensive Agents' time used in reviewing files of discontinued informants to ascertain identities of Security of Government Employee (SGE) type cases in which informants information has been used. He suggests that in order to preclude such reviews the field set up a subfile for each informants' file in which to maintain the desired information readily available when needed without extensive review. He proposes that every Agent when including information from an informant in an SGE type report, dictate a brief form memorandum for the subfile identifying informant and the case in which information is reported. Likewise, that correspondence relating to Department's interest in an informant as a potential witness be routed to the subfile and not buried in informant's general file.

Manual of Instructions, Volume IV, Section 107Q, requires field to review files of discontinued informants for purpose of furnishing Bureau identity of all SGE type cases in which informant's information has been included and whether informant is available for testimony. Field also required to review file and advise Bureau of any correspondence between Bureau and field relating to Department's interest in informant when he becomes available as witness.

It will be noted SA Wertz's suggestion relates to field office procedures of maintaining and handling information relating to informants. The Special Investigative Division interposes no objection to proposed procedure providing it will actually save Agent time and promote efficiency as claimed. It is noted, however, if adopted, every Agent reporting information from an informant in an SGE type case will have a definite responsibility to prepare memoranda for the informant's subfile and if not done properly in each case it will defeat the purpose and leave room for error in handling these matters. Should the Domestic Intelligence Division, which supervises Security Informant matters, feel this suggestion has merit, it is believed a representative number of field divisions should be contacted for their comments and recommendations.

166 XEROX

SEP 19 1963

Aut. REC'D - 1
9-13-63
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9-13-63 JH:MJS

REC
APR 9 1968
XWJ

66-2542-3-1341
1963-1964
XWJ

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 10/4/63

cc: Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6/18/56 sets forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permit the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field submits progress letters under this program on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 8/31/63, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three months ending 8/31/63 | Three months ending 5/31/63 | Total |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------|
| A. Number of active communist contacted | 132 | 206 | 7719 |
| B. Number of other individuals contacted | 278 | 485 | 27744 |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants developed | 41 | 37 | 2655 |

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

REC-53 66-2542-3-1342

66-2542-3

OCT 4 1963

MJR/jmc
(4) P-40

EX-103

3 OCT 10 1963

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that this program be continued. Another memorandum will be prepared upon receipt of the information from the field showing the progress of the program and reflecting the figures for the current quarter (ending 11/30/63), the preceding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.

myR
JDD *five*
JR

SAC, New York

September 16, 1963

Director, FBI (66-2542-3)

① - Mr. Lenz

10/15

DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH-LEVEL INFORMANTS

Security Informants - Gen

Reference is made to previous communications to your office and those offices receiving copies of this letter regarding the need to develop high-level informant coverage within the Communist Party (CP) and especially the need to find an acceptable informant or informants to work closely with NY 694-S and CG 5824-S.

In the latter case several offices have submitted biographical sketches on prospective candidates. To date none have been completely satisfactory. For example:

[redacted] does not appear to have the necessary background or informant potential at this time to work into the Solo operation or as an accountant for the CP in New York City; [redacted] has an [redacted] background which at the moment is not desirable; [redacted] has too many [redacted] at this time; and [redacted] has greater potential in the Maryland-D.C. area at the moment than is immediately foreseeable in the New York City area. All these factors have tended to rule out these informants for the time being. However, subsequent events may alter these conditions and they may become acceptable.

It is not sufficient, however, to wait for conditions to change in order for these informants to become effective. It is your responsibility to continue to look for individuals who can eventually be approved to work closely with NY 694-S and CG 5824-S. There is an immediate need for completion of this program as soon as possible and the Bureau intends to closely follow your efforts in this regard until a successful conclusion has been reached.

- 2 - Chicago
- 2 - Baltimore
- 2 - Washington Field
- 2 - Los Angeles
- 2 - Philadelphia

166-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
199 OCT 29 1963

CCL:chs
(14)

(b)
SAC, El Paso

10/16/63

Director, FBI

REC-11 66-2542-3-1343

PERSONAL

DESTRUCTION OF BUREAU PROPERTY
SUGGESTION

EX-11

Reference is made to the suggestion submitted by you dated October 10, 1963, wherein you proposed that copies of Form FD-209 and other memoranda reflecting positive results be purged from administrative control files of informants following the inspection of the field office by representatives from the Seat of Government.

This matter has been referred to the appropriate divisions for consideration and you will be advised if a favorable decision is reached.


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8/10/82 BY SP4 ELW/DCG

JER:mlf *mlf*
(6) *Suggestion # 247-64*

NOTE: Referred to Inspection, Domestic Intelligence, General Investigative and Special Investigative Divisions for views and recommendations.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____



20
NOV 16 1963
MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

E. B. I.
RECEIVED
OCT 13 8 58 AM '63 OCT 18 1 10 PM '63
FBI - WASH. D. C.

DOMESTIC SECURITY
MAIL ROOM

INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
MAIL ROOM

4247-64

Date

10/10/63

Division of Assignment
EL PASO *

To:
Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name)
SAC HERBERT E. HOXIE

SUGGESTION

Following field office inspection by SOG representatives, copies of FD-209 (form reflecting results of contact with informants) and other memoranda designated for field office control file reflecting results of positive information received from informants be destroyed.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 9/16/82 BY SP4 ELW/1066

Security classification fee

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts)

There is no provision for destruction of these items. Information from these copies of form and memoranda is correlated into Criminal Informant Monthly Progress Letter.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

A periodic purging of the file would provide a means of eliminating considerable material of an administrative nature which no longer need be maintained in this file. The original of the form or memoranda is available in the main informant file. By retaining these copies pending an inspection there would be provision made for review by SOG representatives following which these copies could be destroyed. This should result in a considerable saving in accumulated file space. It is noted that in an analogous situation, the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 3, Page 15, provides for (advantages continued on attached page)

Disadvantages of suggestion

A limited amount of time by clerical employees would be necessary to remove the copies from the file. It is felt that this time actually would be negligible compared to the benefits to be derived.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss Herbert E. Hoxie
Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and Comments of Division Head

2 XEROX
OCT 18 1963 *EX-116* *REC'D OCT 16-1963 - 3-1343*
NOV 11 1963 *Herbert E. Hoxie, SAC*
Signature and Title

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

10-16-63 *mem: Director to SP4, 31 Oct 1963* *10-16-63* *RECEIVED OCT 22 1963*
10-16-63 *HERBERT E. HOXIE* *10-16-63* *RECEIVED OCT 22 1963*

Advantages continued:

destruction after a field office inspection by SOG representatives of copies of the record of information furnished other agencies - FD-159 - from the main dissemination control file. Such information is correlated into a monthly letter to the Bureau. It is felt that the same reasoning which applies to destruction of Form FD-159 applies to destruction of copies of informant forms and memoranda, when the information has already been correlated into the Monthly Progress Letter and it has been reviewed by inspectors.

Mr. Mohr

11/6/63

J. J. Casper

Security info - JAC

DESTRUCTION OF BUREAU PROPERTY
SUGGESTION #247-64 SUBMITTED BY
SAC HERBERT E. HOXIE, EL PASO OFFICE

SUGGESTION: That permission be given to destroying copies of FD-209 (form reflecting results of contact with informants) and other memoranda designated for field office control file reflecting results of positive information received from informants following field office inspection by SOG representatives.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Suggester advises no provision is made for the destruction of these items. Information from these copies of form and memoranda is incorporated into Criminal Informant Monthly Progress Letter.

ADVANTAGES: Periodic purging of file would provide a means of eliminating considerable material of an administrative nature which no longer need be maintained in this file. The original of the form or memorandum is available in the main informant file. By retaining these copies pending an inspection, there would be provision made for review by SOG representatives following which these copies could be destroyed. This would result in a saving of filing space.

DISADVANTAGES: A limited amount of time by clerical employees would be necessary to remove the copies from the file. This time would be negligible compared to the benefits to be derived from proposed procedure.

OBSERVATIONS: General Investigative Division felt the suggestion had merit and should be adopted since this material would have served its purpose when the information has been furnished the Bureau in the monthly letter and after the inspection has been completed since the original material is retained in the informant file.

Domestic Intelligence Division advised this method would not pertain to the work of their division since it involves work regarding criminal informants.

The Special Investigative Division pointed out it was not possible to determine from the manner in which the suggestion was written exactly what "control file" SAC Hoxie referred to. However, upon the assumption that he meant the El Paso Office

1 - Bufile 66-2542 sub 3

1 - Bufile 66-3286

1 - Mr. Gale

Enclosure

ML:mlf

4 NOV 15 1963

166-2542-3
NOT RECORDED
170 NOV 8 1963

SEE PAGE TWO

Memo Casper to Mohr
Re: Destruction of Bureau Property
Suggestion #247-64 Submitted By
SAC Herbert E. Hoxie, El Paso Office

has a "Monthly Progress Letter Control File," the Top Echelon and regular Criminal Informant Desks could see no objection to the proposed idea. Each month a letter is forwarded to Bureau from each field division listing among other things the outstanding accomplishments attributed to their informants during the preceding month. These accomplishments are no doubt written up individually as they occur with copies designated for the control file. When preparing the progress letter the field dictator probably uses these memoranda for the purpose of abstracting information. Therefore, these individual copies would no longer be necessary as the information has been consolidated into the one monthly progress letter.

The Inspection Division advised the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, page 15a, v (3), states channelizing memoranda in criminal cases and security cases may be destroyed following submission of reports, with certain listed requirements. If SAC Hoxie is referring to the criminal informant administrative control file and is channelizing copies of FD-209 containing positive informant statistical information to this file, it would appear this manual reference would permit the destruction desired. While there is no rule concerning such a control file, Manual of Instructions states FD-209 may be used to extent SAC deems justified. This division advised the possibility exists that El Paso has an unauthorized administrative file opened for filing copies of FD-209s containing positive information and recommended El Paso be requested to furnish information regarding this file.

By letter dated 11/1/63, SAC, El Paso advised that in order to avoid a physical review of each and every informant file in the office when the monthly progress letter is prepared for the Bureau, it was found to be more convenient in various offices to maintain a control file which includes positive information furnished of value by informants. When the monthly report is submitted for an informant file and it reflects positive information, a copy is designated for the control file.

The Training Division and the Inspection Division feel that it is permissible for an office to maintain such a control file as an aid to them and, if such a control file is maintained, it is practical to destroy material maintained therein following the field inspection. However, it is felt this practice is not prevalent throughout the field and it should be left to the discretion of the SAC regarding the procedure he finds most convenient. There appears to be no need to bring this matter to the attention of all offices.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion be adopted for use in the El Paso Office and the attached letter of appreciation forwarded to SAC Hoxie. The suggestion was acknowledged by prior letter.

SAC, El Paso

October 30, 1963

Director, FBI

SECURITY INFORMATION
DESTRUCTION OF BUREAU PROPERTY
SUGGESTION

PERSONAL

GENL.

Re Bulet 10/16/63 captioned as above.

Several Divisions at the SOG have been asked to furnish their views re your suggestion pertaining to the destruction of copies of FD-209. Replies received indicate that a question arises as to the exact nature of the control file you are referring to. Please clarify.

Submit your reply attention Training Division to reach the Bureau by
11/8/63.

Personnel file of SAC Herbert E. Hoxie

JHG:mlf *my*

(5) (Suggestion #247-64)

NOTE: Above reply based on suggestion by SAC El Paso relative to destruction of FD-209 (Informant Contact Form) in control file.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

NOV 15 1963
703
MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

4102

REC. 27 66-3548-3-1344
JULY 1963

-- NOV 4 1963

66-2542-3-1345
CHANGED TO



b7D

JUN 25 1964

ps. W.C.

C

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

11/15/63

Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

LIAISON WITH GROUPS
SPONSORING INTEGRATION
RACIAL MATTERS

SECURITY INFORMANTS *-bcw*

In connection with the Bureau's responsibilities in racial matters, certain southern offices have been under instructions to develop sources of information in the Negro community to obtain advance notice of plans to stage demonstrations. Due to the increase of such demonstrations throughout the country, the General Investigative Division in Euairtel of 5/28/63 advised all offices that the Bureau was intensifying this program of liaison with groups favoring integration so that the Bureau could continue to furnish intelligence to the Department and local law enforcement agencies on a timely basis.

Each office was directed to establish liaison on a highly selective and sound basis with responsible leaders in groups favoring integration. Selection of persons to be contacted was left to the discretion of the SAC and the Bureau was to be advised monthly of the identities of the sources with whom liaison was established during the month and the names of the organizations represented.

Review of monthly letters under this program discloses that such liaison has been established and is being maintained throughout the field but some offices are utilizing security informants and potential security informants for liaison purposes. In fact, offices are encouraging security informants to become active in racial matters in order to provide the necessary liaison. For example one office (Minneapolis) has reported that two informants, [] and [] have been urged to become active in organizations dealing with racial matters and they have been participating in legitimate nonsubversive racial activities. [] became [] and he has become []

CRIMINAL - L.D.

b7D

[] is the subject of communist infiltration. (This situation involving [] and [] has been handled by separate communication.)

16-352-3-

Security informants furnish information on subversive individuals and/or their membership in subversive organizations and groups infiltrated or dominated by subversive persons. Security Enc.

157-G

66-2542-3

JDD:crc(9)

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: LIAISON WITH GROUPS
SPONSORING INTEGRATION
RACIAL MATTERS
SECURITY INFORMANTS

157-6

66-2542-3

informants are not to join legitimate nonsubversive organizations to solicit information for the FBI. If a security informant wishes to become a member of a legitimate nonsubversive group for personal reasons, it must be made perfectly clear to him that, while we have no objection if he personally desires such membership, he is not to report information regarding its legitimate activities, such as demonstrations, picketing and the like. However, if information comes to his attention from any source pertinent to the Bureau's criminal investigative responsibilities, such information should be reported to the contacting Agent. Likewise, no payments are to be made to the informant if his attendance at meetings or affairs of the organization is solely for personal reasons.

Utilizing security informants for liaison purposes in racial matters can lead to possible embarrassment to the Bureau as we would be open to the charge of infiltrating legitimate nonsubversive organizations favoring integration by means of confidential informants. Such an accusation has been made against the Bureau on occasion when our security informants have testified in court or before hearing boards to the fact that, in connection with their Bureau work of infiltrating the Communist Party, they joined organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People upon direction of their communist superiors as part of the communist program. In those areas where there is no communist infiltration or attempt to dominate a nonsubversive group by subversive elements, membership in such groups by our security informants would be indefensible and most embarrassing to the Bureau.

ACTION:

To prevent any misunderstanding of the Bureau's objectives and any possible embarrassment to the Bureau, the field is being directed not to utilize security informants and potential security informants for liaison purposes with groups sponsoring integration or in connection with other racial matters unless the particular group in question is under active investigation by the office based upon communist or other subversive infiltration, domination or attempts to obtain control of the organization by subversive individuals. There is attached for approval an appropriate letter to all field offices (original on plastiplate). No Manual or Handbook change necessary.

SAC, Albany

11/18/63

Director, FBI (157-6) (60-2342-3)

LIAISON WITH GROUPS
SPONSORING INTEGRATION
RACIAL MATTERS

✓ SECURITY INFORMANTS

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

Reference is made to Buairtel of 5/23/63 advising all offices that the Bureau was intensifying the program of developing liaison with groups favoring integration so that the Bureau could continue to furnish intelligence to the Department and local law enforcement agencies on a timely basis. Offices were instructed to establish liaison on a highly selective and sound basis with responsible leaders in groups favoring integration. The selection of persons to be contacted was left to the discretion of the SAC and the Bureau was to be advised monthly of the progress being made under the program.

Review of monthly letters submitted by the field discloses that such liaison has been established and is being maintained but some offices are utilizing security informants and potential security informants for liaison purposes. In fact, some offices are encouraging security informants to become active in integration matters in order to provide the necessary liaison even though there is no communist or other subversive infiltration or attempts by subversives to dominate the local racial organization.

Utilizing security informants in such a manner can lead to possible embarrassment to the Bureau as we would be open to the charge of infiltrating legitimate nonsubversive organizations favoring integration. Such accusations have been made against the Bureau when our security informants have testified in court or before hearing boards to the fact that, in connection with their Bureau work of infiltrating the Communist Party, they joined organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People upon direction of their communist superiors as part of the communist program. In an area where there is no

3 - All Offices

JBD:erc
(174)

(SEE NOTE PAGE TWO)

Letter to Albany
RE: LIAISON WITH GROUPS
SPONSORING INTEGRATION
RACIAL MATTERS
SECURITY INFORMANTS

157-6
66-3542-3

communist or other subversive infiltration or attempts to dominate a nonsubversive legitimate group by subversive elements, membership in such groups by our security informants would be indefensible and most embarrassing to the Bureau.

Security informants furnish information and necessary coverage on subversive individuals and/or their membership in subversive organizations and groups infiltrated or dominated by subversive persons. Security informants are not to join legitimate nonsubversive organizations to solicit information for the FBI. If a security informant wishes to become a member of a legitimate nonsubversive group for personal reasons, it must be made perfectly clear to him that, while we have no objection if he personally desires such membership, he is not to report information regarding its legitimate activities, such as demonstrations, picketing and the like. However, if information comes to his attention from any source pertinent to the Bureau's criminal investigative responsibilities, such information should be reported to the contacting Agent. Likewise, no payments are to be made to the informant if his attendance at meetings or affairs of this organization is solely for personal reasons.

NOTE:

See memorandum Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan,
same caption, dated 11/15/63, JDD:erc.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

X TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *W.C.S.*

DATE: 12-3-63

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

EVALUATION OF PROGRAM

Due to success of Toplev Program which was instituted in 1951 (interviews of top-level Communist Party (CP) functionaries), the Security Informant Program was instituted in 1952 whereby persons of lesser importance would be contacted to obtain additional informants in the Party. The primary purpose of the program is to develop persons currently active in the CP into Bureau informants and such individuals, if developed while still in the CP, can immediately produce current information of value whereas persons with no CP affiliation who are willing to be developed as informants, require considerable time before they can produce information of value. In addition, these interviews crystallize the status of security subjects as to attitude and dangerousness and also cause considerable disruption and confusion within the CP itself. In April and May, 1956, this program of approaching active communists was combined with our General Interview Program of contacting security subjects and the resultant current program now embodies contacts not only with active communists but other subversive individuals, the purpose of the interviews being to obtain potential informant material. Since the inception of the program in 1951, 7,719 active communists have been contacted and 27,744 other individuals have been contacted since the extension of the program in 1956. As a result, we have obtained 2,655 sources, potential security informants, and informants. Through continued use of this program, our informant coverage will be extended and disruption in the CP will continue and any expansion of Party or new CP activity will be promptly detected.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since program has proved to be worthwhile, it is recommended it be continued under our present policies and procedures and the continuance of the program again be considered in one year.

66-2542-3

REC-20

66-2542-3-1346

JDD:djw:mjh *mjt*
(4)

11 DEC 5 1963

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

74 DEC 10 1963 / 63

Dolores

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3

DETAILS:

This memorandum contains the results of a complete review and evaluation of the program and a recommendation that the program be continued.

1. Origin

Due to the success of the Toplev Program instituted in 1951 (interviews of top-level Communist Party (CP) functionaries), the SIP was instituted in 1952 whereby persons of lesser importance in the CP were contacted to obtain additional informants in the CP.

2. Purpose

The primary purpose of instant program is to develop persons currently active in the CP into Bureau informants. Such individuals, if developed while still in the CP, can immediately produce current information of value. Another factor to be considered in conducting interviews under the SIP is the disruption and confusion such interviews have caused within the CP itself.

3. Scope

In 1952, Agents in 23 field offices were given specialized training (this included 14 offices trained for Toplev interviews). In 1954, the SIP was further extended through the medium of special training sessions whereby additional Agents were trained in all continental offices to make approaches to active communists. In April and May, 1956, our program of approaching active communists was combined with the general interview program of contacting security subjects of all types and the resultant program is known generally as the SIP.

4. Tie-in with Other Programs

This program is handled as a special project. It is noted, however, it is similar to the Toplev Program which deals with the interviews of top-level and hard-core communists whereas the SIP deals with interviews of persons of lesser importance.

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3

5. Case Load

As of 9-1-63, a total of 7,719 active communists and 27,744 other individuals were contacted under the SIP. All continental offices, except 32, submit quarterly progress letters showing interviews conducted. The 32 offices have conducted all logical interviews with persons suitable for informant development and are required to submit a six-month progress letter.

6. Magnitude

The provisions and instructions formulated in connection with the SIP govern the interviews of persons considered for security informant development in all continental offices.

7. Weaknesses

There are no known weaknesses in the SIP.

8. Administrative Control

All continental offices (with the exception of 32) must submit quarterly progress letters. The 32 offices must submit progress letters every six months. Through analysis of progress letters an accurate evaluation of the effectiveness of the SIP can be made. Close supervision and control is possible and any weaknesses are immediately corrected by issuance of necessary instructions to the office involved.

The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the period ending 8-31-63, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three Months Ending 8-31-63 | Three Months Ending 5-31-63 | TOTAL |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------|
| A. Number of Active Communists Contacted | 132 | 206 | 7719 |
| B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted | 278 | 485 | 27744 |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants Developed | 41 | 37 | 2655 |

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (SIP)
66-2542-3

9. Adequacy and Currentness of Instructions

Instructions pertaining to the SIP are contained in Section 87 D of the Manual of Instructions and have been reviewed and have been found to be adequate.

10. Over-all Value

The over-all value of the SIP is clearly emphasized by the fact that 2,655 sources, PSIs, and informants have been developed through this program. Through the continued use of the SIP the Bureau's security informant coverage will be extended, confusion in the CP will continue, and any expansion of or new CP activity will be promptly detected.

11. Contemplated Action

It is contemplated the development of security informants will be continued through the SIP. It will be closely supervised, followed, and afforded tight administrative control.

November 29, 1963

66-2542-3

PERSONAL

REC

66-2542-3 1345

REC'D - READING ROOM

TT
BT

NOV 29 3 00 PM '63

Federal Bureau of Investigation
San Francisco, California

Dear [redacted]

b6
b7C

Thank you very much for the suggestion concerning
a method for handling certain accounting matters regarding a
particular program. This proposal is being carefully evaluated
and I will let you know if it is adopted.

The initiative you displayed in submitting your
idea to me for consideration is indeed appreciated.

b7D

Sincerely yours,

E. Edgar Hoover

MAILER'S
NOV 29 1963
COMM-FBI

2 - SAC, San Francisco 1 - Field personnel file

1 - Suggestion file

1 - Personnel file of [redacted]

ML:mlf.mly

(6) (Suggestion #405-64 dated 11/22/63)

NOTE: Suggests confidential fund checks for payment to security
informants be written for the net amount the informant
receives when Bureau is withholding Federal income tax. Once a month,
a check for the total Federal income tax withheld for that month for all
informants could be drawn and deposited in the special account.

Referred to the Administrative and Domestic Intelligence
Divisions for views and recommendations.

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

NOV 29 1963
COMM-FBI

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : *John* SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (66-3946)

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION RE SECURITY INFORMANTS
AND SOURCES - INCOME TAX
#405-64

DATE: 11/22/63

Reference is made to No Number SAC Letter 63-E and exhibits dated 3/27/63 instructing this Office to withhold Federal income tax from certain regularly paid security informants.

The San Francisco Office has been following the *gent* instructions set out in this SAC Letter.

The attached suggestion, which was made by [redacted] in the San Francisco Office, has been carefully reviewed. This suggestion, if adopted, would save considerable time on the part of Agent and clerical personnel.

There are three exhibits enclosed, which are quite similar to the exhibits furnished by No Number SAC Letter 63-E. This system, if adopted, appears to be much more logical than the one that is currently being used for the reasons set forth in the suggestion.

b6
b7C

b7D

In the event the Federal income tax withholding system is extended to all Bureau field offices, the adoption of this suggestion would streamline the procedure and save countless hours.

- 3 - Bureau (ENCL. 3) (REG.)
3 - San Francisco (66-3946)
1 - P & C File
1 - Personnel File [redacted]

GAH/afp
(6)

ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED
NOV 22 1963
FBI - SAN FRANCISCO

MEMO REC'D 11/22/63 BY [redacted]
SAC SAN FRANCISCO
EXHIBIT 3 ADDITIVE REC'D 12/10/63
EXHIBIT 11/11/63 ADDITIVE REC'D 12/10/63

166-2542-3
NOT RECORDED

57 JUN 24 1964

5 NOV 26 1963

R. J. [Signature]

TAC

#405-64

Date

11/22/63

To: Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name) [Redacted]

Division of Assignment

SAN FRANCISCO

b6
b7C

SUGGESTION

Confidential fund checks for payment to security informants should be written for the next amount that the informant receives, where the Bureau is withholding Federal income tax. Once a month, a check for the total Federal income tax withheld for that month for all informants could be drawn and deposited in the special account.

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

See attached page 2

36 NOV 26 1963

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

See attached page 3

Inadvantages of suggestion

None known

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for an ~~awarded~~ justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss [Redacted]

Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

This is an excellent suggestion and would definitely simplify the procedure and it is recommended that it be accepted.

ENCLOSURE

Special Agent

Signature and Title in Charge

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

3 - Bureau (encls. 3)
3 San Francisco

68 ENCL 3

RECEIVED
12 NOV 25 1963
FBI - SAN FRANCISCO
13-10-63
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
5 NOV 25 1963

Current Practice or Rule:

Current instructions are that a check should be drawn on the regular confidential fund to cover the gross amount due the informant, including the amount to be withheld for Federal income tax. The check is then cashed by the Agent handling the informant and then he must return the amount of Federal income tax to be withheld to the Accounting Clerk. The Accounting Clerk must then immediately deposit this money in a special account.

Advantages of Suggestion and Annual Savings:

The adoption of this suggestion would save an unnecessary step and thereby save considerable time on the part of Special Agents as well as the Accounting Clerk. There is no reason for an Agent to be given this money in the first place and then turn around and give it back to the Accounting Clerk, who must make a trip to the bank to make an immediate deposit of the money. For example, at this time, an Agent receives a check from the Accounting Clerk in the amount of [redacted]. The check is then cashed by the Agent. [redacted] of this is given in cash to the informant. The Agent then must return the [redacted] to the Accounting Clerk, who must enter it in the records. In the case of a Resident Agent, who usually does not come to headquarters, except when necessary, it is necessary for him to either write a personal check for the \$25 and send it to the Accounting Clerk, or to have another Agent who might be coming to Headquarters personally bring the cash in and give it to the Accounting Clerk in order that it immediately be placed in the special account. Upon receipt of this money by the Accounting Clerk, she must immediately post the necessary ledger sheets and then take the money to the bank and deposit it. Under the present regulations it is almost necessary for her to make daily trips to the bank in order to comply with Bureau instructions, ie. to immediately deposit this money in the bank. The adoption of this suggestion would also simplify posting records on the part of the Accounting Clerk. The current practice is to post the refund received from the Agent on the "Record of Income Tax Transactions" on a daily basis, ie. each day when an Agent returns a tax refund the Accounting Clerk must enter this transaction in the ledger.

The suggestion, if adopted, would completely eliminate this type of posting and it would be replaced with one posting for the whole month, ie. the total amount of money for all informants which was withheld. If the suggestion is adopted, the Accounting Clerk could then, at the end of each month, total up the amount of tax withheld from all informants, make a check out for that amount, cash it and place this amount in the special account.

b7E

Advantages of Suggestion and Annual Savings (con't):

Attached are three exhibits numbered 1, 2 and 3.

Exhibit numbers 1 and 2 are identical with the exhibits which were contained in No Number SAC Letter 63-E dated 3/27/63, with the exception that the column captioned "Tax Withheld from Security" has been added. These exhibits will show that in the case of Exhibit #1, at the end of 10/63 [redacted] was the total tax withheld from informants for income tax. This in turn was placed in the special account. Exhibit #2 shows that during the month of 12/63, a total of [redacted] was withheld. At the end of December, the total of [redacted] was entered as received in the special account.

Exhibit #3 also shows that at the end of 1963 the total tax that was withheld for 1963 was forwarded to the Bureau by check.

b7E

66-2542-3-1347
CHANGED TO



b7D

JUN 25 1964

ps. W.C.

C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Callahan

DATE: 12/3/63

FROM : M. F. Row

✓ Security Info - General

SUBJECT: EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION NUMBER 405-64

SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES - INCOME TAX

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

The Training Division has requested the views and recommendations of the Administrative Division concerning captioned suggestion. The suggestion modifies the instructions and procedures outlined by the Bureau concerning withholding of Federal income tax from payments made to informants and sources to the extent that the checks written on the Confidential Fund for such payments be written for the net amount that is actually paid to the informant, and once a month a check for the total of the Federal income tax withheld for that month for all informants be drawn and deposited to the special account. Employee suggests that the adoption of the change would save employee time in that only one deposit would be made each month instead of several. Employee also suggests that the adoption of the suggestion would simplify posting to ledgers by posting once a month rather than immediately following an individual transaction. To change the current practice of posting, employee suggests new ledgers be adopted. A copy of the suggestion is attached. *b6-2542-3*

b7D

57

JUN 24 1963

As you know, the instructions and procedures for the withholding of Federal income tax from payments made to informants and sources were completed after much consideration by the Bureau. The accounting instructions provide in part that when a payment is made to an informant subject to this plan, the amount to be withheld for income tax purposes will be twenty per cent of the total of services and that a check be drawn on a regular Confidential Fund to cover the total amount of the authorized payment. This check will be cashed and the amount for taxes immediately deposited in the special checking account set up for this purpose. The deposit slip would be used in posting in the ledger accounts. Payment to the informant follows and the receipt by the informant shows the amount received for reimbursement for expenses and the authorized amount for services, and the amount withheld for Federal income tax purposes. The necessary ledgers were drawn up to permit the field to maintain separate and detailed records of each and every transaction involved in this plan.

REC-10 12-3-1347

8 DEC 12 1963

Enclosure

Dec 12 1963 - 3 - 1345

DEC:nfs

(3)

SEE ADDENDUM OF THE TRAINING DIVISION ON PAGE THREE

OVER

ORIGINAL FILED IN

M. F. Row to Mr. Callahan memo
Re: EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION NUMBER 405-64
SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES - INCOME TAX

If the suggestion were adopted it would mean that money for Federal income tax withheld from payments made to informants and sources would accumulate in the regular field office Confidential Fund for an entire month before being withdrawn and deposited in the special bank account. This procedure is objectionable inasmuch as the purpose of the special bank account for the tax money is to prevent such funds from being a part of the regular office Confidential Fund. In addition the Bureau has always very strongly insisted that all financial transactions involving the special funds maintained by the field be handled promptly and that there be no scheduled delay in making deposits to the special bank account. To wait until the end of each month to withdraw money from the regular Confidential Fund and deposit to the special bank account is certainly a scheduled delay. Furthermore, to let the tax money accumulate in the regular Confidential Fund for a month before transferring it to the special bank account makes such money available for other purposes during the month and creates the possibility of not having the appropriate amount readily available for deposit at the end of the month. It also presents a possibility of not having money readily available to make any necessary adjustments to an individual informant at the end of the tax year. To adopt this suggestion would also mean the use of the suggested ledger accounts and such accounts are not practical because to use them would involve keeping records for two separate funds in the same ledger. When the instructions to implement the plan for withholding of tax money was drawn up, it was determined that we maintain separate accounting records and therefore special ledger sheets were designed and made available to the field. To try and consolidate such records with the possibility of saving employee time would defeat the necessity for having sound and practical bookkeeping procedures.

In addition to the above, should the suggestion be adopted, it would mean that a change in voucher procedure would have to be made. Under present procedures the entire amount of the authorized payment is withdrawn from the regular Confidential Fund. The receipt obtained from the informant shows gross or full amount of payment and that a certain amount has been withheld for tax purposes. The field submits vouchers for the total amount of authorized payments and not just the money actually received by informant. If only the net amount of the payment was withdrawn from the fund, then the office could only voucher the same amount. At the end of a month and subsequent to the withdrawal of funds for tax purposes, another blue slip would have to be submitted so that the office could recover this

J. K. Row to Mr. Callahan memo
Re: EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION NUMBER 405-64
SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES - INCOME TAX

amount to replenish the regular Confidential Fund. This blue slip could not be supported by receipt. To eliminate the extra blue slip voucher and to insure that payments of this nature are supported by appropriate receipts, the field office could not claim reimbursement until the end of the month after the transfer of the tax money from the Confidential Fund to the special account had been completed. This plan is not workable inasmuch as it would present the office from having the necessary turnover of the regular Confidential Fund during the course of a month, and it would in all probability become necessary for the Bureau to increase the size of the office Confidential Fund.

In view of the above, it is believed that we should definitely not adopt this suggestion.

RECOMMENDATION:

That employee's Suggestion Number 405-64 concerning a possible modification in the instructions and procedures for withholding of Federal income tax from payments made to informants and sources not be adopted and the Training Division be so advised.

ADDENDUM OF THE TRAINING DIVISION

ML:mlf mly 12/10/63

Views of the Domestic Intelligence Division were also received concerning this proposal and this division was in agreement with the facts set forth in the foregoing memorandum; therefore, the Training Division recommends this suggestion not be adopted due to the objections set forth.

RECOMMENDATION: (1) That the suggestion not be adopted. On approval, no further action is necessary with regard to the suggester as she has been thanked by prior letter.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *Merry*

DATE: 12/3/63

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *WJD*

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE

~~ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CP IN EACH FIELD OFFICE)~~

EVALUATION OF PROGRAM

~~MEMORANDUM~~
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Bulet 8/7/58 instructed each continental field division, except San Francisco and Los Angeles, to submit detailed survey of Communist Party (CP) organization within its territory, setting forth organizational structure, identities of all officers and functionaries from club to district level, identities of each individual CP member, and current informant coverage. Copies of this letter were not directed to San Francisco or Los Angeles inasmuch as they had submitted current information of this type. Replies from the various field offices were thoroughly analyzed and results reflected over-all informant coverage to be good. Certain divisions had areas where additional coverage was needed and instant program inaugurated as a means of emphasizing to the field the necessity of expanding security informant coverage to cover these weak areas. Through the program, the Seat of Government directs concentrated intensive efforts in those particular offices where the need for coverage is most urgent and assures continuous attention to make certain the necessary coverage is effected as rapidly as possible. Program involves 10 offices which are set forth as follows: Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Springfield, and Washington. Each of these offices has been separately instructed to take steps to obtain additional coverage in those areas needing attention.

RECOMMENDATION:

Since this program serves a definite purpose in guiding the field toward strengthening areas of weak informant coverage, it is recommended that it be continued with further evaluation again in 1 year.

66-2542-3-1348

REC-18

6 DEC 12 1963

DETAILS:

This memorandum contains the results of a complete review and evaluation of this program and a recommendation that the program be continued.

1. ORIGIN

Bulet 8/7/58 instructed each continental field division, except San Francisco and Los Angeles, to submit detailed survey of CP organization within its territory, setting forth organizational

66-2542-3

JDD:edj RGD:18 18 1963
322

Adm. Office

Memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

structure, identities of all officers and functionaries from club to district level, identities of each individual CP member, and current informant coverage. Copies of this letter were not directed to San Francisco or Los Angeles inasmuch as they had submitted current information of this type. Replies from the various field offices were thoroughly analyzed and results reflected over-all informant coverage to be good. Certain divisions had areas where additional coverage was needed and instant program has been carried on to emphasize to the field the necessity of expanding security informant coverage to cover these weak areas.

2. PURPOSE

The primary objective of this program has been to pinpoint areas in the field where informant coverage of the Party needs strengthening. It affords a means whereby the Seat of Government can direct concentrated, intensive efforts in those offices where this need for coverage is most urgent and assures continuous attention to make certain the desired coverage is effected as rapidly as possible.

3. SCOPE

As delinquencies in this respect are overcome in an office, that office is dropped from this program. At present, the program is in effect in the 10 following offices:

| | |
|-----------|--------------|
| Boston | New York |
| Chicago | Pittsburgh |
| Cleveland | Springfield |
| Detroit | Washington |
| Milwaukee | Philadelphia |

Each of the above offices has been separately instructed to take immediate steps to obtain additional coverage within those areas needing particular attention.

4. TIE-IN WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

This particular program ties in with our other programs whereby we are endeavoring to ascertain and identify membership of the CP and to determine the financial operations and apparatus of the CPUSA. An important adjunct of this intensified program, of course, is the development of additional informants who are in the position of producing valuable intelligence information on individual communists which is of great value to the Security Index Program.

Memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
66-2542-3

5. CASE LOAD

Each field office maintains a control file for instructions and other communications relating to the program.

6. MAGNITUDE

Each individual office which is being followed under this program is closely supervised by the appropriate Supervisor of the Security Informant - Special Records Desk.

7. PAST OR PRESENT WEAKNESSES

An analysis and re-evaluation of the program have not disclosed any weaknesses at the present time.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

Each of the 10 offices presently being followed under this program is receiving close attention on a periodic basis by the appropriate Supervisor. As each office reports its progress, the results are carefully analyzed and any necessary instructions and directions are transmitted to the field by the Supervisor to make certain this program receives continuing attention.

9. ADEQUACY AND CURRENTNESS OF INSTRUCTIONS

Review of instructions which have been given to each of the field offices under the program discloses that they are adequate and current.

10. OVER-ALL VALUE

The primary purpose of this program is to pinpoint for the field those areas of security informant coverage which need strengthening. In addition, the field has been instructed to take steps to develop additional coverage in those particular areas which will result in obtaining more informants in the security field.

11. CONTEMPLATED ACTION

As each office develops the necessary coverage, it will be dropped from the program. At the same time, we will remain alert for any additional areas in the field which may become weak and place such offices under the program to make certain those weaknesses are eliminated and the necessary coverage is obtained.

flm:wsps

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 1/6/64

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

General

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6/18/56 sets forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permit the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field submits progress letters under this program on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 11/30/63, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three months ending 11/30/63 | Three months ending 8/31/63 | Total |
|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------|
| A. Number of Active Communist Contacted | 117 | 132 | 7836 |
| B. Number of Other Individuals Contacted | 309 | 278 | 28053 |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants Developed | 37 | 41 | 2692 |

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3

REC 30

11 JAN 8 1964

JDD/jmc/jmc
(4)

66 JAN 13 1964 26 EX-114

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that this program be continued. Another memorandum will be prepared upon receipt of the information from the field showing the progress of the program and reflecting the figures for the current quarter (ending 2/29/64), the proceeding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.

J. K. Kew
J. K. Kew
W. E.

66-2542-3-1350
CHANGED TO
66-2542-3-5-1406X

MAY 22 1964

Da - J.S.

(1)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Baumgardner

DATE: March 2, 1964

FROM : Mr. Donohue

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES
PAYMENTS

Geninfo

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Candy _____

Donohue

The following tabulation of expenditures represents payments made to security informants and sources on a monthly basis for the period of January, 1961, through December, 1963.

| | <u>1961</u> | <u>1962</u> | <u>1963</u> |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Jan. | | | |
| Feb. | | | |
| Mar. | | | |
| Apr. | | | |
| May | | | |
| June | | | |
| July | | | |
| Aug. | | | |
| Sept. | | | |
| Oct. | | | |
| Nov. | | | |
| Dec. | | | |
| TOTAL | | | |
| Monthly Average | | | |

b7E

Monthly average January, 1961, through December, 1963.

REC-9

66-2542-2 1351

The above tabulations are reported graphically on the attached page.

EX-108

ACTION: ENCLOSURE

None, for your information.

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Rose

BFR/jmc (3)

81 MAR 9 1964

BT
f.10 1312

CH


1961

1962

1963

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

b7E



Total

Total

Total

Average

Average

Average

Average 1-61 through 12-63

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
IS - R - CUBA

DATE: February 10, 1964

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
 1 - Mr. Rosen
 1 - Mr. Callahan
 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Branigan
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue

Tolson _____
 Belo _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to your memorandum of January 30, 1964, to Mr. A. H. Belmont in which it was stated the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) has only limited authority to make payments to security informants without Bureau authority in certain instances and we control this by limiting amount, and by end-of-month accounting procedure which lists all such payments, to whom made, and for what purpose. The Director noted: "Just what is language of this 'limited authority.' H."

Leah
 Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions provides that the SAC may approve payments to security informants of amounts up to [redacted] and totaling not more than [redacted] on a C.O.D. basis in specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to expend money to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation, b7e which is not otherwise obtainable, or to advance expense money to enable an individual to obtain such information. This applies only to individuals who have never been paid on a regular basis for services or expenses on Bureau authorization. In other words, once an individual has been paid on Bureau authority regardless of the amount, this authority of the SAC may not be utilized. The blue slip submitted by the SAC to the Bureau claiming any payments authorized by the SAC must clearly and accurately explain the circumstances and summarize the information obtained. Prior Bureau authority must be obtained to make any additional payment to an individual who has received payments totaling [redacted]

When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau authority, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to so obtain them. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances concerning the payment must be set forth by the field office on a voucher at the time reimbursement is claimed at the end of the month. Receipts must clearly show:
 (1) the date on which the payment was made; (2) the period for

JDD/jmc (9)

166-2542-3-15
NOT RECORDED
199 MAR 3 1964

52 MAR 5 1964


22 MAR 2 1964

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

which made; (3) the total amount paid, broken down into separate amounts for services and expenses; (4) the name of the FBI Agent making the payment; and (5) the signature of the person receiving the money.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

JF

W.C. Sullivan
W.H.F. Keay

66-2542-3 -

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. J. R. Malley
1 - Mr. Sullivan

February 6, 1964

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

Honorable J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
The President's Commission
200 Maryland Avenue, Northeast
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rankin:

Reference is made to our conversation of January 28, 1964, concerning testimony furnished the Commission by Mr. Henry M. Wade, the District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas. You advised that Mr. Wade testified he had heard that Lee Harvey Oswald had been an informant of the FBI, had been assigned symbol number [redacted] and had been paid [redacted] monthly in this capacity. You further advised that Mr. Wade also indicated that FBI headquarters was not in a position to know in all instances whether an individual was an informant of this Bureau.

b7E

At the time, I advised you that Lee Harvey Oswald had never been an informant of the FBI and that this Bureau's procedure in regard to handling informants is such as to insure that FBI headquarters would have all necessary facts concerning the development and control of any and every informant.

Enclosed for your information and use in this regard is an affidavit in which I have categorically stated that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI and have outlined our administrative procedures for the handling and the payment of confidential informants.

Delivered 1-7-64
11:20 a.m. J.R.H.

Sincerely yours,

XEROX
FEB 18 1964
Enclosure
NOTE: See memorandum W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont 2-6-64, captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security - R - Cuba,"
CDB:eeb

CDB:SD:eeb:mkr (12)

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE-UNIT

RECORDED REC. UNIT
WCS/3

CITY OF WASHINGTON)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA) ss:

1-Mr.Belmont
1-Mr.Mohr
1-Mr.Callahan
1-Mr.Rosen
1-Mr.Sullivan
1-Mr.Branigan
1-Mr.Baumgardner
1-Mr.D.J.Brennan

AFFIDAVIT

J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he has caused a search to be made of the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, by employees of the said Federal Bureau of Investigation acting under his direction, and that said search discloses that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI, was never assigned a symbol number in that capacity, and was never paid any amount of money by the FBI in any regard.

Such a statement can be made authoritatively and without equivocation because of the close supervision FBI headquarters affords its security informant program and because of the safeguards established to insure against any abuse or misuse of the program.

FBI field offices cannot proceed to develop anyone as a security informant without authorization from FBI headquarters. An informant is assigned a permanent symbol number and code name to afford him security. The informant never knows the symbol number assigned to him. It is a number permanently assigned to him, and the same number cannot be used again by the field office under any circumstances for any other individual. The individual also is given a fictitious or cover name by the field office which he, of course, is made aware of, and he affixes it to his communications with the office. Every symbol number and code name is indexed at FBI headquarters.

If the services of an informant warrant payment on a regular basis, the field offices must also obtain authorization from FBI headquarters to make such payments.

Special Agents in Charge (SACs) of FBI field offices are authorized to make payments to individuals not utilized on

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Shultz _____
Gandy _____

NOTE: See memorandum W.C. Sullivan to A.H. Belmont dated 2/6/64 captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security - R - Cuba," CDB:eeb. JDD:jmc:jdd (10)

a regular basis as informants, but here too FBI headquarters controls this by limiting the amount an SAC can pay to any one individual in this category. FBI headquarters maintains control of such payments since they must be accounted for by the field offices at the end of each month through the submission of a detailed accounting to headquarters.

Had any of the FBI field offices made payments to Lee Harvey Oswald under the SAC's authority, these would have been shown in the receipts and vouchers submitted by each office. These records have been checked and no such payment was ever made. Had Oswald been assigned a symbol number, this would be a matter of record not only by number but also by name. As a matter of fact, the FBI can identify every symbol number used, past or present. Oswald could not have been assigned such a symbol number without approval by FBI headquarters. There is no record of any such request by any field office and no record of any such approval.

The only contacts FBI Agents had with Oswald prior to the assassination of President Kennedy involved three interviews FBI Agents had with him. The first was on June 26, 1962, at Fort Worth, Texas, shortly after his return home from the Soviet Union. The purpose was to assess the possibility of his having been given intelligence assignments by the Soviets. The second, on August 16, 1962, was in the same connection. The third was at his specific request on August 10, 1963, following his arrest in New Orleans the preceding day on a charge of disturbing the peace and creating a scene. At that time, he described some of his activities in connection with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the pro-Castro organization.

Oswald was again interviewed by FBI Agents at the Dallas Police Department following his arrest after the assassination of the President. This interview was aimed at eliciting any admissions he might make in connection with the assassination, as well as to obtain any information he might have been able to furnish of a security nature.

FBI headquarters has obtained affidavits from every Special Agent who was in contact with Oswald, as well as affidavits from their respective SACs. These affidavits show that none of these FBI Agents developed Oswald as an informant.

Mr. Henry M. Wade, a former Special Agent of the FBI and currently the District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas, reportedly testified previously to the Commission that he had

heard that Lee Harvey Oswald was an FBI informant with the symbol number [redacted] and was being paid [redacted] monthly. As the facts clearly show, this is not true.

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Furthermore, the facts refute Mr. Wade's reported statement to the Commission that there is no record maintained in the FBI of informant funds expended or the purposes for which used by the FBI employee to whom they were furnished.

Mr. Wade reportedly stated that he had worked in the FBI's Special Intelligence Service (SIS) and that he was supplied from time to time with various sums of money for which he did not have to account and for which he did not have to obtain any receipts from the persons to whom he disbursed the money.

The emergency conditions that prevailed during World War II when the FBI conducted its SIS program did not permit the tight supervision that prevails currently in the FBI's informant operations. But this is true only in regard to the fact that SIS men necessarily were given the latitude to develop and pay informants on the spot without prior approval from FBI headquarters. Nevertheless, SIS men operated under a control system and adhered to it by advising FBI headquarters of payments made and the identity of the individuals paid. Such payments were supported by receipts in nearly every instance.

Mr. Wade, for example, entered on duty with the FBI on December 4, 1939. On July 6, 1942, he was advanced the sum of [redacted] in connection with an [redacted] assignment.

b7E

[redacted] In addition, he was required to make full restitution of the total amount which had been advanced him and subsequently did so. All of his expenditures of the total amount furnished him were substantiated by vouchers he submitted.

Mr. Wade arrived [redacted] on August 16, 1942. He [redacted]

[redacted] Mr. Wade was required to submit vouchers twice monthly [redacted]

[redacted] They were reviewed there and forwarded to FBI headquarters where they were checked prior to approval and the transmittal of funds to Mr. Wade's account.

In his operations, Mr. Wade handled a total of 11 informants. His vouchers clearly identify each expenditure made by him in connection with payments to any one of these informants. In all, Mr. Wade expended a total of [redacted] in payments to informants. In addition to identifying each informant paid and indicating the amount paid to each, he complied with the regulations to furnish separately summary data on all informants he was using and an evaluation of their services.

b7E

Five of the informants Mr. Wade was operating were the most productive. These five received a total of [redacted] in 52 separate payments made by Mr. Wade. Each of these payments was supported by a receipt. Six other payments unsupported by receipts were accounted for by Mr. Wade in vouchers submitted by him.

Mr. Wade left [redacted] and in a letter dated May 25, 1943, submitted his resignation from the FBI. By letter dated June 13, 1943, Mr. Wade sought reinstatement, stating that he had made a mistake in resigning. However, this request for reinstatement was refused since the FBI's request for his deferment under the Selective Service Act already had been withdrawn.

Signed this 6th day of February, 1964, at Washington, District of Columbia

J. Edgar Hoover

Subscribed and Sworn to before
me this 6th day of February,
1964. Louise D. Walter, Notary
Public, District of Columbia.
My commission expires August 14,
1968.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: 2-6-64

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
INTERNAL SECURITY - R - CUBA

| | |
|------------|-------|
| Tolson | _____ |
| Belmont | _____ |
| Mohr | _____ |
| Casper | _____ |
| Callahan | _____ |
| Conrad | _____ |
| DeLoach | _____ |
| Eyman | _____ |
| Gale | _____ |
| Rosen | _____ |
| Sullivan | _____ |
| Tavel | _____ |
| Troutier | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Holmes | _____ |
| Gandy | _____ |

*J. S. [Signature]
Barry [Signature]
Brigigan [Signature]*

Reference is made to my memorandum dated 2-5-64 captioned as above in which we forwarded for the Director's approval a proposed affidavit to be furnished to the President's Commission to refute the allegation that Lee Harvey Oswald was an FBI informant. In accordance with the Director's approval of same and his instructions, the affidavit has been properly dated, notarized, and prepared for the Director's signature for transmittal to Mr. J. Lee Rankin with the attached transmittal letter.

RECOMMENDATIONS:*Security Information Gen.*

1. That the enclosed affidavit be forwarded to the Director for execution.

2. That the affidavit be delivered to Mr. Rankin, with the attached letter of transmittal, by Mr. Malley.

*Delivered 1/7/64**11:20 am. AM
Enc.*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. J.R. Malley
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan

*CDB:eeb
(11)*

*WEPs
JF
GL FSB/OS
66-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
299 FEB 18 1964*

*22 FEB 18 1964**ED**5-1 [Signature]**PERS. REC. UNIT*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: 2-5-64

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
INTERNAL SECURITY - R - CUBA

In accordance with the Director's request, we have prepared the enclosed affidavit incorporating facts which clearly refute the allegation that Lee Harvey Oswald was an FBI informant and which also refute testimony given to the President's Commission by Mr. Henry M. Wade that (1) the FBI does not account for money paid to informants and (2) Wade, while serving in the FBI's [redacted] was provided with funds to pay informants and was not held accountable for the money.

The affidavit is sound and constitutes an unequivocal refutation of the false allegations. The Director may desire to use this affidavit in connection with an appearance before the President's Commission.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the enclosed affidavit be forwarded to the Director. This affidavit should be dated when executed.

Enc.

116-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
199 FEB 18 1964

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. D.J.Brennan

ADDENDUM, 2/5/64 (AHB:csh) -

Please note this affidavit goes into detail as to Wade's activities [redacted]. The purpose is to show that our records, even 20 years ago, show accountability for monies expended. I wonder, however, if we don't labor this too much, as it fills two pages of a 4-page affidavit. Also, we mention [redacted] where Wade was assigned.

Possibly this will

raise a fuss
I suggest we [redacted]

CDB:skw:jdd
(9)

53 FEB 21 1964

PERS. REC. UNIT

(see page two)

22 FEB 18 1964

SOVIET SECTION

b7E

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont, 2/5/64
Re: Lee Harvey Oswald, IS-R-Cuba

Addendum, continued:

In addition, this affidavit goes into detail, i.e., that headquarters must authorize the field to develop an informant; he is given a permanent symbol and code name; headquarters must authorize payments; and receipts and vouchers are submitted by the field to headquarters. In Federal Court trials against the Communist Party and individual communists, the defense has repeatedly made every possible attempt to explore our handling of informants and get its hands on our records, under the Jencks decision, etc. This public affidavit may provide the basis for the defense to demand further records, such as our vouchers or blue slips and all correspondence between the Bureau and our field offices dealing with the development and handling of an informant who is used as a witness.

I suggest we show this proposed affidavit to Assistant AG Yeagley to see whether it would provide a basis for the defense to demand and secure such Bureau records at a trial. If he thinks it will result in such action, it is suggested we rewrite this affidavit to make it as strong as possible and yet eliminate such particulars.

A. H. Belmont

I think affidavit
is adequate & don't
want to quibble with
Commissioner re its scope.
Prepare it for notarizing
& date it & have it signed.
It should then be transmitted
to Rankin referring to his
conference with you?

2

Done --
See memo Sullivan
to Belmont 2/6/64.
Same caption
cbs

| | |
|---------------|------------------|
| 1-Mr.Belmont | 1-Mr.Sullivan |
| 1-Mr.Mohr | 1-Mr.Branigan |
| 1-Mr.Callahan | 1-Mr.Baumgardner |
| 1-Mr.Rosen | 1-Mr.Brennan |

I, J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, do hereby swear and depose that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI, was never assigned a symbol number in that capacity, and was never paid any amount of money by the FBI in any regard.

Such a statement can be made authoritatively and without equivocation because of the close supervision FBI headquarters affords its security informant program and because of the safeguards established to insure against any abuse or misuse of the program.

FBI field offices cannot proceed to develop anyone as a security informant without authorization from FBI headquarters. An informant is assigned a permanent symbol number and code name to afford him security. The informant never knows the symbol number assigned to him. It is a number permanently assigned to him, and the same number cannot be used again by the field office under any circumstances for any other individual. The individual also is given a fictitious or cover name by the field office which he, of course, is made aware of, and he affixes it to his communications with the office. Every symbol number and code name is indexed here at FBI headquarters.

If the services of an informant warrant payment on a regular basis, the field offices must also obtain authorization from FBI headquarters to make such payments.

Special Agents in Charge (SACs) of our field offices are authorized to make payments to individuals not utilized on a regular basis as informants, but here too FBI headquarters controls this by limiting the amount an SAC can pay to any one individual in this category. FBI headquarters maintains control of such payments as they must be accounted for by the field offices at the end of each month through the submission of a detailed accounting to headquarters.

Had any of our offices made payments to Lee Harvey Oswald under the SAC's authority, these would have been shown in the receipts and vouchers submitted by each office. These records have been checked and no such payment was ever made.

See memo Sullivan to Belmont, 2-5-64,
CDB:skw:jdd, re Lee Harvey Oswald, IS-R-CUBA.

MAIL ROOM MAIL ROOM ENCLOSURE

Digitized by srujanika@gmail.com

Had Oswald been assigned a symbol number, this would be a matter of record not only by number but also by name. As a matter of fact, we can identify every symbol number used, past or present. Oswald could not have been assigned such a symbol number without approval by FBI headquarters. There is no record of any such request by any field office and no record of any such approval.

The only contacts FBI Agents had with Oswald prior to the assassination of President Kennedy involved three interviews FBI Agents had with him. The first was on June 26, 1962, at Fort Worth, Texas, shortly after his return home from the Soviet Union. The purpose was to assess the possibility of his having been given intelligence assignments by the Soviets. The second, on August 16, 1962, was in the same connection. The third was at his specific request on August 10, 1963, following his arrest in New Orleans the preceding day on a charge of disturbing the peace and creating a scene. At that time, he described some of his activities in connection with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the pro-Castro organization.

Oswald was again interviewed by FBI Agents at the Dallas Police Department following his arrest after the assassination of the President. This interview was aimed at eliciting any admissions he might make in connection with the assassination, as well as to obtain any information he might have been able to furnish of a security nature.

We have obtained affidavits from every Agent who was in contact with Oswald. In addition, we also have secured affidavits from their respective SACs. These affidavits show that none of these FBI Agents developed Oswald as an informant.

I have been advised that Mr. Henry M. Wade, a former Special Agent of the FBI and currently the District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas, previously testified to the Commission that he had heard that Lee Harvey Oswald was an FBI informant with the symbol number [redacted] and was being paid [redacted] monthly. As the facts clearly show, this is not true.

Furthermore, the facts refute Mr. Wade's reported statement to the Commission that there is no record maintained in the FBI of informant funds expended or the purposes for which used by the FBI employee to whom they are furnished.

Mr. Wade reportedly stated that he had worked in the FBI's [redacted] and that he was supplied from time to time with various sums of money for which he did not have to account and for which he did not have to obtain any receipts from the persons to whom he disbursed the money.

The emergency conditions that prevailed during World War II when the FBI conducted its [redacted] program did not permit the tight supervision that prevails currently in our informant operations. But this is true only in regard to the fact that SIS men necessarily were given the latitude to develop and pay informants on the spot without prior approval from FBI headquarters. Nevertheless, [redacted] men operated under a control system and adhered to it by advising FBI headquarters of payments made and the identity of the individuals paid. Such payments were supported by receipts in nearly every instance.

Wade, for example, entered on duty with the FBI on December 4, 1939. On July 6, 1942, Wade was advanced the sum of [redacted] in connection with an [redacted] assignment. This was for subsistence and travel in connection with his assignment [redacted] as well as to provide him with some money to finance his operations. [redacted]

[redacted] In addition, he was required to make full restitution of the total amount which had been advanced him and subsequently did so. All of his expenditures of the total amount furnished him were substantiated by vouchers he submitted.

Wade arrived [redacted] on August 16, 1942. [redacted]

[redacted] Wade was required to submit vouchers twice monthly [redacted] They were reviewed there and forwarded to FBI headquarters where they were checked prior to approval and the transmittal of funds to Wade's account.

In his operations, Wade handled a total of 11 informants. His vouchers clearly identify each expenditure

To whom _____
Bureau _____
Mohr _____
Clegg _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Fisher _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Tele. Room _____
Hoffman _____

made by him in connection with payments to any one of these informants. In all, Wade expended a total of [redacted] in payments to informants. In addition to identifying each informant paid and indicating the amount paid to each, he complied with the regulations to furnish separately summary data on all informants he was using and an evaluation of their services.

b7E

Five of the informants Wade was operating were the most productive. These five received a total of [redacted] in 52 separate payments made by Wade. Each of these payments was supported by a receipt. Six other payments unsupported by receipts were accounted for by Wade in vouchers submitted by him.

Wade left [redacted] on May 2, 1943, and in a letter dated May 25, 1943, submitted his resignation from the FBI. By letter dated June 13, 1943, Wade sought reinstatement, stating that he had made a mistake in resigning. However, this request for reinstatement was refused since the FBI's request for his deferment under the Selective Service Act already had been withdrawn.

J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Note:

See memorandum Sullivan to Belmont 2-5-64 re
"Lee Harvey Oswald," CDB:skw:jdd.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
IS - R - CUBA

DATE: January 30, 1964

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

SYNOPSIS

Security Informants

Purpose of memorandum is to explore allegation Lee Harvey Oswald was FBI informant and related points covered by President's Commission last week during appearance before Commission of Henry Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas, and to set forth pursuant to Director's request (1) procedures we use in development and control of FBI informants, (2) the system used in handling informants in Special Intelligence Service (SIS) program, and (3) details concerning Wade's SIS service while in the FBI.

Contrary to testimony, Oswald was never FBI informant, was never paid money for information and was never assigned any symbol number. Procedures we use in informant program preclude the possibility of Oswald's connection with FBI as an informant without knowledge of Seat of Government.

We closely supervise all aspects of informant program. Field offices cannot develop security informants without Bureau authorization, which is based on exhaustive background investigation to determine reliability, trustworthiness and stability.

When we do authorize, we follow informant's development through progress letters which field offices submit at four-month intervals.

We approve use of symbols and code names, maintain an index of these and none may be used twice by the same field office. *5 FEB 24 1964*

We authorize payments on regular basis and maintain current records of every expenditure made showing to whom made and why. *66-2542-3-*

SAC has only limited authority to make payments without Bureau authority in certain instances and we control this by limiting amount, and by end-of-month accounting procedure which lists all such payments, to whom made, and for what purpose. NOT RECORDED

199 FEB 26 1964

CDB:kmj

(9)

1964
Mr. W. C. Sullivan
7-13-64

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Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

These procedures enable us to apply a cross check to our operations. Our records show (1) no payments were listed to Oswald, (2) no symbol number was assigned him, and (3) no field office requested authorization to consider Oswald for development as informant--a necessary requisite in our program.

b7E

We have already informed Commission purpose of three interviews Bureau Agents had with Oswald prior to assassination and one interview afterward. During none of these were any efforts made to develop Oswald as an informant and we have secured affidavits from every Agent in contact with Oswald at any time which substantiate this fact. We have also secured affidavits from their respective Special Agents in Charge (SAC's). These affidavits will be available in event Director desires to furnish them to the Commission.

In regard to SIS program, we had a control system whereby we have records of payments to informants similar to records maintained under our present domestic informant program.

Henry Wade

did not have unlimited funds

for informant development. He was required to account strictly for his expenditures and did so. Copies of the vouchers and receipts he submitted are available.

A brief of Wade's Bureau service record has been prepared separately for the information of the Director.

It would be desirable to furnish President's Commission with facts which clearly and unequivocally refute allegation that Oswald was a paid informant for the FBI operating with a symbol number. We should point out desirability of Commission issuing statement at once refuting allegation because (1) Communist Party has been carrying on propaganda campaign to spread this allegation; (2) allegation has developed enough interest to warrant even Commission's inquiry; and (3) if allegation goes unrefuted it will gain increasing public acceptance and prove damaging not only to FBI but Government as a whole.

Should Commission refuse to act, we should follow accepted policy of meeting such lies head on and issue statement ourselves. We can do so without referring to testimony before Commission since allegation has appeared in public source publications, notably communist press.

RECOMMENDATION: many issues. Done-meet 2/14/04 CDB

That this memorandum be referred to Director for information and approval of proposal to have statement issued either by President's Commission or by us if Commission declines. WPA

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

DETAILS

Background

Reference is made to the discussion January 28, 1964, between the Director and Mr. J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of the President's Commission, concerning appearance before the Commission last week of Henry Wade, former FBI Agent who currently is the District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas.

According to Rankin, the Commission was advised that speculation had been made that Lee Harvey Oswald had been an FBI informant with symbol number [redacted] and had been receiving payments from the FBI in the amount of [redacted] monthly.

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Wade reportedly told the Commission Oswald could have been active in this capacity without FBI headquarters personnel knowing about it because of the manner in which informants are developed and handled. In support of this contention, Wade is said to have pointed to his own experiences in the FBI specifically in regard to his service in [redacted]

[redacted] when, allegedly, records of his activities were not maintained, and he did not have to account for money furnished him to develop and pay informants.

Purpose

The purpose of this memorandum is to explore these specific allegations and to set forth, pursuant to the Director's request, (1) the specific procedures we use in the development and control of our security informant program, (2) the system used in handling informants [redacted] years ago, and (3) details concerning Wade's [redacted] service while he was employed as a Special Agent of the FBI.

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

I. Development and Control of Security Informants

First, it can be said unequivocally that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an FBI informant, was never paid any money for furnishing information, and was never given a symbol number of any kind much less the specific one allegedly assigned him. Furthermore, we are in a position not only to state this but also to produce records which would prove the impossibility of such being the case. These records cover every aspect of the procedures used in the development and control of informants.

Informant Program Closely Supervised

In order to fulfill our responsibilities in the internal security field, we use security informants to penetrate the Communist Party (CP), USA, and keep us advised of the Party's plans and activities. Recognizing the importance of this phase of our operations, we afford close supervision at the Seat of Government (SOG) to the security informant program and have established safeguards to insure against any misuse or abuse of its operation by our field offices.

Bureau Authority Necessary

Our field offices cannot develop anyone as a security informant without authorization from the SOG. To obtain this authorization, they must conduct an exhaustive background investigation of the prospective informant, the results of which are analyzed at the SOG before approval for development is given. Prior to giving such approval, the SOG automatically eliminates as a prospective informant any individual with questionable factors in his background, such as evidence of mental instability, a dishonorable discharge from the armed forces, narcotic addiction, perversion, unusual credit risks, complicated marital or domestic situations, and the like.

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

Progress Letters Necessary

When we do authorize a field office to proceed with the development of an individual as an informant, we follow the development through progress letters. At the end of four months, and at four-month intervals thereafter, the field office must submit progress letters containing an informative summary of information furnished and assistance rendered by the individual under development. These include a current certification each time concerning the individual's stability and reliability.

Symbols and Code Names Assigned

As the individual develops, he is assigned a permanent symbol number and code name to afford him security. The informant never knows the symbol number assigned to him. It is a number permanently assigned to him, and the same number cannot be used again by the field office under any circumstances for any other individual. The individual also is given a fictitious or cover name by the field office which he, of course, is made aware of and he affixes it to his communications with the office. Every symbol number and code name is indexed here at the SOG.

SOG Authorizes Regular Payments

If the services of an informant warrant payment on a regular basis, the field offices must also obtain authorization from the SOG to make such payments. In every such case, this too is re-evaluated every four months at the SOG to determine if continued payments are warranted.

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

Special Agents in Charge (SACs) Authority Limited

SACs of our field offices are authorized to make payments to individuals not utilized on a regular basis as informants, but here too the SOG controls this by limiting the amount an SAC can pay to any one individual in this category to [redacted] SACs are under instructions to make such payments only in specific instances in which it is necessary and expedient to do so to obtain information concerning matters or persons under investigation when such information is not otherwise obtainable or when it is necessary to advance expense money to an individual to enable him to secure the information.

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Controls in Effect

The SOG maintains additional control of such payments by the SAC in several ways. Such payments can only be made to individuals who have never been paid on a regular basis for services or expenses with Bureau authorization; such payments cannot exceed [redacted] regardless of the number of payments; and such payments must be accounted for by the field offices at the end of each month through the submission of a detailed accounting to the SOG.

Funds Accounted For

When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance, either on the SAC's authority or on prior Bureau authority, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to so obtain them. If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances concerning the payment must be set forth by the field office on a voucher at the time reimbursement is claimed at the end of the month. Receipts must clearly show: (1) the date on which the payment was made; (2) the period for which made; (3) the total amount paid, broken down into separate amounts for services and expenses; (4) the name of the FBI Agent making the payment; and (5) the signature of the person receiving the money.

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

Records of Expenditures Maintained

Receipts and vouchers prepared by field offices in this regard are transmitted to the SOG generally on a monthly basis (more frequently in many instances). They are reviewed to insure that all such payments are being made in accordance with Bureau instructions and are recorded in ledgers pertaining to each field office operation.

It is to be noted that the Bureau's precise handling of such matters is demonstrated every time an informant, a former informant, or other persons to whom we have paid sums of money are prospective witnesses. In such cases, we must and do furnish the Department a set of photostats of the original receipts signed by the prospective witnesses.

Control Measures

In regard to control of informants, field offices are under instructions to maintain close contact with them. The informants must be contacted as often as necessary with at least one personal contact every two weeks. The net result of these close contacts, as previously noted, are evaluated at the SOG in the four-month progress letters submitted. When it is necessary for any reason to discontinue the services of an informant, the field office must promptly notify the SOG.

Oswald Precluded as Informant

It can readily be seen then how such policies and procedures completely preclude the possibility of Lee Harvey Oswald even being considered as an FBI informant much less having been developed as one by us. The statement that he was is, in fact, ridiculous. The CP, USA, through its press has been spreading this outrageous lie in order to divert attention from the fact that Oswald was a confessed Marxist who was active in support of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) (a pro-Castro organization) and who was in correspondence with the CP, USA.

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

Absence of Payments to Oswald

Had any of our offices even made payments to him under the SAC's authority, these would have been shown in the receipts and vouchers submitted by each office. These records have been checked and double checked and no such payment was ever made.

Symbol Numbers Identifiable

Had Oswald been assigned a symbol number, this would be a matter of record not only by number but also by name. As a matter of fact, we can identify every symbol number used, past or present. The number [redacted] supposedly assigned Oswald is currently used by the Dallas Office for a criminal informant [redacted]

[redacted] In New Orleans, where [redacted]
spent some time, the number [redacted] was used by the New Orleans Office back in 1941 to designate an informant, [redacted]

[redacted] who was reporting security information and who was discontinued in [redacted]. As previously noted, once a number is used in any capacity, whether to designate a security or a criminal informant, it cannot be used by the field office again. In Mexico, to which Oswald traveled just prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, our Legal Attaché there currently has a security informant [redacted] who was so designated in 1960.

[redacted]

Procedural Steps Never Taken

Furthermore, Oswald could not have been assigned such a symbol number without a prior background investigation by any field office considering him for development. Had any field office considered developing him, it would have had to obtain approval by the SOG. There is no record of any such request by any field office and no record of any such approval.

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Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

Nature of Contacts with Oswald

As we have already pointed out to the Commission, the only contacts FBI Agents had with Oswald prior to the assassination of President Kennedy involved three interviews Bureau Agents had with him. The first was on June 26, 1962, at Fort Worth, Texas, shortly after his return home from the Soviet Union. The purpose was to assess the possibility of his having been given intelligence assignments by the Soviets. The second, on August 16, 1962, was in the same connection. The third was at his specific request on August 10, 1963, following his arrest in New Orleans the preceding day on a charge of disturbing the peace and creating a scene. At that time, he described some of his activities in connection with the FPCC.

Affidavits Secured

Oswald was again interviewed by FBI Agents at the Dallas Police Department following his arrest after the assassination of the President. This interview was aimed at eliciting any admissions he might make in connection with the assassination, as well as to obtain any information he might have been able to furnish of a security nature.

During none of the interviews with Oswald by Bureau Agents were any efforts made to develop him as an informant. We have obtained affidavits from every Agent who was in contact with Oswald. In addition, we also have secured affidavits from their respective SACs. These affidavits show that none of the FBI Agents ever made any effort to develop Oswald as an informant. These affidavits will be available in the event you desire to furnish them to the Commission.

II. Handling of Informants Under SIS Program

With regard to the handling of informants under the SIS program, file review shows that as a result of a control system then in effect we do have a record of

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

payments made, the identities of informants and Agents handling them, and receipts for payments. In the few instances where informants refused to sign receipts, Bureau was furnished all other data and record was still made of payment and informant who received same.

III. Henry Wade's [redacted] Service

Mr. Henry M. Wade entered on duty as a Special Agent on December 4, 1939, and resigned September 1, 1943, to enter the Armed Forces. He was in [redacted]

b7E

We received from [redacted] agents a periodic summary on informants [redacted]. Such a list was furnished by Wade on September 23, 1942, a few weeks after his arrival [redacted]. This was supplemented by other letters from Wade on [redacted] and [redacted] and a complete list of all informants handled by him, listing the disposition of each. prepared [redacted] before his departure [redacted]. In these, Wade indicated the amount being paid to each informant and his intentions to continue such payments as justified by services received. Wade had eleven informants, paid ten of them, and his vouchers for this period clearly show amounts paid to each and list receipts obtained.

Funds Handled by Wade [redacted]

Concerning funds handled by Wade, he was required to account for his expenditures and reclaim them by voucher, as mentioned above. In July, 1942, he did receive an advance of [redacted]. This money was not primarily for operational expenditures but for subsistence and travel in connection with his assignment. His passage from [redacted] to [redacted] for example, cost over [redacted]. Wade was required to make full restitution of this advance and completed repayment on June 28, 1943.

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

Therefore, it can be seen that Wade did not have unlimited funds for the purpose of developing sources, was required to strictly account for expenditures made and did furnish such an account, supported by receipts. Copies of Wade's vouchers and receipts submitted have been prepared and are available for delivery to the Commission if such action is desired.

A brief of Wade's complete Bureau service record has been prepared separately for the Director's information.

OBSERVATIONS

It is definite that we have all the facts to clearly and unequivocally refute the wild and ridiculous allegations that Lee Harvey Oswald was a paid informant for the FBI and operated with a symbol number. It would be desirable to furnish these facts to the President's Commission and point out that in the interest of setting the record straight, the Commission should issue a statement refuting these allegations.

It could be pointed out to the Commission that this is important for several reasons. Less than two weeks after the assassination, the communist press began a campaign to develop the idea that Oswald was an FBI informant and that, as an agent of the Government, he assassinated President Kennedy. The story has developed enough interest to result in calling individuals before the Commission to inquire into it. If the allegations continue unchallenged and unrefuted, there is bound to be increasing acceptance of them on the part of the public -- an acceptance that will prove damaging not only to the FBI but to the Government as a whole.

Should the Commission refuse to issue a statement refuting the allegations, we should inform the Commission we intend to issue such a statement. We should point out that the allegations are not confined to testimony before the Commission but have appeared publicly, notably through the campaign of the CP to hammer away on these points. As a result, we are free to deal with the allegations as we see fit.

Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan
to Mr. A. H. Belmont
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

We should point out to the Commission that it has always been our policy to face such allegations head on and we intend to follow the same policy in this matter if the Commission will not take prompt and effective action. If we do not do this, remaining silent, attacks against us in the press on this point may increase. Our silence will be taken as an admission of guilt. Six months from now when the Commission issues its report, the falsehood will be so widely distributed that it will be much more difficult to refute it.

JP

W.C.S.
V.H.O.

UNITED STATES

MENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

DATE: 4/6/64

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
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As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6/18/56 sets forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permit the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field submits progress letters under this program on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 2/29/64, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three months ending 2/29/64 | Three months ending 11/30/63 | Total |
|---|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------|
| A. Number of Active Communist Contacted | 96 | 117 | 7935 |
| B. Number of other Individuals Contacted | 233 | 309 | 28426 |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants Developed | 27 | 37 | 2737 |

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3

JDD/fnh
(4)

REC 30

66-2542-3-1352

APR 7 1964

56 APR 10 1964

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that this program be continued. Another memorandum will be prepared upon receipt of the information from the field showing the progress of the program and reflecting the figures for the current quarter (ending 5/31/64), the preceding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.

Y
FBI/WS

Jack

WCA

SAC, New Orleans (100-16057)

5/22/64

REC-10
66-2542-3-1353

Director, FBI (66-2542-3) (62-100119)

1 - Mr. Donohue

SECURITY INFORMANTS - GEN.

TROPUS

Reurlet 5/14/64 in which you stated it would be inadvisable to furnish information to Secret Service on security informants and potential security informants.

Since you feel the best interests of the Bureau would be served by not disseminating such memoranda, it will not be necessary to take any action under this program with regard to dissemination of memoranda on informants.

Due to the size of the Communist Party (CP) in your division and your informant coverage, it may be possible for your informants to be apprised by their communist associates of any contacts, interviews or other action by Secret Service. When such comes to their attention, the informants could be prepared to use a cover story to protect their relationship with the FBI.

According to relet, you indicated the Bureau could logically request Secret Service to advise the interested Bureau division of the identities of any individuals Secret Service plans to interview based upon the fact that such action may affect an active Bureau investigation. Under this program we are furnishing to Secret Service information on individuals who are considered dangerous. The protection of the President is the primary responsibility of Secret Service and that Agency must decide what action to take or not to take with regard to any individual who may be a threat to the safety of the President. The Bureau does not intend to contact Secret Service to ascertain what its plans may be with regard to the individuals included under this program. But, if locally Secret Service voluntarily furnishes information to you of any such plans in connection with individuals in your division, you should be in a position to assist your informants in being prepared with the proper answer for their communist associates.

JDD/jmc
(G)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

D MAY 26 1964

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MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

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Letter to New Orleans
RE: SECURITY INFORMANTS
TROPUS
66-2642-3
62-109119

NOTE:

New Orleans does not feel it necessary to take any action toward disseminating memoranda on security informants in connection with this project of disseminating memoranda on Security Index subjects to Secret Service. New Orleans is being advised to be prepared to furnish their informants guidance in the event action is taken by Secret Service on SI subjects. New Orleans inquires as to whether the Bureau could ask Secret Service to advise the interested Bureau Divisions of the identities of individuals on whom they contemplate action. There are no plans for such action by the Bureau as Secret Service must decide what action it should take with regard to any individual who may be considered dangerous to the President and our inquiry along this line would be undue interference into the Secret Service's responsibilities.

ENCLOSURE TO DIRECTOR, FBI (66-2542-3)(66-109119)

FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS (100-16957)

Copy of Act. No. 270

by:

New Orleans letter to Bureau, 5/14/64 (REGISTERED)

251



5/12/64 1353

ENCLOSURE

HOUSE BILL NO. 1069

BY: MESSRS. PEISTER, JOHN,
ARCEANEAU, D. S., EVENING
AND C. R. ANNIS AND
SENATORS PRUITT,
MONTGOMERY, LEE,
CARPENTER AND DAVIS

AN ACT

To Revise, Amend and Re-enact Sections 358 through 376 of Title
14, of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, to identify
control and regulate the Communist conspiracy in Louisiana.

270

~~ORIGINATED~~

~~IN THE~~

House of Representatives

Clerk of the House of Representatives

~~Received by the Governor
July 1, 1962 at 9:15 P.M.
D. Andries~~

Received by Secretary of State

this 11th day of July, 1962

~~Secretary of State~~

67-3-Ex-66-67
67-3-Ex-66-67

BY: MESSRS. PFISTER, JOHN,
ARCEAUX, D. A. PERNARD AND
E. R. AMMONS AND SENATORS
BROUSSARD, MONTGOMERY, BLAIR,
CARPENTER AND DAVIS.

AN ACT

To Revise, Amend and Re-enact Sections 358 through 376 of Title 14, of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, to identify, control and regulate the Communist conspiracy in Louisiana; to require registration of certain Communists and other persons and organizations with the Department of Public Safety; providing that neither the names of the members of the Communist Party nor the names of Communists shall appear on the ballot in primary or general elections; providing that Communists and certain other persons shall not hold non-elective positions or jobs; defining subversive activities and prohibiting certain acts; establishing certain procedures relative to insuring the loyalty of candidates for public office; containing definitions and a short title and fixing penalties.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:

Section 1. Sections 35.8 through 376 of Title 14, of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 are hereby amended and re-enacted to read as follows:

Section 358. Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law; Declaration of Public Policy

In the interpretation and application of R.S. 14:358 through R.S. 14:376 the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows:

There exists a world Communist movement, directed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites, which has as its declared objective world control. Such world control is to be brought about by aggression, force and violence, and is to be accomplished in large by infiltrating tactics involving the use of fraud, espionage, sabotage, infiltration, propaganda, terrorism and treachery. Since the state of Louisiana is the location of many of the nation's most vital military establishments,

and since it is a producer of many of the most essential products for national defense, the state of Louisiana is a most probable target for those who seek by force and violence to overthrow constitutional government, and is in imminent danger of Communist espionage, infiltration and sabotage. Communist control of a country is characterized by an absolute denial of the right of self-government and by the abolition of those personal liberties which are cherished and held sacred in the state of Louisiana and in the United States of America. The world Communist movement constitutes a clear and present danger to the citizens of the state of Louisiana. The public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this state require the immediate enactment of this measure.

Section 359, Definitions

A "Communist" is a person who is a member of the Communist Party or is proven to be substantially under the discipline and control of the International Communist Conspiracy.

The "Communist Party" is the Communist Party, U.S.A. or any of its direct successors and shall include any other organization which is directed, dominated or controlled by the Soviet Union, by any of its satellite countries or by the government of any other Communist country; or any organization which in any manner advocates or acts to further the success of the program of world domination of the International Communist Conspiracy.

"Communist Front Organization" shall, for the purpose of this act include any Communist Action Organization, Communist Front Organization, Communist Infiltrated Organization or Communist Controlled Organization and the fact that an organization has been officially cited or identified by the Attorney General of the United States, the Subversive Activities Control Board of the United States or any Committee or Subcommittee of the United States Congress as a Communist Organization, a Communist Action Organization, a Communist Front Organization, a Communist Infiltrated Organization or has been in any other way officially cited or identified by any of these

aforementioned authorities as a Communist Controlled Organization, shall be considered presumptive evidence of the factual status of any such organization.

"Organization" means an organization, corporation, company, partnership association, trust, foundation, fund, club, society, committee, political party, or any group of persons, whether or not incorporated, permanently or temporarily associated together for joint action or advancement of views on any subject or subjects.

"Subversive organization" means any organization which engages in or advocates, abets, advises, or teaches, or a purpose of which is to engage in or advocate, abet, advise, or teach activities intended to overthrow, destroy, or to assist in the overthrow or destruction of the constitutional form of the government of the state of Louisiana, or of any political subdivision thereof by revolution, force, violence or other unlawful means, or any other organization which seeks by unconstitutional or illegal means to overthrow or destroy the government of the State of Louisiana or any political subdivision thereof and to establish in place thereof any form of government not responsible to the people of the state of Louisiana under the Constitution of the state of Louisiana.

"Foreign subversive organization" means any organization, directed, dominated or controlled directly or indirectly by a foreign government which engages in or advocates, abets, advises, or teaches, or a purpose of which is to engage in or to advocate, abet, advise, or teach, activities intended to overthrow, destroy, or to assist in the overthrow or destruction of the constitutional form of the government of the state of Louisiana, or of any political subdivision thereof to establish in place thereof any form of government the direction and control of which is to be vested in, or exercised by or under, the domination or control of any foreign government, organization, or individual.

"Foreign Government" means the government of any country,

nation or group of nations other than the government of the United States of America or one of the states thereof.

"Subversive person" means any person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy, or to assist in the overthrow or destruction of the constitutional form of the government of the state of Louisiana, or any political subdivision thereof by ~~revolution, force, violence or other unlawful means~~; or who is a member of a subversive organization or a front subversive organization.

Section 360. Registration of Communists

A. Each person remaining in this state for as many as five consecutive days after July 30, 1962, who is a Communist or is knowingly a member of a Communist front organization, shall register with the Department of Public Safety of the state of Louisiana on or before the fifth consecutive day that such person remains in this state; and, so long as he remains in this state, shall register annually with said department between the first and fifteenth day of January.

B. Such registration shall be under oath and shall set forth the name (including any assumed name used or in use), address, business occupation, purpose of presence in the state of Louisiana, sources of income, place of birth, places of former residence, and features of identification, including fingerprints of the registrant; organizations of which registrant is a member; and any other information requested by the Department of Public Safety which is reasonably relevant to the purpose of R.S. 14:358 through R.S. 14:376.

C. Under order of any court of record, the registration records shall be open for inspection by any person in whose

favor such order is granted; and the records shall at all times, without the need for a court order, be open for inspection by any law enforcement officer of this state, of the United States or of any state or territory of the United States. At the discretion of the Department of Public Safety, such records may also be open for inspection by the general public or by any member thereof.

Section 361. Communist Party Not to Appear on Election Ballots

The name of any Communist or of any nominee of the Communist Party shall not be printed upon any ballot used in any primary or general election in the state or in any political subdivision thereof.

Section 362. Public Office; Disqualification of Communists

No person may hold any non-elective position, job or office for the state of Louisiana, or any political subdivision thereof, where the remuneration of said position, job or office is paid in whole or in part by public money or funds of the state of Louisiana, or of any political subdivision thereof, where the evidence shows such person to be a Communist or a knowing member of a Communist front organization.

Section 363. Enforcement

The Attorney General of the state of Louisiana, all district and parish attorneys, the Department of Public Safety, and all law enforcement officers of this state are each be charged with the duty of enforcing the provisions of R.S. 14:358 through R.S. 14:376.

Section 364. Acts Prohibited

It shall be a felony for any person knowingly and wilfully to:

- (1) Commit, attempt to commit, aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow or destroy, or to assist in the overthrow or destruction of the constitutional form of government of the state of Louisiana, or any political subdivision thereof, by revolution, force, violence, or other unlawful means, or
- (2) Advocate, abet, advise, or teach by any means any person to commit, attempt to commit, or assist in the commission of any such act under such circumstances as to constitute a clear and present danger to the security of the state of Louisiana, or of any political subdivision thereof, or
- (3) Conspire with one or more persons to commit such act; or
- (4) Assist in the formation or participate in the management or to contribute to the support of any subversive organization or foreign subversive organization knowing said organization to be a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization; or
- (5) Destroy any books, records, or files, or sacrifice any funds in this state of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization, knowing said organization to be such; or
- (6) To become or to remain a member of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization knowing said organization to be a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization; or
- (7) Fail to register as required in Section 361 hereof or to make any registration which contains any material false statement or omission.

Section 365. Penalties

Any person convicted of violating any of the provisions of Section 364 shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned at hard labor for not more than ten years, or both.

Section 366. Additional Penalties

Any person convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of violating any of the provisions of R.S. 14:375 through 14:376 in addition to all other penalties thereby provided shall from the date of such conviction be barred from

(1) Holding any office, elective or appointive, or any other position of profit or trust in or employment by the government of the state of Louisiana or of any agency thereof or of any parish, municipal corporation or other political subdivision of said state;

(2) Voting or offering for election to any public office in the state of Louisiana;

(3) Voting in any election in this state.

Section 367. Dissolution of subversive organizations; forfeiture of charter; seizure of books and records

It shall be unlawful for any subversive organization or foreign subversive organizations to exist in this state of Louisiana and any organization which by a court of competent jurisdiction is found to have violated the provisions of this Section shall be dissolved, and if it be a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Louisiana a finding by a court of competent jurisdiction that it has violated the provisions of this Section shall constitute legal cause for forfeiture of its charter and its charter shall be forfeited, and all funds, books, records and files of every kind and all other property of any

organization found to have violated the provisions of this Section shall be seized by and for the state of Louisiana, the funds to be deposited in the state treasury and the books, records, files and other property to be turned over to the Department of Public Safety of Louisiana.

Section 368. Judge's charge to grand jury

The judge of any court exercising general criminal jurisdiction, when in his discretion it appears appropriate, or when informed by the attorney general or district attorney that there is information or evidence of violations of the provisions of this act to be considered by the grand jury, shall charge the grand jury to inquire into violations of R.S. 14:358 through 14:376 for the purpose of proper action, and further to inquire generally into the purposes, processes, and activities and any other matters affecting Communism or any related or other subversive organizations, associations, groups or persons.

Section 369. Ineligibility of subversive person for public office or employment

No subversive person, as defined in R.S. 14:359, shall be eligible for employment in, or appointment to any office, or any position of trust or profit in the government of, or in the administration of the business of this state, or of any parish, municipality, or other political subdivision of this state.

Section 370. Screening of prospective public officials and employees

Every person and every board, commission, council,

department, court or other agency of the state of Louisiana or any political subdivision thereof, who or which appoints or employs or supervises in any manner the appointment or employment of public officials or employees shall establish by rules, regulations or otherwise, procedures designed to ascertain, before any person, including teachers and other employees of any public educational institution in this state, is appointed or employed, that he is not a subversive person, and that there are no reasonable grounds to believe such person is a subversive person. In the event such reasonable grounds exist, he shall not be appointed or employed. In securing any facts necessary to ascertain the information herein required, the applicant shall be required to sign a written affidavit containing answers to such inquiries as may be reasonably material.

Section 371. Exceptions to screening requirements

The inquiries prescribed in R.S. 14:370, other than the written statement to be executed by an applicant for employment, shall not be required as a pre-requisite to the employment of any persons in the classification of laborers in any case in which the employing authority shall in his or its discretion determine, and by rule or regulation specify the reason why the nature of the work to be performed is such that employment of persons as to whom there may be reasonable grounds to believe that they are subversive persons as defined in R.S. 14:359, will not be dangerous to the health or security of the citizens or the security of the government of the state of Louisiana, or any political subdivision thereof.

Section 372. Sufficiency of grounds for discharge from office or position; effect of civil service laws

Reasonable grounds on all the evidence to believe that any person is a subversive person, as defined in R.S. 14:359, shall be cause for discharge from any appointive office

or other position of profit or trust in the government of or in the administration of the business of this state, or of any parish, municipality or other political subdivision of this state, or an agency thereof. The appropriate civil service commission or board shall, by appropriate rules or regulations, prescribe that persons charged with being subversive persons, as defined in R.S. 14:359, shall be accorded notice and opportunity to be heard, in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law for discharges for other reasons. Every person and every board, commission, council, department, or other agency of the state of Louisiana or any political subdivision thereof having responsibility for the appointment, employment or supervision of public employees shall establish rules or procedures similar to those required herein for classified services for a hearing for any person charged with being a subversive person, as defined in R.S. 14:359, after notice and opportunity to be heard. Every employing authority discharging any person pursuant to any provision of R.S. 14:358 - 14:376 shall promptly report to the Department of Public Safety the fact of and the circumstances surrounding such discharge.

Section 373. Candidates for public office; filing of non-subversive affidavits

No person shall become a candidate nor shall be certified by any political party as a candidate for election to any public office created by the constitution or laws of this state unless such candidate or certification by the political party shall have attached to the qualifying papers, the nominating petition or nominating papers filed with the appropriate party committee of this state or the Secretary of State, whichever the case may be, a sworn affidavit that the candidate is not and never has been a subversive person as defined in R.S. 14:359. No qualification of candidates, nominating petition or nominating papers for such

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office shall be received for filing by the official of records unless the same shall be accompanied by the affidavit aforesaid and there shall not be entered upon any ballot or voting machine at any election the name of any person who has failed or refused to make the affidavit as required above.

Section 374. Citation of Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law

R. S. 14:358 through R. S. 14:376 may be cited as the Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law.

Section 375. Repeal of conflicting laws

All laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith and specifically R. S. 14:358 through R.S. 14:380 as previously enacted and amended are hereby repealed.

Section 376. Saving Clause

If for any reason any provision of this act is declared by the Courts to be unconstitutional or invalid, the other ~~separable provisions thereof shall not be thereby affected~~

SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR AND PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

APPROVED: July 7, 1962

APPROVED:

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (66-2542-3) (66-109119) *62* DATE: 5/14/64
Attn: Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan

FROM : SAC, NEW ORLEANS (100-16957)

SECURITY INFORMANTS

SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF THE PRESIDENT
IN THE UNITED STATES AND
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

ReBulet to Albany dated 5/1/64.

The New Orleans Office has taken into consideration the contents of relet regarding the dissemination of memoranda on security informants (SI) and potential security informants (PSI) to Secret Service and feels it is inadvisable to furnish information on SI's and PSI's of this office. This decision is based upon the fact that the Louisiana State Legislature on 7/8/52 passed Act #506, commonly called the Cagle Act, which required communists and members of communist front organizations to register with the Department of Public Safety. Subsequently, on 7/11/62, the Louisiana State Legislature passed Act #270 to revise, amend and re-enact Sections 358 through 376 of Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, which included under Section 360 the requirement that communists and members of communist front organizations register with the Department of Public Safety. A copy of this act is enclosed for the Bureau.

OK Jan

Relet points out that the Bureau is not in a position to know what particular action, if any, will be taken by Secret Service in connection with information furnished by the FBI. It further pointed out that Secret Service, with the assistance of law enforcement authorities, will undoubtedly take action upon receipt of these memoranda and may contact the subjects, conduct surveillances and otherwise take any necessary action to protect the President when he may contemplate visiting a particular locality. Since it is not known the extent of information furnished to local law enforcement agencies by Secret Service, to furnish information on SI's and PSI's of this office could

②-Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL) (AIR MAIL)

1-New Orleans

ECW:lvc

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ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

REG. 104

MAY 26 1964

NO 100-16957

possibly result in their arrest and being charged by the State of Louisiana with violating the Louisiana Communist Control Law.

Relet does not state whether the Bureau has given consideration or plans to maintain liaison with Secret Service to determine what action Secret Service plans to take in connection with information furnished by the FBI on various persons. Since the FBI is furnishing the information on many individuals, including those on Security Index, it would appear the Bureau could logically request Secret Service to advise the interested Bureau division of the identities of any individuals they plan to interview, stating the reason for the request is that the Bureau might have an active investigation on some of these individuals.

5/5/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-24

(B) SECURITY OF TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS - SECURITY INFORMANTS -
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - RACIAL INFORMANTS -- Recently a conversation
relating to hoodlum activities between an informant in one city and his contacting Agent in another city was overheard by a telephone operator, who reported to a local hoodlum that she had listened to part of a telephone conversation between an unknown individual and a Special Agent of the FBI. The operator was instructed by the hoodlum to continue to be alert for any similar calls. The telephone call was made by a criminal informant, who used a code name, and his identity is not known to the underworld.

Instruct all informants to be most discreet and exercise caution in telephone calls to contacting Agents even in those instances when calls may be made to an unlisted number. Informants should always use their code names and avoid making collect calls, as such calls require handling by an operator who will know or can determine that the location being called is the FBI. All Agents should, likewise, be cautioned to make certain that they are careful in their conversations over the telephone, especially, on long distance calls to a field office.

Security of our informants and of our investigative operations requires that we be most circumspect in the use of all communications media, particularly the telephone, which is subject to monitoring by company employees.

F-211
72 MAY 18 1964

66-2542-3
NOT RECORDED
133 MAY 15 1964

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FBJRC* DATE: 4/20/64

FROM : Mr. E. B. Reddy *ER*

SUBJECT: INFORMANTS EXPOSED AS A RESULT
OF INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD
1962-1964

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Ryan
1 - Mr. Rosack
1 - Mr. Reddy

phd *- gen'l* *RJ* *Shuford* *Darlene*
Set forth below are current statistics concerning the status of our Security Informants Program with emphasis on informants exposed or who may be exposed as a result of administrative and criminal proceedings under the Internal Security Act of 1950. This memorandum supersedes my memorandum dated 11/6/63.

Informants made available to Department for interview to consider their potential as witnesses 311

Active informants who have been exposed through testimony before the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB):

- (1) By their testimony before the SACB..... 25
(2) By testimony of spouse before the SACB.. 3
(3) By testimony of relative before SACB.... 1

Total active Communist Party informants exposed as a result of SACB proceedings during the period 1/1/62 to date..... 29

Active informants who have been released for testimony but who have not yet testified..... 14

Discontinued informants exposed as a result of testimony before the SACB..... 8

In our continuing effort to conserve our informants and to bolster our cases, it is noteworthy that, in addition to active and former informants, the following type witnesses have been utilized in these proceedings: 10 newspaper, radio, and/or television reporters or officials; 1 student; 5 police department officials; 1 discontinued potential security informant; 2 municipal employees; and 1 FBI handwriting expert.

100-372598

166-2542-3-

NOT RECORDED

EBR:bgc (6)

102 APR 28 1964

6 APR 27 1964

156 MAY 5 1964

Memorandum to Mr. Baumgardner

RE: INFORMANTS EXPOSED AS A RESULT
OF INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD
1962-1964

.100-372598

The multiple use of our informants as witnesses in separate hearings has also enabled us to conserve active informants. For example, the testimony of [redacted] has been presented in 8 hearings and stipulated in 10 additional hearings.

b6
b7C
b7D

Borken down by field division, our loss of active informants who were CP members as a result of testimony is as follows:

| <u>Field Office</u> | <u>Active Informants Exposed</u> |
|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| Albany | 2 |
| Baltimore | 1 |
| Buffalo | 3 |
| Chicago | 2 |
| Dallas | 2 |
| Los Angeles | 4 |
| Minneapolis | 1 |
| New York | 7 |
| Newark | 1 |
| Portland | 2 |
| San Antonio | 1 |
| Seattle | 3 |

The following figures indicate the over-all effect of our loss of active CP informants as a result of hearings under the Internal Security Act of 1950 and other factors on our informant program:

| | |
|---|-------|
| Total informants in CP as of July, 1962..... | 421 |
| Total informants in CP as of January, 1964..... | 358 |
| % decrease of informant coverage during the period July, 1962, to January, 1964..... | 14.9% |

Memorandum to Mr. Baumgardner

RE: INFORMANTS EXPOSED AS A RESULT
OF INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD
1962-1964

100-372598

Our greatest loss of informants as a result of hearings before the SACB to date is in New York where 7 informants, who were CP members, were exposed through testimony. Also, an additional active CP informant was discontinued in New York as a result of his refusal to testify.

One of our top informants, [redacted] who is a member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, has been interviewed by Department attorneys and released for possible testimony in proceedings against Gus Hall and Benjamin J. Davis, Jr., for violation of the Internal Security Act of 1950.

b7D

ACTION:

None. For information. You will be periodically advised regarding the status of our informant programs as it is affected by proceedings under the Internal Security Act of 1950.

MR
FBI/CS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 6/2/64

FROM : J. J. Casper

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SUBJECT: **INFORMANTS**

SUGGESTION #936-64, SUBMITTED BY
SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT EMMET GRANT, NEW YORK

SUGGESTION: That a ~~form~~ (copy attached to original suggestion) be adopted for use in the four-month evaluation summary of an informant used to request Bureau authority to continue payments.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Manual of Instructions (MOI), Volume IV, Section 107, item N, 3, a, b, and N, 4 on pages 18, 19, and 20, provides that specific Bureau authority must be obtained to make payments to anyone on a continuing basis and that, in requesting authorization, justification must be set forth showing 14 different items. In connection with informants not paid on Bureau's authorization, a communication must be submitted to the Bureau every four months after the date of designation containing the same detailed information with the exception of items concerning amounts paid and expenses incurred.

ADVANTAGES: Suggester believed his idea would provide administrative uniformity, allow for expeditious access to information eliminating the necessity of time-consuming research and delay while furnishing an always ready reference.

OBSERVATIONS: A.D. Malone, in charge of the New York Office, commented that the proposed form would appear to warrant consideration; however, the basic instructions as set forth in the manual would have to be followed.

The Domestic Intelligence Division opposed adoption. They stated that Section 107N, item 3b, MOI, requires the field to obtain Bureau authority for continued payments to an informant. This requirement sets forth 14 specific subheadings which must be contained in the letter requesting Bureau authority. The proposal made by the suggester would require the printing of a form which would merely set forth a description of what the letter relates to, which description is unnecessary, and would also set forth the manual citation requiring the submission of the letter which fact is also unnecessary. They did not consider the suggestion warranted further attention and opposed adoption.

JER:kap

12

56 JUNI 1941

1 JUN 4 1968

~~REC-129~~

66-2542 3 1354

• JUN 3 1964

110

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J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr Memorandum


Re: Informants

Suggestion #936-64, Submitted by

Special Agent Robert Emmet Grant, New York

Training Division is also opposed. Since the items required in the letter would still be required on the form, the suggested procedure would eliminate little, if any, work, in any case, not enough to warrant the printing, stocking, and distribution of another form.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted. On approval, no further action is necessary; receipt of the idea was acknowledged previously.



VIEWS OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION RE: SUGGESTION #936-64

**ADDENDUM: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, STREAMLINING COMMITTEE,
5/25/64, GWA:mec:**

Section 107N, Item 3b, of the Manual of Instructions requires the field to obtain Bureau authority for continued payments to an informant. This requirement sets forth 14 specific subheadings which must be contained in the letter requesting Bureau authority.

The suggestion as submitted by Special Agent Grant would require the printing of a form for such letters. This printed form would merely set forth a description of what the letter relates to, which description is unnecessary, and will also set forth the Manual citation requiring the submission of the letter which fact is also unnecessary.

The Domestic Intelligence Division does not consider suggestion warrants further attention and suggestion should not be adopted.

ACTION:

Forward to Training Division for its recommendation.

gjm
WVMS

mem Casper to TDS
TDS:ms 5/25/64

~~Ex 466 9435-2799~~
66-2542-3-1355

May 20, 1964

PERSONAL

Mr. Robert Emmet Grant
Federal Bureau of Investigation
New York, New York


Dear Mr. Grant:

Your suggestion has been received that a form be used for the periodic administrative reports evaluating the activities of certain individuals. Careful consideration is being given to your proposal and you will be further advised if a favorable decision is reached.

Your interest and initiative in submitting this idea to me are appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover



2 - SAC, New York

- 1 - Suggestion file
- 1 - Field personnel file

1 - Personnel file of SA Robert Emmet Grant

JER:mlf *mly*
(6) (Suggestion #936-64 dated 5/14/64)

(6) (Suggestion #500-04 dated 9/14/61)
NOT E: Suggests form be used in submitting periodic administrative reports on security informants.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Referred to Domestic Intelligence Division for views and recommendations.

JUN 11 1964

1904  1904-1905

1963.1.7.1384

#936-64

Date

XXXXXX 5/14/64

| | | |
|----------------------|---|---|
| To: Director, FBI | From: (Suggerster's name) SA ROBERT EMMET GRANT | Division of Assignment New York |
|----------------------|---|---|

SUGGESTION

That consideration be given to introducing a new standard form utilizing the general format of the enclosure set forth, which concerns the administrative reporting of the four month summary informant letter.

(1) Security Informants - General

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

No standard form. Summary letter is prepared by reference to Volume IV, Manual of Instructions Section 107N 3b.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

Essentially provide for administrative uniformity. Such a new form would also allow for expeditious access, eliminating time consuming research and delay, while furnishing an always ready reference much in the manner of the Standard Form FD-336, employed in the request to interview a security subject.

Disadvantages of suggestion

None XEROX
JUN 5 1964

None

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss

Robert Emmet Grant
Signature and Title of Suggerster

Recommendations and comments of Division Head The above would appear to warrant consideration. However, the basic instructions must be followed as set forth in the manual.

66-2542-3-135
Signature and Title SAC

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

8-ENCLOSURE - detached at suggestion date 5/14/64

21
18 MAY 1964

UNINDEXED COPY FILED IN 66-3254-3442-11
SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE:

FROM : SAC,

SUBJECT:

The following is an Informant Evaluation Summary regarding [redacted] which is set forth in accordance with Manual of Instructions, Volume IV, Section 107N 3b:

RECOMMENDATION:

Dee XEROX
JUN 5 1964

66-2542-3-1355

66-2435-2774

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
WCS

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner
Jen

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

DATE: 7-1-64

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 sets forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permit the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field submits progress letters under this program on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 5-31-64, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three months ending 5-31-64 | Three months ending 2-29-64 | Total |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------|
| A. Number of Active Communist Contacted | 96 | 96 | 8031 |
| B. Number of other Individuals Contacted | 277 | 233 | 28703 |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants Developed | 33 | 27 | 2770 |

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3

JDD/fnh/mjh *mjb*
(4)

SOLO

1 JUL 9 1964 XEROX
1 JUL 9 1964 1964

4 JUL 2 1964

UNRECORDED CC BY FILED IN 134-100-1

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that this program be continued. Another memorandum will be prepared upon receipt of the information from the field showing the progress of the program and reflecting the figures for the current quarter (ending 8-31-64), the proceeding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.

W
PSB

T S
June 29, 1964

PERSONAL

66-2542-3-

b6
b7C

REC'D--READING ROOM

F B I

JUN 29 1964 - 66-2542-1-160

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear [redacted]

Your suggestion has been received concerning a method for use in assigning certain numbers. After careful evaluation, it has been decided this proposal should not be adopted since it is felt this date should be made a matter of record in correspondence to the Bureau rather than using the date of the letter.

The interest which prompted you to submit your idea to me is indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

1 - Mr. Evans

1 - Personnel file of [redacted]

ML:mlf

(5) (Suggestion #1084-64 dated 6/24/64)

NOTE: Suggests the date an individual is designated a symbol-number informant be the same as the date of the letter to the Bureau.

RFB
Special Investigative Division recommended suggestion not be adopted. The actual date an individual is considered to have become an informant should be made a matter of record in correspondence to the Bureau rather than to merely use an arbitrary date which would be based on the date the correspondence happens to be prepared. Training Division agrees and recommends suggestion not be approved.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT
edw

JUL 1 1964
FBI - WASH. D.C.
edw

Keayec *JW*

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-1-160

X (OS4-64)

Date

6/24/64

Division of Assignment

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE

To:
Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name)
[Redacted]

SUGGESTION

It is suggested that the date the individual was designated a symbol number informant be the same as of the date of the letter to the Bureau.

Security Informants-General

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

The current practice is for the field offices to assign a symbol number to an individual and the letter to the Bureau may be dated a week later. Section 108 E2f, Manual of Instructions, does not give a specific time for

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

see page 2

The symbol number cards are counted once each month at the Bureau after the Monthly Progress Letters are received. A symbol number informant will be added in those letters and the new informant letter has not been received at the Bureau. This necessitates having the number searched in order to see if the mail is in the Bureau. For example one informant was designated 5/28/64 and the letter to the Bureau was dated 6/5/64. If the date designated was changed to the date of the letter, Section 108 E2f, Manual of Instructions would be eliminated. Section 108 E2, Manual of Instructions would be changed to read "When a potential informant has furnished worthwhile information in accordance with the provisions of section C above, a symbol number should be assigned as of the date of the letter to the

see page 2

Disadvantages of suggestion

None known

166-2542-3-

NOT RECORDED

176 JUL 1 1964

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss

Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head Recommended suggestion not be adopted. The actual date an individual is considered to have become an informant should be made a matter of record in correspondence to the Bureau rather than to merely use an arbitrary date which would be based on the date the correspondence happens to be prepared.

C.A. Every Assistant Director

(Do not write in this space for Bureau use only)

1 JUN 30 1964

Adm. Mgr. Pl. Mkt.

Two Jr.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-1-1/10

Suggestion continued

Current practice or rule(continued)

designating.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (continued)

Bureau. This letter should contain the following:"

S. J. edm
September 14, 1964

PERSONAL

REC-47 66-2542-3-1357

[redacted]
b6
b7C

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Tampa, Florida

Dear [redacted]

I have received your suggestion that a form be adopted for use as page one in connection with the submission of certain information to the Seat of Government. This proposal is being carefully considered and you will be advised if it is adopted.

The interest and initiative you displayed in submitting your idea to me are indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

REC'D-READING ROOM
SEP 14 1964
FBI-BIT

MAIL TO

1964

COMM-FBI

2 - Tampa 1 - Field personnel file
 1 - Suggestion file

1 - Personnel file of [redacted]

ML:jmn

(6) (Suggestion #182-65 dated 9/8/64)

NOTE: Suggests a form (copy attached) be adopted for use as page one of the Justification Letter (quarterly progress letter) for Security Informants and Organizational Racial Informants.

Referred to the Domestic Intelligence Division
for views and recommendations.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

346

OCT 5 1964

edm

XEROX

SE 15 1964

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2542-10-

#152-65

Date

9/8/64

| | | |
|----------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| To: Director, FBI | From: (Suggester's name) [Redacted] | Division of Assignment FBI, TAMPA |
| SUGGESTION | | b6 b7C |

That a form be prepared to be used as page 1 of the Justification Letter (quarterly progress letter) for Security Informants and Organizational Racial Informants as set forth on the attached page.

~~EXP. PROC.~~
~~35 SEP 10 1964~~

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts) These paragraphs are typed into each Justification Letter as paragraphs 1, 11, 12 and 13 (MofI, Vol IV, Section 107-N (3) (b))

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate) If these paragraphs did not have to be typed, five minutes or more per letter would be saved in steno time, which, in the Tampa Division, would amount to a little more than two days time per year saved in that Tampa at present has 65 SI, PSIs and Organizational Racial Informants (five minutes per letter three times a year amounts to approximately $16\frac{1}{2}$ hrs. per year).

Supervisory time would also be saved in that these paragraphs would not have to be read each time before the letter is put in the mail.

4-16-64 file - Disadvantages of suggestion

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any Justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss [Redacted]

Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

Suggestion is worthwhile and would be time-saving.
Recommend adoption.

J. F. Johnson Jr.
Signature and Title

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

ENCLOSURE

8 detailed suggestions
memorandum dated 9-24-64

REC-4766-2542-3-13
1 SEP 1964
XEROX
SEP 15 1964

3 SEP 1964

4766-2542-3-13
1 SEP 1964
XEROX
SEP 15 1964

4766-2542-3-13
1 SEP 1964
XEROX
SEP 15 1964

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2542-210-

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, _____

SUBJECT: (NAME or SYMBOL NUMBER of Informant)
SI or PSI (if nationality, show same); (R or R-(PROB))

DATE:

Re let to Bureau dated _____

1. Recommendation (Check A. if not paid, B. if paid)

A. I recommend that contacts be continued with above informant for a period of four months, effective _____, and same will be done, UACB.

B. I recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to above informant up to _____ per month for services rendered, plus up to _____ per month for expenses actually incurred, for a period of four months, effective _____.

2. Stability and Reliability

There have been no indications of any personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, untrustworthiness, or unreliability, or other similar problems on the part of the informant which might become a source of future embarrassment to the Bureau.

3. Indoctrination Against Disclosure

Every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with the Bureau through any media.

4. All Necessary Action Taken on Information Furnished

Yes.

(Should it be necessary to change or make an addition to one of the above, same should be indicated by an asterisk (*) placed before the number of the section, and the change or addition placed at the top of page 2 of this letter)



2 - Bureau (RM)

1 - (Field Office)

(3)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

66-2542-3-

CLOSURE

(The preceding page should be followed by:)

5. Residence and Employment
6. Current Membership and Position Held in Subversive Organization (or, Klan and hate-type organizations)
7. Summary of Information Furnished and/or Services Rendered During Pertinent Period.
8. Amount Paid for Services and Expenses by Month
9. Type and Number of Meetings Attended and Other Activities
10. Number of Written and Oral Reports Submitted
11. Information Furnished of Unusual Value
12. Approximate Number of Persons Upon Whom Coverage Furnished and Their Importance
13. Steps Being Taken to Advance Informant
14. Miscellaneous

Xerox 1/1964 9-11-64

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: 9-1-64

FROM Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT: RACIAL DISTURBANCES AND VIOLENCE
RACIAL MATTER

b6
b7C

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Evans
1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. Bland
1-Mr. Trainor

Tolson _____
Belmont
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
McLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Bland
① SECURITY INFORMATION. *This document is* *for your information* *5-17-64*

In connection with an article appearing in the "Washington Post and Times Herald," 9/1/64, captioned "Police Raid Negro Movement Offices in Riot-Torn Section of Philadelphia," the Director asked: "What about this? What kind of racial coverage do we have in Philadelphia?"

In connection with the raid mentioned in the above article, my memorandum of 9/1/64, captioned as above, contained among other things details of the Philadelphia Police Department raid on the premises of one [redacted] also known as [redacted] on 8/31/64. *5-17-64*

Briefly, Bureau Agents were present on the morning of 8/31/64 when police officials, including a National Academy graduate, discussed steps that could be taken in efforts to prevent [redacted] from instigating trouble in connection with the riots. We have an informant who is very close to [redacted] and in a discussion with this individual on 8/29/64 [redacted] indicated that because of the heavy concentration of police in his immediate vicinity he, [redacted] was unable to participate in the riots and spoke of taking a group of his followers to South Philadelphia in efforts to instigate trouble in that area. This information was immediately furnished to the Philadelphia Police Department.

By way of background. [redacted] was a member of the Nation of Islam (NOI) from [redacted] until approximately [redacted] when he [redacted] never held an official position in this organization. He is [redacted]

[redacted] who have been the cause of trouble in the riot area in the past. He is well-known to the police department having been arrested on [redacted] occasions since 1955 for breach of peace, assault and battery on a police officer, and possession of concealed weapon. Agents of the Philadelphia Office have discussed [redacted] and his people with the police department on many occasions over the years.

166-2542-3-37-

NOT RECORDED

184 SEP 14 1964

TDR:mlf:jdd

(7)

— CONTINUED - OVER —

4 SEP 14 1964

79 SEP 15 1964

5010-106-0-1

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: RACIAL DISTURBANCES AND VIOLENCE
RACIAL MATTER

On the basis of the police knowledge of [redacted] background, b6
as well as on the basis of information that we have furnished the b7C
police department regarding [redacted] which included the information developed through the informant who is close to [redacted] on 8/29/64 and on no other information of a confidential nature, the police department secured and served the search warrant on [redacted] on 8/31/64.

With respect to the Director's inquiry as to what kind of racial coverage we have in Philadelphia the following is submitted:

There are currently a total of 47 live sources and informants in Philadelphia in a position to report on various aspects of racial activities. Among these we have 12 racial sources, four Negro criminal informants and 31 security informants, including four informants who report on Black Muslim and NOI activities. In addition, four technical installations are in operation through which we are obtaining information concerning racial matters. We are also utilizing numerous invaluable sources in Philadelphia who supplement the coverage listed above. These sources, including civic leaders, local officials, businessmen, newsmen and others who, although having no organizational affiliations, furnish us with a constant flow of valuable intelligence information concerning racial matters.

In connection with my memorandum of 8/31/64, captioned "Philadelphia Riots," the Director inquired as to whether we had had any report on the cause of these riots and whether there was any outside influence or subversive influence involved.

The rioting began when [redacted] a local [redacted] b6
criminal and trouble maker with a long arrest record, [redacted] b7C
[redacted] in an assault on two police officers who were making a routine arrest. Sources and informants of the Philadelphia Office have been unable to turn up any information indicating the rioting was instigated by outside or subversive influence and was other than spontaneous.

However, certain individuals or groups have been reported by sources to have taken advantage of the riot or to have been building up racial tension in the area.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

RE: RACIAL DISTURBANCES AND VIOLENCE
RACIAL MATTER

For example, the North Philadelphia Fighters for Liberty and Justice, which is headed by members of the Progressive Organizing Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party, had planned, although later canceled, a street meeting in the riot area for Saturday night, 8/29/64. This group apparently was spreading an unfounded rumor that policemen beat a pregnant woman to death on August 28. It has held street meetings for several weeks discussing police brutality against Negroes in the South, the need for Negroes uniting against white oppressors, and other racial issues. Local authorities were advised.

In addition, a Communist Party spokesman in Philadelphia reportedly prepared a statement for "The Worker," an east coast communist paper, to be issued 9/1/64, which lays the blame for the riots on the failure of the City to correct living conditions in the area, criticizing the FBI, and makes demands for better treatment of the Negro. Plans called for the distribution of this week's midweek edition of "The Worker" in the riot area. Local authorities were advised.

As indicated, above, [redacted] and his group have been the cause of trouble in the area in the past.

b6
b7c

On 8/29/64 the Philadelphia Police Department reported that four men, all with local addresses, who were carrying copies of "Muhammad Speaks," official publication of the NOI, in their automobiles, were charged with breach of peace, for transporting inflammatory literature to the riot area. With regard to outside influence being involved in the Philadelphia situation, two Negroes and one white man, not residents of Philadelphia, were among those arrested on 8/31/64 for violating the curfew proclaimed by the Mayor of Philadelphia on 8/29/64. The two Negroes claimed to be members of the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee and the white man claimed he is joining the Congress of Racial Equality next week and is going to join the Mississippi Summer Project. All three asserted that they had been in Atlantic City, were in Philadelphia to visit a friend, and were then going to Mississippi.

ACTION:

We have given Philadelphia instructions to interview a representative number of those riot participants now in jail.

pk glb - 3 - J.W.S. ✓

4/10
66-2542-3-
June 25, 1964

PERSONAL

Mr. Ralph J. Rampton
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rampton:

I have received your suggestion concerning the revision of certain portions of instructions in two of our manuals. It is a pleasure for me to advise you this proposal has been adopted and steps are being taken to place it into effect.

The initiative you displayed in bringing this matter to my attention is indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

MAILED 20
JUN 25 1964

COMM-FBI

1 - Mr. Evans

1 - Personnel file of SA Ralph J. Rampton

ML:mlf

(5) (Suggestion #1071-64 dated 6/16/64)

NOTE: Based on memorandum A. B. Eddy to Mr. Evans,
RJR:gjf, 6/16/64, re: Suggestion Memorandum
Concerning Informant Symbol Numbers.

Approval of this letter will be authority for Manuals
Desk, Training Division, to have the manual changes printed.

7/25/64 3834.21
RECEIVED - DIRECTOR

20 JUL 22 1964

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

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66-2542-1-122
ORIGINAL FILED IN

OPTIONAL FORM 10
MAY 1962

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Evans *gjf*

DATE: June 16, 1964

FROM : A.B. Eddy *APH*

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
INFORMANT SYMBOL NUMBERS (By SA Ralph J. Rampton
#1091-64 Fugitive Section)

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SECURITY INFORMANTS

genk

R. Rampton

The instructions for preparing symbol numbers for individuals, confidential techniques and sources are located in several appropriate sections in the FBI Handbook and the Manual of Instructions. From time to time field offices have misinterpreted these instructions, resulting in a duplication of numbers for different individuals or the assignment of new numbers to the same individual. Basic Bureau policy concerning the assignment of symbol numbers is as follows:

(1) Symbol numbers consist of a prefix (teletype abbreviation of the handling office), number (each office maintains a numerical sequence of numbers for informants and sources), and a suffix (a letter or group of letters indicating the type of informant or source).

(2) Once a number is assigned from the numerical sequence maintained by each office, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant, regardless of type or designation.

(3) If an informant or source is discontinued and later reactivated the same number previously assigned is again used for the reactivated source, if appropriate.

Handbook & Manual of Instructions reviewed for info

Enc.

66-2542-3-

NOT RECORDED
102 JUL 14 1964

- 1 - Manual and Suggestion Desks (Room 5302 JB)
- 1 - Joseph G. Deegan (Room 2708 JB)
- 1 - Joseph D. Donohue (Room 815 RB)
- 1 - Suggestion Committee (Division 9)
- 1 - John E. Kelly (Room 1541 JB)
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Eddy
- 1 - Mr. Rampton

3 JUL 10 1964

2 AC:CCB

RJR:gjf

ENCLOSURE

(9) CC-66-1934

2-fab

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-1-722

Memorandum to Mr. Evans
RE: SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
INFORMANT SYMBOL NUMBERS

- (4) With a change in type of information furnished by a source, the suffix will be changed but the prefix and number will remain the same.
- (5) With the permanent movement of a source from one field office to another the prefix will be changed to the appropriate teletype abbreviation of the new field office and a new number will be assigned from the numerical sequence of that office.

A review has been made of the applicable Handbook and Manual citations and appropriate manual changes have been prepared. No change in policy was contemplated or is involved in this review.

SUGGESTION:

It is suggested the proposed changes (attached) in language pertaining to this subject in the FBI Handbook and Manual of Instructions be approved. No SAC letter or Bureau bulletin advising the field is necessary since no change in policy is involved.

*W.C. C.H.
J.W. F.B.I.
Q.S.*

1 - Suggestion Committee (Div. 9)
1 - John E. Kelly (Room 541 JB)
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Eddy
1 - Mr. Rampton June 16, 1964

PERIODICAL CHANGES IN THE SI HANDBOOK

Part I

Item 21 (page 17)

ALL as the last sentence to the first paragraph under this item the following:

Refer to the appropriate sections of the Manual of Instructions for the procedure to follow in preparing symbol numbers for confidential informants and sources.

Part I

Item 26 A5 (page 18)

Eliminate the second sentence beginning with "Once a symbol number is assigned, etc."

Part I

Item 26 C3 (page 20a)

Eliminate the second sentence beginning with "Once a symbol number is assigned, etc." Also eliminate the last sentence beginning with "Symbol numbers for racial informants shall be, etc."

- 1 - Manual and Suggestion Desks (Room 5302 JB) (detached)
1 - Joseph G. Deegan (Room 2708 JB) (detached)
1 - Joseph D. Donohue (Room 815 RB) (detached)

NOTE: See cover memo A. B. Eddy to Evans captioned, "Suggestion Memorandum Concerning Informant Symbol Numbers," dated 6/16/64, RJR:gjf.

RJR:gjf
(12)

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

66-2452-2

RECORDED-READING ROOM

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RECORDED-READING ROOM

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P
E

Suggestion Committee (D 9)

1 - John E. Kelly (Room 1541 JB)

1 - Mr. Evans

June 16, 1964

1 - Mr. Eddy

1 - Mr. Rampton

PROPOSED CHANGES IN
THE MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

Section 107

Item I 1a (page 13)

Revise the second sentence as follows:

Once a number is assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant, source or confidential technique, regardless of type or designation.

REC'D.-READING ROOM

JUN 27 1964

Section 107

Item I 1 (page 13)

Add an item "I" as follows:

The prefix of a symbol number is made up of the appropriate field office teletype abbreviation followed by the appropriate assigned number. The suffix of the symbol number will consist of the letter "S" to designate a security informant, the letters "PSI" to designate a potential security informant. Although an individual, confidential technique or source may subsequently furnish information requiring a change in designation (e.g. FBI security to criminal or to racial, etc.) the number previously assigned will remain the same; however, the suffix is to be changed to the appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-H to NY 000-C or to NY 000-P).

JUL 1 1964
RJR
JUL 1 1964
RJR
JUL 1 1964
RJR

Section 107

Item I 2 (page 14)

Eliminate items "e," "h," and "i," and realphabetize item I 2.

Section 107

Item I 2e (page 27)

Eliminate the first word "Symbol" and the fifteenth word "syabol" in this sentence.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Cooper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

1 - Manual and Suggestion Desks (Room 5302 JB) (detached)

1 - Joseph G. Deegan (Room 2708 JB) (detached)

1 - Joseph D. Donohue (Room 815 RB) (detached)

NOTE: See cover memo A. B. Eddy to Evans captioned, "Suggestion Memorandum Concerning Informant Symbol Numbers," dated 6/16/64. RJR: gjf. ENCL: SJK: RJA: gjf (12) 66-2542-3. R

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

Section 103

Item E 6 (page 3)

Eliminate this item.

Section 103

Item G 6 (page 5)

Revise first sentence as follows:

Once a number is assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant, source or confidential technique, regardless of type or designation.

Revise second sentence by eliminating the twelfth word "symbol" from the sentence.

Add an item 10 as follows:

The prefix of a symbol number is made up of the appropriate field office teletype abbreviation followed by the appropriate assigned number. The suffix of the symbol number will consist of the letter "C" to designate criminal informant, the letters "POT" to designate a potential criminal informant who has been assigned a symbol number, the letters "ZAP" to designate a top echelon informant and the letters "TOP" to designate a potential top echelon criminal informant. Although an individual, confidential technique or source may subsequently furnish information requiring a change in classification (e.g. from criminal to racing or to top echelon, etc.) the number previously assigned will remain the same; i.e., if, for example, the number previously assigned was NY 000-12345, the suffix is to be changed to the appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (NY 000-12345 to NY 000-12345-C or to NY 000-12345-ZAP).

Section 103

Item E (page 3)

Replace items 1 and 2 with the following:

The prefix of a symbol number is made up of the appropriate field office teletype abbreviation followed

~~PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE
MANUAL OF OPERATIONS~~

~~Symbol and state assigned number. The suffix of the symbol will consist of the letter "R" to designate a reliable informant, followed "R(C-12)" to designate a reliable secret informant (where class numbers are used). Alteration in individual, confidential technique of source may subsequently furnish information requiring change in designation (e.g. from racial to criminal or security, etc.) the number previously assigned will remain the same; however, the suffix is to be changed to the appropriate letter or letters indicating this change (e.g., to CM 600-C or to CM 600-1). Communications following to symbol informants should be captioned according to those symbol numbers.~~

Replace item 3 with the following and renumber items 3 and 4:

~~Once a number is assigned, it must not be subsequently reassigned to any other informant, source or confidential technique, regardless of type or designation.~~

Section 130

Item E 2e (page 8)

Eliminate the first word "Symbol" and the fifteenth word "symbol" in this sentence.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Tavel ST
FROM : L. E. Short

DATE: 7-1-64

SUBJECT: RECORDS MANAGEMENT
66-18966

#5-65

Copy
SECURITY INFORMATION - gen'l

Reference is made to SAC Letter 64-12 (A) wherein we requested suggestions and observations to strengthen the Bureau's Records Management Program.

In connection with this program, SAC, New York, suggests that when obsolete cards are deleted from special source of information index, that cards in general index be destroyed.

Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 6, item K (1), page 7, instructs that at time obsolete cards deleted from special source of information index, index cards in general office index should not be removed.

Suggestion is recommended unfavorably for adoption. Suggestion has been previously considered on several occasions and not adopted. Although source of information may no longer be in position to furnish information to Bureau or some other situation occurs which justifies deletion from source of information index, fact that he was a source of information pertinent to field office operations, and of potential future value from information standpoint, Retention of index card in general office indices insures record of this information.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That suggestion not be adopted.

~~RECORDED~~

15 JUL 1964

(2) That this memorandum be referred to Training Division for review.

166-2542-3
NOT RECORDED
102 JUL 1964

ST TWO
7/2

SEE ADDENDUM OF TRAINING DIVISION ON PAGE TWO CONTAINED

INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8-19-82 BY SP4 ELW/cal

60 JUL 16 1964

55c
Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Conner _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Memo Short to Tavel
Re: Records Management
66-18966

ADDENDUM OF THE TRAINING DIVISION

JER:mlf my

7/6/64

Training Division agrees with views and recommendations of Files and Communications Division. As noted, same suggestion was previously considered at which time members of the Inspection Staff and General Investigative Division were opposed to its adoption. They believed the cards were not without value even though the source was no longer operable. The possibility always exists of reactivation at a later date and further, should the name of the individual come up subsequently in the course of investigative operations, it would be helpful to know he was once a source of information even in the absence of other identifying data.

RECOMMENDATION: That the idea not be adopted. On approval, no further action is necessary. Suggestion was credited to New York Office under the provisions of the Records Management Program.

[Handwritten signatures and initials over the recommendation text]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: September 24, 1964

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - CEN.
SUGGESTION #182-65 SUBMITTED BY
[redacted], TAMPA OFFICE

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

b6
b7c

SUGGESTION: That a form be prepared to be used as page one of the Justification Letter (quarterly progress letter) for Security Informants and Organizational Racial Informants as attached to suggestion.

CURRENT PRACTICE: Suggester states these paragraphs are typed into each Justification Letter as paragraphs 1, 11, 12, and 13 according to the Manual of Instructions, Volume IV, Section 107-N, (3), (b).

ADVANTAGES: [redacted] feels that, if these paragraphs did not have to be typed, five minutes or more would be saved in stenographic time for each letter. This in the Tampa Office would amount to more than two days time per year saved since at present there are 65 Security Informants, Potential Security Informants and Organizational Racial Informants. Supervisory time would also be saved in that these paragraphs would not have to be read each time before the letter is forwarded to the Seat of Government.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Santoiana, Tampa, felt suggestion was worthwhile and would save time. He recommended adoption.

The Domestic Intelligence Division acknowledged that time would be saved if this idea were adopted. However, the items which would appear on the pre-printed page are vital ones and can never be taken for granted. Preprinting would invite complacency wherein dictation of the items by the handling Agents provokes serious thought and sound reflection. In this instance, the Domestic Intelligence Division did not feel the easy way would be the best way and recommended against adoption.

Training Division agrees with the Domestic Intelligence Division. It is felt subject matter of the type which is included in the Justification Letter does not lend itself to a form and one is not warranted.

REC 37

14 SEP 28 1964

(ML:jmn
(3)

EX-103

1 - Bufile 66-2542-10
61 OCT 6 SEP 28 1964 XE.OA

CONTINUED - OVER

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2542-10
2542-10
2542-10

Memo Casper to Mohr
Re: Security Informants

Suggestion #182-65 Submitted by
[redacted] Tampa Office

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted. On approval, no further action is necessary with regard to the suggester as she was thanked by prior letter.

[Signature]
J.P. Mohr
FEB 17 1964

MHC:js

ADDENDUM: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE STREAMLINING COMMITTEE: RAM:gci 9/17/64

We acknowledge that time would be saved if this suggestion is adopted. However, the items which would appear on the preprinted page are vital ones and can never be taken for granted. Preprinting would invite complacency wherein dictation of the items by the handling Agents provokes serious thought and sound reflection.

In this instance, we do not feel the easy way is the best way and recommend against adoption.

From MBW WESB

mimeo Computer 9-24-64
9-24-64
ML:jmc -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *W.C.S.*

FROM : F. J. Baumgardner *F.J.B.*

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

DATE: 10/8/64

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
DeLoach _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of 1956, SAC Letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56 sets forth changes in policy and procedures which, among other things, permit the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative, Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. The authority in the SAC Letter does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field and the like.

The field submits progress letters under this program on a quarterly basis in June, September, December and March. The following is a tabulation summarizing the results of this program for the three months ending 8-31-64, the previous three months and the grand total from the inception of this program.

| | Three months ending 8-31-64 | Three months ending 5-31-64 | Total |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------|
| A. Number of Active Communist Contacted | 58 | 96 | 8092 |
| B. Number of other Individuals Contacted | 251 | 277 | 29097 |
| C. Results Number of Sources, PSIs and Informants Developed | 33 | 33 | 2833 |

The performance of each office in implementing this program is being followed closely. It was not necessary during the past months to transmit letters to any office regarding their activity under this program.

66-2542-3

X-14

REC-58

66-2542-3-1359
get 3
11 OCT 12 1964

JDD/fnh/ltl 345
(4)

67 OCT 15 1964

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

ACTION:

The program whereby individuals are interviewed upon SAC authority with certain exceptions has been of tremendous help to the field in sifting prospects for informant development.

It saves much correspondence and plays an important part in our efforts to obtain additional informant coverage on communist and related matters. Since it serves a definite worthwhile purpose, it is recommended that this program be continued. Another memorandum will be prepared upon receipt of the information from the field showing the progress of the program and reflecting the figures for the current quarter (ending 11-30-64), the preceding quarter and the grand total from the inception of the program.

*W
L
D*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: September 30, 1964

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT PROGRAMS
SUGGESTION #203-65 SUBMITTED BY
SA MIKE PETER TOPOUSIS
KANSAS CITY

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr *[initials]* _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

m3
Security Informants - General
SUGGESTION: In view of the upsurge in criminal activities and the current racial activities which subsequently necessitate more informant coverage for factual information, suggests a general program which is based on its flexibility. Its purpose is to fully and validly evaluate informants. This plan could be used as a training device in the informant field for new Agents assigned. Further consideration should be given to its use as a possible approach to a plan to combat Chinese Intelligence Activities or any other specialized activity. The larger field offices should consider this program on a borough or zone basis in contrast to other field offices when considering the plan on their assigned area as a whole. Suggests: (1) A separate squad in each office designated as the Informant Squad which would handle all informant classifications and would not handle any other classification except by Bureau authority. (2) Sets forth a formula for use in determining the number of Agents to be assigned to this special squad. (3) Qualifications for Agents assigned to this squad should be established by realistic interest in the informant field and substantiated by success in its application by Agent by past performance. (4) The Informant Squad would be decentralized and one desk would carry one informant classification and its subclassifications. Suggerster also goes into great detail concerning re-evaluation of informants, deadlines which would be set under various circumstances, et cetera.

CURRENT PRACTICE: Suggerster states it is the Agent's responsibility to identify prospective criminal informants and the development of prospective informants to the point where they will regularly contribute information to the Bureau.

66-2542-3-
ADVANTAGES: SA Topousis feels specialization will afford positive and prompt evaluation and exploitation of potential and developed informants. Agents within the field office can be assigned additional cases, inasmuch as their informant cases will be reassigned. Specialization will afford a device to train new Agents through practical experience. Suggerster states all new Agents will eventually have a specialty in this field. This program can be used for special cases.

NOT RECORDED

OCT 6 1964

ML:jmn
(2)

CONTINUED - OVER

6 1964

OCT 6 1964 *man*

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-2542-3-135

Memo Casper to Mohr
Re: Confidential Informant Programs
Suggestion #203-65 Submitted by
SA Mike Peter Topousa
Kansas City

DISADVANTAGES: Agents not on informant desk would not have the incentive to obtain potential informants.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Fitzgibbon, Kansas City, observed in his view the suggestion refers to matters that have been considered by the Bureau in the past and do not provide basis for any change in our current Criminal Informant Program. He recommended against adoption.

The Special Investigative Division concurred with SAC that suggestion not be adopted. It noted proposal would make the administration of the informants in each office a rigid procedure and the specialization would tend to remove the specialty squad Agents from the channels of information which give them information for discussion with informants. At present, the administrative setup in each office is left to each SAC depending upon office needs and this is the most practical method to handle this program. This suggestion would not be feasible in every office since offices vary widely in size and needs. It certainly does not have field-wide application.

The Domestic Intelligence Division was opposed since the majority of offices would not be in a position geographically, time-wise or manpower-wise to implement such a program. This general plan has been tried in larger field offices and the results have not justified recommendations that other smaller offices be included. The individual SACs, in the event they are not meeting Bureau's requirements in informant development, have existing authority to make necessary adjustments to allow for concentration on informant development by certain Agents without actually going through an unwieldy process of setting up a special squad with only its members committed to informant development. It is particularly necessary that Resident Agents be ever alert to development of informants and this proposed squad would certainly lessen a Resident Agent's incentive to obtain the best possible informant coverage.

Training Division agrees with the views of the other interested divisions. The plan as proposed is too complicated and as mentioned before too unwieldy to be of benefit to our operations at this time.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted. On approval, no further action is necessary with regard to the suggester as he was thanked by prior letter.

att
JF
- 2 -
MR
EPP

VIEWS OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION RE: SUGGESTION #203-65

ADDENDUM SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION 9-21-64 RJR:mlp:bsn

This suggests a separate informant squad in each field office handling all types of informants exclusively. Agents would be relieved of other assignments and placed on this squad based upon a complicated formula (ratio of average case load to needed informants). Each squad would have three desks handling criminal, security and racial informants. The potentials developed by Agents in the Office would be reassigned to the speciality squad; thereafter, informants would be contacted by two speciality squad Agents and one case Agent. A complicated system of contacts by the speciality squad as prompted by requests from case Agents would be utilized with deadlines for handling.

Special Investigative Division concurs with SAC that suggestion not be adopted. The suggestion would make the administration of the informants in each Office a rigid procedure and the specialization would tend to remove the speciality squad Agents from the channels of information which give them meat for discussion with informants. Presently the administrative set-up in each field office is left to each SAC depending upon office needs and this is the most practical way to handle the program. This suggestion would not be feasible in every office since offices vary widely in size and needs. It certainly does not have field-wide application.

Q

RP

ML

EGL

mlp: EPL
9-21-64
MLP

VIEWS OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION RE: SUGGESTION #203-65

ADDENDUM: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE STREAMLINING COMMITTEE: RAM:gci 9/23/64

We are opposed to this suggestion that separate squads be formed to handle development of criminal and racial informants in all field offices since majority of offices would not be in position geographically, time-wise or manpower-wise to implement such a program. This general plan has been tried in larger field offices and the results have not justified recommendations that other smaller offices be included. The individual SACs, in the event they are not meeting Bureau's requirements in informant development, have existing authority to make necessary adjustments to allow for concentration on informant development by certain Agents without actually going through an unwieldy process of setting up a special squad with only its members committed to informant development. It is particularly necessary that Resident Agents be ever alert to development of informants and this proposed squad would certainly lessen a Resident Agent's incentive to obtain the best possible informant coverage.

John
W.W.
W.H.

*Memo Dated 9/23/64
to [unclear]
9/23/64*

66-20342-3
September 21, 1964

PERSONAL

Mr. Mike Peter Topousis
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Kansas City, Missouri

REC'D--READING ROOM
SEP 21 1964
FBI

Dear Mr. Topousis:

1113
Thank you very much for the suggestion concerning procedures for use in handling certain matters of importance in our operations. This proposal is being carefully evaluated and I will let you know if it is adopted.

The interest and initiative which prompted you to give me the benefit of your thoughts on this matter are indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

MAILED 19

SEP 21 1964

COMM-FBI

2 - Kansas City 1 - Field personnel file
 1 - Suggestion file

1 - Personnel file of SA Mike Peter Topousis

NML:jmn

(6) (Suggestion #203-65 dated 9/7/64)

NOTE: Suggests a general program for use in regard to our informant programs. Separate squads would be formed in each office to handle all informant classifications and would not handle any other classification except by Bureau authority. Sets forth a formula for the number of Agents to be assigned to such a squad according to field office involved. Suggester sets forth rules to be followed in handling cases received in offices regarding informant matters.

2EB 51 4 JS 5W 2H

OCT 6 1964 *MHC* Referred to the Special Investigative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions for views and recommendations

elm

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ORIGINAL FILE IN

#203-65

Date

9/7/64

| | | |
|----------------------|--|---|
| To: Director, FBI | From: (Suggerer's name) MIKE PETER TOPOUSIS | Division of Assignment KANSAS CITY (General) |
|----------------------|--|---|

SUGGESTION

In view of the upsurge in criminal activities and the current racial activities which subsequently necessitate more informant coverage for factual information, the following informant program is herein suggested. This program by no means infers or implies inadequacy in the present program, which has proven successful, but is rather a program to be used as an alternate plan to accelerate procurement of informants and to train Agents in this field. Field offices feeling that specialized acuity in the informant sphere is a pragmatic necessity should utilize this plan.

The general program herein suggested is based on its flexibility. Its purpose is to fully and validly evaluate informants; to

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

It is the Agent's responsibility to identify prospective criminal informants and the development of prospective informants to the point where they will regularly contribute information to the Bureau.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (Include basis for estimate)

Specialization will afford positive and prompt evaluation and exploitation of potential and developed informants. Agents within the field office can be assigned additional cases, inasmuch as their informant cases will be reassigned. Specialization will afford a device to train new Agents through practical experience. Eventually all new Agents will have a specialty in this field. This program can be used for special cases.

EX-1 PROOF

Disadvantages of suggestion

Agents not on informant desk would not have the incentive to procure potential informants.

66-2542-3
NOT RECORDED

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for a justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss

Signature and Title of Suggerer SA

Recommendations and comments of Division Head It is my view the suggestion refers to matters that have been considered by the Bureau in the past and do not provide basis for any change in our current Criminal Informant Program. The suggestion is not recommended.

H. A. FITZGIBBON Signature and Title SAC

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

1. Lofack
9-21-64
H. A. FITZGIBBON
7 SEP 1964
TWO

SUGGESTION (Cont'd)

develop these potentials promptly and with the thoroughness needed to fully exploit the developed informant.

This plan conjunctively could be used as a training device in the informant field for new Agents assigned.

Further consideration should be given to this program as a possible approach to a plan to combat the present and future CHINESE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES as set out in SAC Letter dated 1/28/64, or any other specialized activity.

It could be said that a disadvantage in this program would be that Agents not on the informant desk would not have the incentive to procure potential informants. This factor can be offset by maintaining the requirements that each Agent will constantly maintain a certain amount of potential informants and as one is procured credit will be given as a case opened and closed when reassigned to the informant desk, as set out below.

The larger field offices, such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco should consider this program on a borough or zone basis in contrast to the other field offices, considering the plan on their assigned area as a whole.

- I. (A) A separate squad will be formed in each field office which shall be designated as the Informant Squad. This desk shall handle all informant classifications.
- (B) The Informant Squad will not handle any other classification, except by Bureau authority.
- (C) Formula for the number of Special Agents to be assigned to the Informant Squad will be as follows:

$$A * P = N$$

A = Field office average case load per Agent, including RA's.

P = Field office minimum potential informant (in any informant classification, PCI, PSI, etc.) that each Special Agent is required to carry.

SUGGESTION (Cont'd)

N = One Special Agent for N answer. (This should be rounded off to the nearest multiple of five.)

Example: Average case load - 35 cases per Agent.

Minimum potential informant requirement for each Agent - three (3)

$$A = 35$$

$$P = 3$$

35 divided by 3 is equal to 11+ or 10

N = For every 10 Agents in the field office one (1) Agent will be assigned to the informant Squad.

- (D) Qualifications for Agents assigned to the Informant Squad shall be pre-empted by realistic interest in the informant field, substantiated by success in its application by the Agent by past performance.

- II. (A) The Informant Squad will be decentralized and one desk will carry one (1) informant classification and its subclassifications. Therefore, three (3) desks will be assigned within the squad, (1) Criminal, (2) Security, (3) Racial. The larger field offices may wish to assign a fourth desk for Special Problems. The number of Agents assigned to each desk will be based on the load of the informant classification heaviest within the division, etc.
- (B) Duties of each desk in the Informant Squad will be to immediately assume responsibility of all their respective informant classification presently in pending status.
- (1) Will, with the Agent who originally was assigned the case, interview the potential informant and re-evaluate the potential for development and exploitation. (All these cases should be completed within six months after the new desk is assigned, subject to extenuating circumstances, which shall be approved by the SAC.)

SUGGESTION (Cont'd)

- (2) All new informant cases which should be opened by all Agent personnel and properly accredited and subsequently assigned to the informant desk, shall follow the same procedure as set out in (1) above and should be covered within 30 days in headquarters, 45 days in RA's.
- (3) Will within 30 days headquarters city, 45 days RA's after the first interview contact the approved potential informant singly, evaluate, develop and direct.
- (4) When the informant has related sufficient information, justifying symbol or full development status, he will be contacted by two (2) Agents from the same informant desk and one (1) Agent from the squad the informant's coverage predominates or is assigned to.
- (C) If the informant after three interviews has not furnished any information, this case will be closed administratively. This will not preclude opening the same potential upon receiving realistic information.
- (D) The informant desk will assign by paper the developed informant to the squads handling the predominate classification of the informant.
 - (1) The developed informant shall be interviewed by the Informant Desk Agent as the exigencies of his services are needed and with coverage at least every 30 days headquarters city, 45 RA's.
- (E) All squads within the division shall direct their request for informant information to the informant desk which shall be answered within 15 days headquarters city and 15 days RA's, unless requested sooner.
- (F) All information received from all informants shall be directed to the respective desks within 5 days.
- (G) All policies concerning informants, specifically monies, forms, justifications for full development, shall remain the same as set out in the Manual of Instructions. All policies set out herein shall be changed accordingly.

SUGGESTION (Cont'd)

Current practice on rule: (Cont'd)

Manual of Instructions, Volume 4, Section 108, A-D.

There are no existing instructions as to which squad or desk shall handle the informant program and it is generally assigned to a desk handling case classifications which include the informant classification.

SAC, Chicago (66-4461)

November 4, 1964

Director, FBI (66-3482)

EX-100

REC-42 66-2542-3-1360.

~~SECURITY INFORMANT COVERAGE
OF ORGANIZATIONS AND
INFORMATION FORM~~

Reurlet 10/22/64 requesting authority for the use of a form in security informant coverage of organizations.

Proposed form is approved providing it is used as a temporary administrative device, is not placed in file, and is destroyed after the preparation of the semiannual letter to the Bureau. The Bureau should be advised of the decision of the Chicago Office. If the form is to be used, two copies properly numbered should be forwarded to the Bureau for the attention of the Forms Management Desk, Training Division, and a copy placed in the appropriate section of the FBI Form Book in the Chicago Office.

1 - Domestic Intelligence Division, Att.: Mr. Donohue, 815 RB
(sent direct)

1 - Inspection Division, Att.: Mr. Neagle, 5252 (sent direct)

(6 copies)

fk

NOTE: Based on review and recommendations of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Inspection Division. It appears unnecessary to duplicate information in the organizational file when a similar pattern of information is included in the required semiannual letter submitted to the Bureau, copy of which is filed in the informant file. Proposed procedure of Chicago Office provided that executed form should be filed in the organizational file.

MAILED 2

NOV - 4 1964

COMM-FBI

Wilson _____
Mont _____
Fach _____
Dasper _____
Callahan _____
Conted _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

60 NOV 64 ROB [REDACTED] TELETYPE UNIT [REDACTED]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (66-4461)

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS ^{here} COVERAGE
OF ORGANIZATIONS AND
INFORMATION FORM

ATTN: TRAINING DIVISION

DATE: 10/22/64

There are attached hereto ten copies of a form concerning security informant coverage of organizations prepared by the Chicago Division for which authority is sought for use from the Bureau.

It is felt that this form would provide uniformity and detail in providing necessary information required by the Bureau in connection with its semi-annual security informant coverage of organizations letter. Through the utilization of this form, the agent correlating the over-all security informant coverage picture of organizations would have this information available in uniform form and it would greatly assist in preparing this detailed letter. The form itself would be blockstamped and placed in the organizational file and it would readily available for inspection. It would also enable the supervisor or other agents reviewing the organization file to readily obtain pertinent data in one page for use in contacts with informants concerning information on the organization.

If Bureau approval is granted, a form number will be assigned.

② - Bureau (Enc. 10)
1 - Chicago

CNF:mec
(3).

10. ENCL¹⁰


If suggestions can and Capital Resources be
offered, but we should first determine why
the suggested forms may not be suitable
such as the information
RECD EX-100 REC'D 66-2542-3136
WCS/KP NOV 5 1964

RECOMMENDATION OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION JTN:wmj 11/2/64

The proposed form has merit as a ready reference for the supervisor or other Agent as well as the case Agent re pertinent data during the 6-month period between semiannual letters. It would also provide uniformity and required detail in the preparation of the letter.

Since the data is transferred to the letter there appears to be little reason to retain the form in each organizational file, after the letter is written, since the information is available in the letter. Comparison of the proposed form and the semiannual letter indicates the requested information is in substantially the same detail.

If the suggested form is adopted for the use of the Chicago Office, it is recommended that it be established as a temporary administrative device which will be destroyed after the preparation of the semiannual letter.

A handwritten signature consisting of stylized, cursive initials, possibly "J.W.", written in black ink.

CG-

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

M E M O R A N D U M

TO : SAC

DATE:

FROM : ASAC

SUBJECT:

If the above title is not correct, please give correct title here: _____

The agent to whom the above captioned organization is assigned is requested to indicate herein the following information:

(A) A breakdown of the above captioned organization into the Divisions and units thereof, such as clubs, committees and chapters in the Chicago Division Territory, and their locations:

(B) If membership organization, list the approximate membership of each sub-division:

(C) The symbol numbers and positions of live security informants who are members. Where no live security informant coverage exists or where coverage is provided by informants or sources who are not members, such information should also be set forth:

THIS MEMO SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY
AND ROUTED TO THE ASAC'S SECRETARY.

66-2542-3-1360

ENCLOSURE